Brexit will only increase the threat from organised crime
Everything has changed because of the coronavirus, and crime is no exception. Criminals have adapted to the pandemic, and this isn’t the only major challenge facing the police and security services. The appointment of a new national security adviser, and our imminent Brexit, also complicate the efforts of those working to keep us safe.
Covid-19 means fewer flights, ferry crossings and movement in general, making the trafficking of drugs and
people more exposed to discovery by the security services. On the other hand, there are new opportunities for organised crime: black markets in personal protective equipment (PPE); fraudulent health products; and counterfeit medicines and snake-oil sales schemes. They all have obvious potential for exploitation, as does the problem of personnel shortages in health services. Meanwhile, illicit drugs have already been discovered hidden in consignments of much-needed PPE. The trend to commit crime via the internet will also be further enhanced.
Intelligence about the changing nature of criminality has always been important, but as the pace of that change increases, it is vital. The departure of Sir Mark Sedwill as head of the civil service is not wholly a shock, given the briefings against him over recent months. More significant, though, is his replacement as national security adviser with David Frost, the prime minister’s Brexit adviser who will remain as chief Brexit negotiator. As face-to-face negotiations restart, attention will return to the way in which security and police cooperation will be affected.
The UK has always been an outlier in European justice and home affairs policy, but the ability and skill of the country’s detectives has always been admired – as is the British policy of policing by consent. This has led to an assumption among British negotiators that the EU will have to give the UK something in exchange for our continued cooperation.
UK negotiators in the Brexit talks are critically underestimating the nature and complexity of criminal networks and not taking into account the differences in legal and policing procedures
They know that without this, there is a possibility that after Brexit the UK will become an offshore haven for transnational criminals because extradition will be problematic and money laundering easier. The UK will expect cooperation from the rest of Europe in finding and returning its offenders, while possibly refusing or delaying the extradition and provision of evidence to police and judicial authorities outside its borders. The country will become attractive to people smugglers because stronger border controls will enable them to put their prices up.
UK negotiators in the Brexit talks are confident that the country will still cooperate with the EU in justice and home affairs through mutual legal-aid agreements that will lead to the arrest and prosecution of criminals. They are critically underestimating the nature and complexity of cross-border criminal networks, however, and not taking into account the differences in legal and policing procedures (unlike many EU nations, UK investigators and politicians favour disruption over prosecution, arguing that prosecution takes too long and that juries tend not to understand complex cases and therefore acquit).
People working in the intelligence and security services want to share data with their counterparts in other countries after Brexit. UK politicians are uncomfortable with this because it means UK security activity would be supervised by the European courts; although they might be happy to look at data from EU countries, they are much less happy to have investigators from those countries accessing UK data. The EU itself is, of course, very suspicious of UK data-protection law and procedures. That the Home Office failed to admit the wrongful storage of data from EU databases and the sharing of such data with the US (and probably the rest of the “Five Eyes”) strengthened this suspicion.
If there is lack of reciprocity, it is likely that continental investigators will give a low priority to requests for assistance from UK security and intelligence. Requests to Interpol for information are unlikely to run as smoothly as European Arrest Warrants and European Information Orders – unless there is to be significant
UK investment in technology and personnel into the world policing organisation first.
Exclusion from the Schengen database, which collects information on people’s movements across European borders, is likely after Brexit and this will increase the response time for UK requests for intelligence and access to alerts on individuals. The UK is already excluded from access to the Schengen Information System for immigration alerts.
The UK is likely to be able to negotiate access to the Secure Information Network Exchange Application (Siena), as the USA and Australia already have, but Siena has nowhere near the capabilities of the Schengen Information System. It should be possible for the UK to participate in joint investigative teams, as third countries are sometimes invited to join a particular case – but, of course, that is subject to judicial supervision under the law of the lead country. It is certainly unlikely that the UK would be ever be allowed to lead a joint investigative team.
If there is one certainty, it is that police officers will always try to find a way to work together and that politicians will have to legislate to legalise their operation if it leads to successful penetration of criminal networks.
Information and intelligence will always be exchanged informally. The problem is turning such exchanges into evidence that can be used in court – which is why justice and home affairs policy exists.
Bill Tupman is a terrorism and organised crime consultant. He is visiting professor of criminal justice at BPP University, a research fellow at Anglia Ruskin University and university fellow at the University of Exeter