IDF admits to failures in botched Gaza operation
SECONDS in Gaza made the difference between a botched mission with one casualty and a crisis of national proportions on November 11 last year.
For the first time, the IDF High Command published findings from its investigation into the high-profile failure of an intelligence operation in Gaza.
The investigation, which was carried out by eight teams including high-ranking IDF officers and representatives of other Israeli intelligence organisations, found a number of failings in the planning and operational stages but also commended the quick thinking and bravery of the commandos on the ground, as well as the crew of the evacuation helicopter, who succeeded in extricating the team.
The report was released to the media heavily redacted: it did not mention the objective of the mission or the names of the units involved, save to say they were from the Intelligence Branch’s Special Operations Division.
According to statements by Hamas, which captured some of the equipment the team were carrying in two civilian vehicles that were stopped in Khan Yunis in the Gaza Strip, the team’s objective had been to attach listening devices to Hamas communication networks.
The Israeli report says the team aroused the suspicion of Hamas members and were stopped and questioned for 45 minutes. When two of the team’s members were ordered out of their van, the commander on the ground decided there was no choice but to open fire. Lieutenant-Colonel M, one of the members outside the van, acted to distract the Hamas men, and the commander opened fire, followed by other members of the team.
Five or six of the Hamas men were killed but M was also hit and killed by friendly fire, and another member of the team severely wounded.
The firefight lasted 90 seconds, after which Israeli commandos sped away, radioing for an evacuation helicopter. It arrived within 15 minutes, landing in a built-up area inside the Gaza Strip. To block more Hamas forces from impeding the extraction, fighter aircraft attacked targets around the landing area.
Hamas claims the Israeli team entered Gaza with some personnel using false identities of members of international aid organisations. The IDF would not comment on the actual nature of the cover stories but acknowledged that they may not have been sufficiently prepared and, as a result, the commandos were over-confident.
Other acknowledged planning failures included the amount of information the team on the ground had to deal with during the operation.
There were also “micro-tactical” mistakes which contributed to the force arousing suspicion and being detained.
Senior IDF officers stressed that the professionalism of the soldiers on the ground and the pilots of the evacuation helicopter ensured that the team, with Lt Col M’s body and the critically wounded commando, were out of Gaza 20 minutes after the first shot was fired.
The results could have been much worse: some of Israel’s most experienced special operators could have been captured by Hamas.
In the months since, the Special Operations Division has carried out similar missions including inside Gaza. Operational and organisational changes have been made with the division and a number of senior officers, including the division commander Brigadier G, have been replaced.
He decided there was no choice but to open fire’ The team was out of the Gaza Strip within 20 minutes’