Israel’s response must not cost it the support of its Arab neighbours
LAST WEEKEND’S Iranian attacks on Israel were a total contrast to the regime’s previous extreme caution in responding to Israel and risking a confrontation with the United States.
It had been faced with a major dilemma after Israel’s assassination of Hasan Mahdavi, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Syria.
The regime had the choice of a moderate response, which would weaken the perception of Iranian deterrence; or a more extreme one, which could escalate the conflict. The Iranian leadership chose the latter. It is clear that Iran now wants to respond directly rather than using its proxies. From its perspective, relying on proxies would be a sign of military weakness and risks exposing them – especially Hezbollah – to an overwhelming Israeli response.
In that context, it appears that Sunday was not just about revenge. It was a crunch moment for Tehran. The regime calculated that without an eye-catching attack, its ability to deter future strikes – either against overseas interests or against Iran itself – would be severely undermined.
But despite Tehran’s readiness for retaliation and escalation, the Iranian leadership is not preparing for a fullscale war. They are still constrained by concerns of a possible entanglement with US forces in the Gulf and a reluctance to sacrifice Hezbollah. It seems that after Sunday’s retaliation, the Iranian leadership wants to end the current conflict without being dragged into a direct and prolonged confrontation with Israel.
With the spectacular attack on Israel executed, the ball is now back in Jerusalem’s court.
Those who know the Middle East well know that Israel’s need to respond to Iran goes much further than last weekend’s attack. While the Islamic Republic may not have been fully appraised of all the details of Hamas’s October 7 plans, the military and financial assistance Iran has provided to Hamas – as well as the support of the Shiite militias, instructed by Iran since the start of the war in Gaza – show Iran’s overall responsibility.
However, an extreme Israeli response such as a direct strike on Iranian soil could lead to a spiralling escalation and perhaps all-out war. While Iran is seeking to avoid an escalation, it would certainly respond to an open attack on its territory.
Such a move by Israel could also undermine its ability to achieve its primary goals of destroying Hamas and securing the release of the hostages.
Moreover, it would open a Pandora’s box that could draw in Hezbollah and force the IDF to shift its focus to Iran’s proxies right across the northern fronts. This would have dramatic and far-reaching implications for Israel’s defence establishment, its citizens and the economy – which is gradually recovering from October 7 – as well as international support, which has diminished since the conflict began. That means considering a response that halts the current exchange.
The recent attack has also shown the importance of working within a coalition to take on Iran. Hitting the regime in a way that counters the US position and undermines the willingness of Arab neighbours to help defend the Jewish state – as they did last weekend – would be counterproductive when it comes to Israel’s future security.