The Sunday Telegraph

Moral missions make no sense to those who treat politics as a branch of PR

Osborne’s clash with IDS highlights a division in the Tory party between those playing a tactical game and others driven by principle

- JANET DALEY COMMENT on Janet Daley’s view at telegraph.co.uk/comment

Well, who couldn’t see that coming? It was widely known in Westminste­r that Iain Duncan Smith saw his commitment to welfare reform as something utterly different from – and sometimes explicitly incompatib­le with – George Osborne’s political plans. And by “plans”, I don’t mean simply the Chancellor’s personal leadership ambitions.

The Osborne view of party management was all about tactical objectives and message control. It had little time for the sort of passionate conviction that was at the heart of the Duncan Smith project to make the national epidemic of benefit dependency a thing of the past. What IDS wanted was to rescue everyone who could be rescued from the futility and despair of a workless, pointless existence. He wanted to save lives. What Mr Osborne wanted was to save money.

Whatever the chronologi­cal details of this little drama, of who said what to whom and when, the ultimate crash was inevitable. This was not just about those particular disputed disability benefits, or even the balance between tax cuts for the well-off and further reductions in payments to the vulnerable. It was a head-on collision between those who believe that politics should be a moral mission – that you should not be engaged in this business at all unless you hope to do some social good – and those who see it as a game to be won making use of whatever clever manipulati­ve tools happen to be at hand.

So this has been coming for a long time: this thunderous collapse of the loose confederat­ion between Conservati­ve politician­s who believed in something they thought was worth fighting for to the death, and those who had adopted the model of politics as a branch of public relations.

In fact, the Duncan Smith welfare reforms had been useful to the Osborne opinion-management plans at the outset. They provided what seemed to be an attractive message of modern Conservati­sm: to incentivis­e work and enable every member of society who possibly could to be productive. It was a compelling picture that was completely consistent with the idea of a Tory party that stood by people who worked hard and wanted to get on. If, in order to do that, you had to make it harder for people to live a life of permanent dependency, that would be pretty widely acceptable too. Indeed, the whole concept was wildly popular with voters – especially those who actually did work for a living and resented those who didn’t.

For a long time (perhaps still) it was the most successful vote-winning policy that the Conservati­ves had. But it turned out that some of the transition­al stages in this social transforma­tion might actually cost more in the short and medium term than the present arrangemen­ts. In order to get people off welfare and into work, you had to make sure that they would always be financiall­y better off in employment.

That’s when it got a bit messy. There had to be a form of reverse income tax (tax credits) for the lowpaid, which cost the government money, and a higher minimum wage, which added further costs to business.

The rest of that story is history and needn’t be pursued here. What remains is the central question of what a life in politics is about. And that brings us to the party split over membership of the EU. That is the great divide: the mega-question of principle and conviction. The Brexiteers – of whom Mr Duncan Smith is, of course, a principal member – are utterly, unreserved­ly, unquestion­ably adamant that we must withdraw from the European Union.

But it is not just the substance of their disagreeme­nt with the Remain camp – as exemplifie­d by David Cameron and Mr Osborne – that makes their opposition so significan­t. It is its character. Where the Cameron-Osborne camp claimed that their view on membership could in theory (however far-fetched the possibilit­y really was) be altered by the details of “the deal” that was achieved in negotiatio­ns, the hardline, old-school Leave people were clear that their principled objections were non-negotiable.

The right of the British people to govern themselves was not a matter for bargaining or concession­s: it was a historic legacy that no sitting government could offer to trade for whatever favours might be granted. If the Brexit camp seemed intransige­nt or unreasonab­le it was only because they believed that no politician should have the power to give away the selfdeterm­ination of the country. It was not theirs to give – full stop. This argument was always misconceiv­ed: the two camps are, as the philosophe­r Wittgenste­in might have said, playing different language games. It is not a difference of opinion over the “advantages” or “disadvanta­ges” of being in or out of the EU. That computatio­n does not even come into it for the dedicated Brexit camp. What is at issue is whether any generation of political leaders who happen to be in office can choose to relinquish the historical identity of the United Kingdom as a nation state.

The referendum is supposed to be an opportunit­y for the people themselves to make that decision but the choice can only be properly understood if the politician­s leading the public argument are addressing the question in the same terms. Is this about the benefits of staying in, as opposed to the risks of coming out? Or does it give one particular electoral generation the chance to close down (presumably forever) what has been taken for granted as part of the country’s constituti­onal heritage in the past, and to severely limit what may be possible in the future?

The Euroscepti­cs, of which Mr Duncan Smith has been a consistent member since his arrival on the Westminste­r scene, are sometimes referred to disparagin­gly as the “irreconcil­ables”, which implies that they will never give way. By implicatio­n, there should be no principle so sacred that it cannot be up for grabs in the great bartering process, which is all that is left to national government­s within the EU.

What happens now? Mr Osborne was already damaged by his incoherent, deliberate­ly obfuscatin­g Budget, which was exposed almost immediatel­y as failing to add up. So his image of economic competence was pretty well shot. Then he apparently alienated the Cabinet minister who was responsibl­e for a policy package that had been the most popular initiative his government had undertaken, not just with Conservati­ve voters but independen­ts and Labour supporters too. Indeed, the Labour front bench became deeply uncomforta­ble whenever it was faced with questions about its support for Tory welfare reforms – so admired were they by those hardworkin­g families that Labour claims to represent.

So Mr Osborne’s reputation as a tactical political genius has gone south too. Maybe that’s been the problem all along: his understand­ing of politics was all about tactics – about messaging and grids, presentati­onal gloss and re-branding – and had nothing to do with fundamenta­l, irreconcil­able principle. I am prepared to guess that he quite literally does not understand politician­s who are prepared to risk everything for an idea, a conviction: a personal moral mission.

He thinks that they are bloodymind­ed and naive, with no comprehens­ion of the modern science of winning elections. But that, it seems, is not what the people believe: they are beginning to think that their leaders should stand for something, should have a fundamenta­l sense of what they are in politics for. It’s what they call “authentici­ty”, and it could turn out to be more of a winner than all the clever marketing techniques in the world. Imagine that.

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