Eurocrats don’t want the UK to be reasonable – they want it to be subservient

There were good and honourable arguments for staying in the EU. There are no arguments – none – for extending the transition period.

Some former Remainers – including, to his credit, Keir Starmer – recognise the difference. Although they fought tooth and nail to overturn the referendum result, they grasp that keeping Britain in a long transition, with all the obligations of membership and none of the rights, is a different proposition.

But, of course, politics is a tribal business. The prolonged culture war that followed the referendum has conditioned many Europhiles to demand an extension, not because it would bring benefits, but they hate everything associated with Brexit. The Lib Dem, Green, SNP, Plaid and SDLP leaders have pleaded with the EU to drag things out.

The EU, naturally, has jumped at that suggestion. Michel Barnier floated it again on Friday. From his point of view, keeping Britain as a non-voting member is the best of all worlds. Brussels officials even proposed – as though making a generous concession – that Britain could be excluded from the EU budget during any extension, paying a lump sum instead.

In truth, Britain will never agree to a prolongation, for five good reasons.

First, every Conservative MP was elected on a manifesto that promised, “we will not extend the implementation period beyond December 2020”.

Second, that commitment was enshrined in statute.

Third, the dynamic has shifted since the general election. Theresa May’s desire to remain close to the EU made her the demandeuse. But now it is the EU that wants closer alignment, while the UK simply wants a standard trade deal. A no-deal outcome is far closer to Britain’s preferred position than to the EU’s.

Fourth, British negotiators know that the EU’s position will not change with time. What Britain is asking for is a basic, off-the-peg free trade agreement, every element of which has some precedent in the EU’s existing accords with third countries. The EU will either agree to that or it won’t. If it doesn’t agree now, it won’t shift its ground later.

Fifth, the coronavirus closures have overtaken what would otherwise have been the chief costs to Britain of a no-deal outcome. We are no longer worried about queues at Dover. The Government knows that the economic recovery will require shock therapy. There will be changes to our taxes, our regulations, our supply lines, our consumer habits. That is the moment to make changes to our trade policy, too.

My sense is that Michel Barnier knows all this. Hence his unwontedly testy language and his attempt to put the ball back into Britain’s court by saying, in effect: “If you want a close trade deal with us, you must pay for it.” This is an odd way to look at trade deals – as though they were bestowed from kindness rather than sought from self-interest.

But, rather than wheedling, the British negotiators, who know that the EU has a structural trade surplus with the UK, simply said: “Fine, then, if a close trade deal comes with strings attached, how about a looser trade deal? If you truly believe that we are somehow trying to get privileged access to your markets while enjoying a competitive advantage, go ahead and raise some tariffs.”

That offer seems to have annoyed Brussels negotiators even more. They don’t want Britain to be reasonable; they want it to be subservient. Throughout the process, their objective has been, not to maximise the prosperity of their citizens, but to retain a measure of suzerainty over a breakaway province. Given what we now see of their attitude, perhaps a deal was never on the cards.