Ukraine shows the future of modern warfare

Ben Wallace should pay close attention to events that may be a turning point in how we win wars

In an address to the National Army Museum earlier this month, the Defence Secretary Ben Wallace gave a fascinating view of the present state, and possible future, of military power. Though he focussed on Ukraine, he also gave some tantalising hints about where the UK might be moving next.

Wallace painted a picture of a Russian army that was “rotten” from top to bottom, with demoralised rank-and-file troops and a class of “failing” generals, whose planning, if that word could even be used, left their men helpless against fierce Ukrainian resistance. Corruption and inefficiency were ubiquitous, from soldiers selling their vehicles’ fuel for extra cash, to expensive and vital logistics vehicles being poorly maintained. All of this contributed to an enormous strategic failure at the Battle of Kyiv.

Such basic lessons should hopefully be irrelevant to UK armed forces, but the Defence Secretary also discussed weapons and technology, and it is here that things get interesting. He spoke of the Russian army as a fighting force rooted in heavy, almost unthinking, firepower. Instead of using the high-tech weaponry many anticipated, Russia revealed itself to be a Second World War force – and a primitive one at that. Unable to deploy their heavy armour and artillery properly, they resorted to “indiscriminate barrages” that failed to convert their greater numbers into a victorious situation.

Wallace’s praise for the Ukrainians was also noteworthy. Alongside their moral superiority, he singled out their success in using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to observe and attack the unprepared Russians. The Defence Secretary also seemed to reiterate this preference for UAVs and against traditional heavy forces at another conference this month. Asked whether the UK should use the lessons of Ukraine to rebuild a large British land army (ours has suffered major reductions in personnel, equipment and funding over the past decade) he demurred. When asked what he would do with the promised greater defence funding he exclaimed: “Would I triple the size of the Army? No.” Instead he reiterated the value of UAVs.

The Defence Secretary’s instincts not to recreate a large land army may prove controversial, but they are eminently reasonable in light of recent events. Many initially believed that the Ukraine war had reinforced the tank’s value on the battlefield, but severe Russian heavy vehicle losses have undermined this assumption. Instead, we are seeing the value of range attack. As the Russians, with their heavy but ultimately short-range force, have shown, it is very difficult to move forward into the face of a modern army which has a system of different ranged defences at its disposal.

All of this means that if the UK military does receive significant new funding, focussing on soldier numbers and heavy land vehicles could be the riskier, retrograde choice. It would be far better to take some time to try and understand what has happened in Ukraine before investing. Poor spending choices will merely entrench the vested interests defending armed forces that Britain no longer needs, which will ultimately make her a less influential Nato and European partner.

Other militaries, including the Chinese government, are thought to be setting time aside to learn the lessons of this war to evaluate their own strategy. Events in Ukraine might well be a turning point in modern warfare, the moment it became clear just how difficult it is for all but the most dominant military powers to suppress defensive firepower. Taking stock might be a risky political move for Ben Wallace, but in the long run it would be far more shrewd.

Poor spending choices will merely entrench the vested interests defending armed forces that Britain no longer needs