PORSCHE IN THE USA
Today it’s one of the company’s most lucrative territories, but Porsche’s Stateside beginnings are much more humble. Total 911 looks back to where it all started in 1950…
It was when the Gmünd Coupe arrived in the USA that sales really took off. One of the surprises of the 1948 Geneva Show was an open two-seater from Porsche, previously known only as an automotive engineer. Once production started, these cars were quickly lapped up: Swiss hillclimbers and VW importers Ben Pon in the Netherlands and D’ieteren in Brussels also took an interest. But it was the entrepreneurial Viennese Max Hoffman, a pre-war motorcycle racer and now a New York car dealer, who really saw the Porsche’s potential. In 1950 he imported three Coupes. Ferry Porsche was happy initially simply to have an outlet in the US. But Hoffman was much more ambitious: the 30 cars sold in the USA in 1951 became 600 in 1952 and Hoffman had no hesitation in telling Ferry what his cars needed to appeal to Americans. This marked the beginning of an American influence on Porsche and one result was the rapid development of the 1.5-litre engine from the original 1,131cc unit. Ferry took Hoffman seriously and despatched one of his right-hand men, Herbert Linge, to manage customer service, soon joined by another Porsche stalwart, Rolf Wütherich. Hoffman, who also imported Mercedes, Jaguar and later BMW, understood US tastes – he had Porsche redesign the dash with a prominent rev counter, and at his suggestion Ferry sketched what would become that great Porsche identity symbol, the Porsche crest. Pressure from Hoffman led to the 1954 Speedster, a minimal-equipment roadster which sold 5,000 examples in four years; another Viennese expatriate John von Neumann did for the West Coast what Hoffman achieved on the East. Von Neumann was also a racer and sold the 1500RS (which Hoffman told Ferry to brand ‘Spyder’, more enticing than a set of figures). Richie Ginther cut his teeth on a von Neumann car and other racers improved the output of the flat fours. Chevrolet engineer Zora Arkusduntov, who raced the works 1500RS at Le Mans in 1954-5, persuaded Ferry of the virtues of anti-roll bars and to create a skid pan, which would lead to the establishment of Weissach. By 1959, the US was taking 40% of all Porsches – Germany came next with 23% – and the company set up its US subsidiary, Porsche of America Corporation.
If in the 1950s Porsche learned to understand American preferences, as the 911 took over from the 356C, a bigger challenge was posed by federal regulators. Following Ralph Nader’s infamous
Unsafe At Any Speed it appeared that open cars could be banned. In the climate of uncertainty, Porsche designed the famous Targa Top, creating an enduringly successful 911 derivative; the Sportomatic transmission, introduced with the US in mind, found a greater following however in Europe. North American requirements would lead to the creation of two types of 911: the US version and the Rest of World (ROW) model. Initially the differences were detail, like the famous US eyebrow headlamps, but became more complex when catalytic converters became mandatory. For 30 years, harsher emissions controls would deprive Americans of a succession of the fastest Porsches, beginning with the 2.7 RS, built only as a ROW car; on the other hand, the controversial impact bumpers designed to meet US 5mph crash regulations quickly became part of the 911’s character. However, concerns in the early 1970s over the rear-engined 911’s continued acceptability in the US led to the development of the front-engine 928, a futuristic car which from any other manufacturer might have been an unqualified success, but at Porsche would always play second fiddle to the 911. Porsche began the 1980s with a new American CEO, Peter Schutz, who would wave the flag enthusiastically for Porsche in the States, and in taking advantage of the US dollar’s strength Porsche would quadruple its sales over five years. But the company then suffered its worst ever recession when the American market (now over half Porsche’s total sales) collapsed and by 1990, the company was only just solvent. Porsche’s US woes seemed unending: withdrawal from the CART to concentrate on F1 caused acrimony and the refusal of US customs to allow import of the 959, for which clients had paid hefty deposits, was a humiliating setback and contributed to the premature termination of the 959.
After being deprived of the Turbo until 1987, once again US customers were disappointed not to be able to get their hands on the 964 RS or 993 RS (neither Us-crash tested). However, a specific Us-only 911, the RS America, was created, thanks partly to Vic Elford, doing much to boost otherwise lacklustre 964 sales. However, the return of Wendelin Wiedeking in 1991 would mark a steady upturn, the first tangible fruit of this being the acclaimed 993 followed by the Boxster, which was an instant success Stateside. By 2001 Porsche was homologating models for over 70 markets and the old ROW/US distinctions had lost relevance. Nevertheless, US enthusiasts could not import the 996 GT3 until 2004 – the last time Porsche’s most important market would be deprived of a 911 derivative. The decision to build the Cayenne – Porsche needed to diversify and the SUV market was eight times bigger than the sports car market – went ahead only after wholesale support in the US for a Porsche SUV was confirmed. Strong sales there (the Cayenne outsold the 911 by 3:1) assured the continuity of Porsche’s sports cars.
After 50 years as Porsche’s main outlet, some years taking up to 55% of production, the US yielded to China in 2016 as Porsche’s largest market. Here demand was prestige-led, the concept of the sports car as yet undeveloped, and it was no coincidence that 40% of Panameras found homes in China. However, over four decades Porsche’s US sales were crucial in allowing the company to continue to develop the 911 and later the mid-engined cars, and America provided the basis for its 21st century model diversification. Without the US, Porsche would probably not have survived as an independent concern; in today’s market, it is hard to imagine China, or any other individual territory, could
ever wield such influence.