CLIPPER MAN OVERBOARD
Following the tragic loss of Simon Speirs in the 2017-18 Clipper Race, we look through the findings and speak to the family
What really happened and what’s been learned
The Maritime Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) has released its findings into the fatal loss of Simon Speirs during leg 3 of the 2017-18 Clipper Race from Cape Town to Fremantle during a headsail change.
The wide-ranging and thorough report, has taken 18 months to compile and lists the circumstances surrounding the accident and the Branch’s findings including, but not limited to: criticism of boat and equipment maintenance; difficulty changing headsails in heavy weather; and crew fatigue. Arguably most damning for the race owner, Clipper Ventures, are the statements about recommendations made to the company following previous incidents, which it said were not implemented. To read the report in full visit www.yachtingmonthly.com.
For its part, Clipper Ventures says, ‘It is factually incorrect to state that Clipper Ventures has ignored previous MAIB recommendations. Specifically, Clipper Ventures has: installed navigation plotters on deck at the helming position; implemented new passage planning procedures; introduced a paid, professionally qualified ‘Additional Qualified Person’ to aid each of the race skippers.’
The report covers the events leading up to the loss of Simon Speirs overboard and ultimately his death, adding a series of conclusions and recommendations.
There is significant detail into the hours leading up to Speirs’ tragic death, but the facts within the opening section of the MAIB report are these.
‘Simon [Speirs] was initially secured to the yacht, but before he could be recovered his safety tether hook distorted and suddenly released. He was recovered, with no signs of life, from the water by the crew and could not be resuscitated.
‘At the time of the accident the skipper was on the helm and was sailing CV30 downwind, in very rough seas, to facilitate the lowering of the yankee 3 headsail. Five crew, including Simon, all of whom were secured to the yacht by their tethers, were on the foredeck to haul down and secure the yankee 3. When the sail was ¾ down a large wave on the port quarter caused CV30 to slew to starboard and then to port, leading the yacht to accidentally gybe. The bowman fell overboard but was then able to haul himself back on board. Shortly afterwards, Simon Speirs fell overboard from his position on the starboard side between the forestays.
‘The skipper tacked CV30 to place Simon on the high side of the yacht, but he was limited in his ability to slow the yacht due to damage sustained during the accidental gybe. The bowman was unable to reach Simon, who was being dragged along in the water... A halyard was passed to him, but as he struggled to secure it to his lifejacket his tether hook distorted and released. The yacht’s crew immediately initiated the manoverboard (MOB) recovery procedure. In the prevailing wind and sea conditions, and without full control of the sails, the skipper managed to manoeuvre CV30 alongside Simon, who appeared to be unconscious, 32 minutes later, but following his recovery he was unable to be resuscitated.’
FINDINGS
Section 3 of the report deals with conclusions and lists 21 points regarding ‘safety issues directly contributing to the accident that have been addressed or resulted in recommendations’.
Within this section a number of points relate to the design of the Clipper 70 yacht, where point one states that: ‘… the foredeck was a vulnerable place for the crew to be operating in the very rough sea conditions given the labour intensive and difficult task of lowering a headsail in strong winds and the narrow foredeck and lack of suitable securing points for crews’ short safety tethers...’ It adds in point two that: ‘The Clipper 70’s narrow bow and small foredeck area have almost certainly contributed to the increase in the number of tethered MOB incidents.’ There had been at least 15 incidences of ‘tethered MOBS’ between 2013, when the Clipper 70 was introduced, and July 2018. Nine occurred on the 2017-18 race, and all bar one involved a crew on the foredeck.
There are further statements on the use of hanked headsails, too, with the report adding in point five: ‘The MAIB’S investigations into the fatal MOB accident on CV21 [Clipper 70 Ichorcoal from which two lives where lost in the 2015-16 edition of the race] highlighted the difficulties of lowering hanked-on headsails in strong winds, and recommended improvement. Clipper Ventures did not make any changes to equipment or amend its procedures for reducing sail prior to the 2017-2018 race.’
Elsewhere there is more on previous recommendations made to Clipper Ventures: ‘[A previous report following the incidents on CV21] concluded that while a single employee on board a commercial yacht might provide sufficient company oversight in many circumstances, the special nature of the Clipper Round the World Yacht Race placed a huge responsibility on one person to ensure the safety of the yacht and its crew at all times.
‘In its report, the MAIB recommended that Clipper Ventures review its onboard manning policy, taking into consideration the merits of manning each yacht with a second employee or contracted ‘seafarer’ in order to take reasonable care of the health and safety of all persons on board. Clipper Ventures’ response to the MAIB recommendation was not to recruit a second employee for each yacht. Instead, the company stated that the crew members selected to complete the Clipper coxswain course would bring up matters of concern far more freely than a person who was dependent on the company for his or her job.
‘Clipper Ventures also stated that the responsibility of the Clipper coxswain-trained crew would be expanded through the formation of a safety committee for future races.’
Clipper says: ‘the MCA had provided Clipper Ventures with an exemption which meant that the specifically designed Clipper Race Coxswain Course was the approved qualification. This was lifted and Clipper Ventures has employed a paid first mate (Additional Qualified Person) for each team since the Fremantle stopover in November 2017.
The foredeck was a vulnerable place for the crew to be operating in the very rough sea conditions
MAINTENANCE ISSUES
There are wide-ranging findings into the general upkeep, maintenance and condition of the boats. The MAIB highlighted that during leg 3, the crew had experienced very rough sea conditions which left the forward two starboard stanchion bases damaged (It was temporarily repaired with high modulus polyethylene lines and the skipper minimised work on the foredeck in rough weather, particularly when the damaged guardrail was on the leeward side) and two main sail battens and the vang strut broken.
CV30, which was on its third circumnavigation, also suffered from a leak in the forepeak (which required it to be pumped out with a manual bilge pump), a problematic watermaker, and a starboard wheel with a significant amount of play.
Though the report acknowledges that there will always be maintenance required on a yacht sailing offshore it was felt that: ‘There were several examples that indicate that preventative maintenance or pre-race inspection could have been improved. The resulting issues, while able to be managed at sea by the crew, were unnecessary, and could have been avoided had a more thorough planned maintenance system been in place.’ Elsewhere, it also specifically makes note of the race’s rule that if a boat needs a new sail at the end of a leg, that boat will be docked 2 points from her overall score, thus putting a premium on sail repairs by the crew.
THE HEALTH OF THE CREW
These factors may have contributed to fatigue, reported to be significant by many crew. The report states that: ‘Simon’s performance at the time of the accident might have been affected by fatigue and other factors. Analysis of hours of work and rest records demonstrates the difficulty skippers [the only member onboard required as an employee of the company to log hours] had in achieving sufficient rest in compliance with health and safety requirements…
‘Throughout the race, one or two of CV30’S crew were often confined below with illness or injury, potentially placing further workload on others. At the time of the accident two out of the 16 crew were unable to stand watch on deck due to injury. The crew demographic… also had an influence on workload as many physical tasks could only be carried out by the physically capable, often younger and fitter members of the crew. Simon acknowledged in his blog that, at the age of 60, he did not have the strength and stamina he had when he was younger.
‘Despite this, he was considered one of the more capable crew, and was providing assistance on the foredeck during the challenging evolution [sail change] that led to this accident. While a level of fatigue will be present during the race, it is important that every effort is made to ensure crew do not become ‘critically’ fatigued. The skipper had an unenviable task of balancing the ability to race his yacht, sail it safely and not exhaust his crew. Simon’s blog recorded occasions where he had worked long hours repairing spinnakers, the watch crew were bailing out water, and crew were spending hours working around problems, such as those with the generator and watermaker.’
CRUCIAL TETHER HOOKS
In the weeks following Speirs’ death the MAIB released an Urgent Safety Advisory Notice highlighting the potential for tethers to open when under lateral load.
While the tethers can withstand a load of over 1 tonne longitudinally, it was found that they would deform under less lateral load. Clipper themselves asked the MAIB to put out an urgent warning about clips prior to the Sydney to Hobart Race. When they realised this was not going to happen, Sir Robin Knox-johnston put out a video.
It was found Speirs’ hook had become jammed under the forward mooring cleat, preventing it from rotating and so transferring load onto a lateral plane. The report notes that from Fremantle onwards Clipper Ventures advised crew to ensure ropes were wrapped around the cleats at sea, so ameliorating the chance of a tether hook catching under the cleat as in this case.
The skipper of CV30 had installed secondary jackstays to port and starboard on the advice of another skipper who had completed the event previously. The report states that: ‘In exercising his duty of care, CV30’S skipper had judged that additional measures beyond those identified in Clipper Ventures’ risk assessments and procedures were required… It was also evidenced by the skipper’s decision to fit a secondary jackstay on each side of the yacht to prevent the crew from falling a significant distance when attached to the high side of the yacht. By providing an additional hooking point, it also potentially reduced the risk of crew entering the water through falling overboard. However, the skipper did not believe it necessary to share his initiatives with Clipper Ventures’ management as he was aware other skippers had made the same or similar modifications.
Consequently, while aimed at improving safety, his wellintended unilateral actions had been neither formally risk assessed nor challenged given that clipping on to the secondary jackstay had the effect of indirectly clipping on to the guardrail stanchion bases, which was contrary to instructions in the race crew manual.”
FINAL MOMENTS
It was reported that Speirs’ likely cause of death was drowning and he was unconscious by the time he was recovered.
There are no clear findings as to exactly how he may have drowned but the report notes that at no point while in the water did Speirs raise the splash hood of his lifejacket.
Before his long tether safety hook succumbed to lateral loading, Speirs was dragged alongside the boat – the skipper tacked to put him on the high side per his Clipper MOB training. The report states that: ‘…the long tether with which Simon was secured to the yacht, and the difficulty of bringing the yacht under control and stopping it in the water, prevented the crew from being able to recover Simon quickly, leaving him suspended overboard at significant risk of inhaling water.
‘That Simon did not deploy his sprayhood indicates he was probably unconscious shortly after the tether hook released,’ states the report.
‘With the sea water temperature estimated at 12º-13ºc, cold-water shock might have contributed to Simon’s death. However, having been dragged along in the water by his safety tether prior to his immersion, the shock of entering the water might have had less effect. Inhalation of water was likely, especially as Simon was unable to deploy his sprayhood. The extent to which Simon not wearing his dry-suit might have adversely affected his survival is unknown.’
It remains unknown why Simon was only clipped on with his long tether. There is a suggestion that he may have temporarily unclipped his short tether in order to assist the bowman, but this matter remains inconclusive.