A his­toric law of geopo­lit­i­cal scale:

Why the newly passed Deoc­cu­pa­tion Law mat­ters. Part II

The Ukrainian Week - - CONTENTS -

In­ter­na­tional lawyer Volodymyr Va­sylenko on why the newly passed Deoc­cu­pa­tion Law mat­ters. Part II

Volodymyr Va­sylenko, Judge of the In­ter­na­tional Crim­i­nal Tri­bunal for the for­mer Yu­goslavia in 2002-2005, for­mer Am­bas­sador to Benelux coun­tries, EU and NATO

See part I in Is. #2(120) of Fe­bru­ary 2018 or at ukraini­an­week.com

WHEN RUS­SIA’S AG­GRES­SION AND TEM­PO­RARY OC­CU­PA­TION OF UKRAINE’S TER­RI­TORY BE­GAN

The text of the law does not in­di­cate a date of when the ag­gres­sion be­gan or the date of when the tem­po­rary oc­cu­pa­tion of parts of Ukraine started. How­ever, these dates are men­tioned in the acts men­tioned in the pre­am­ble, in­clud­ing the Law on En­sur­ing the Rights and Free­doms of Cit­i­zens and the Le­gal Regime on the Tem­po­rar­ily Oc­cu­pied Ter­ri­tory of Ukraine and the Verkhov­naRada State­ment on Re­sist­ing the Armed Ag­gres­sion of the Rus­sian Fed­er­a­tion and Over­com­ing its Con­se­quences ap­proved by the VR Res­o­lu­tion No337- VIII on April 21, 2015.

Both listed doc­u­ments spec­ify the date as Fe­bru­ary 20, 2014. It is used in MFA notes and law­suits to in­ter­na­tional courts, in­clud­ing the Euro­pean Court of Hu­man Rights (ECHR), In­ter­na­tional Crim­i­nal Court (ICC) and In­ter­na­tional Court of Jus­tice. There­fore, the of­fi­cially es­tab­lished start­ing date of Rus­sia’s ag­gres­sion against Ukraine is Fe­bru­ary 20, 2014. It matches the date when the oc­cu­pa­tion of Crimea and the city of Sev­astopol be­gan: the an­nex­a­tion of these parts of Ukraine’s ter­ri­tory qual­i­fies as an act of ag­gres­sion per se. That an­nex­a­tion be­gan on Fe­bru­ary 20, 2014.

In­ter­na­tional prac­tices of­fer mul­ti­ple sce­nar­ios for con­nect­ing the start­ing dates of armed ag­gres­sions and oc­cu­pa­tions – whether iden­ti­cal, close or dis­tant, di­rect or in­di­rect – since oc­cu­pa­tion is al­ways a con­se­quence and man­i­fes­ta­tion of ag­gres­sion, a process and a fact si­mul­ta­ne­ously. The fight­ing that has been tak­ing place in parts of Ukraine faced with the ag­gres­sion is in­evitably ac­com­pa­nied by mil­i­tary oc­cu­pa­tion. In such cases, oc­cu­pa­tion is a mil­i­tary op­er­a­tion while the oc­cu­pied ter­ri­tory is con­trolled by the mil­i­tary ex­clu­sively. As the size of the oc­cu­pied ter­ri­tory ex­pands be­yond the area of the fight­ing, it gains the sta­tus of the tem­po­rar­ily oc­cu­pied ter­ri­tory un­der con­trol of the pre­dom­i­nantly civil­ian oc­cu­pa­tion ad­min­is­tra­tions. Leg­isla­tive de­ter­mi­na­tion of the start­ing date of the armed ag­gres­sion has the key and de­ci­sive mean­ing. From this date, the armed of­fen­sive qual­i­fies as an in­ter­na­tional crime com­mit­ted by a state; all cases of war crimes and crimes against hu­man­ity, and the caus­ing of ma­te­rial and non-ma­te­rial losses in the area of fight­ing or within the tem­po­rar­ily oc­cu­pied ter­ri­tory are recorded.

The start­ing dates of tem­po­rary oc­cu­pa­tion have no im­pact on the as­sess­ment of the dam­age caused by the act of ag­gres­sion. They tend to fluc­tu­ate and be linked to dif­fer­ent ter­ri­to­ries in dif­fer­ent time­frames. How­ever, they are im­por­tant for the es­tab­lish­ment of the date when the oc­cu­py­ing state should start ful­fill­ing its pos­i­tive obli­ga­tions to­wards civil­ians in the oc­cu­pied ter­ri­tory. There­fore, it is rea­son­able to es­tab­lish the start­ing date of tem­po­rary oc­cu­pa­tion with the acts of the ex­ec­u­tive branch, not with laws.

THE LE­GAL FOUN­DA­TION FOR COUN­TER­ING THE ARMED AG­GRES­SION

Rus­sia’s armed ag­gres­sion be­gan with un­de­clared and concealed in­va­sions into the ter­ri­tory of Ukraine with units of Rus­sia’s Armed Forces and other se­cu­rity en­ti­ties. This was done par­al­lel to the or­ga­ni­za­tion and sup­port of ter­ror­ist ac­tiv­i­ties, and with no Pres­i­dent elected on the na­tion­wide scale, le­git­i­mately con­vened Verkhov­naRada or lo­cal au­thor­i­ties in Ukraine.

In this con­text, it was vi­tal for Ukraine to solve two ma­jor tasks: to en­sure coun­ter­ac­tion to the ag­gres­sion, and to form new power struc­tures with­out vi­o­lat­ing the Con­sti­tu­tion of Ukraine. There­fore, Ukraine’s lead­er­ship that came to power af­ter Yanukovych’s regime col­lapsed or­ga­nized re­sis­tance to the Rus­sian ag­gres­sion by launch­ing the anti-ter­ror­ist op­er­a­tion in April 2014 with a wide-scale en­gage­ment of the Armed Forces. Early pres­i­den­tial elec­tion held in May 2014, fol­lowed by early par­lia­men­tary and lo­cal elec­tions, elim­i­nated any doubts about the le­git­i­macy of the new au­thor­i­ties in Ukraine and en­sured in­ter­na­tional sup­port in its strug­gle.

From day one of Rus­sia’s armed ag­gres­sion, the anti-ter­ror­ist op­er­a­tion has been “an el­e­ment of Ukraine’s in­te­gral right to in­di­vid­ual self-de­fense from ag­gres­sion as in­ter­preted un­der Art. 51 of the UN Char­ter”. This ap­proach was recorded in a num­ber of Verkhov­naRada res­o­lu­tions that have de­fined the key pa­ram­e­ters of Ukraine’s le­gal stance in coun­ter­ing the armed ag­gres­sion and deal­ing with its con­se­quences, as the fight­ing un­folded.

It is known that the Armed Forces of Ukraine play the key role in the wide-scale fight­ing against the Rus­sian ag­gres­sion de facto, even if the Se­cu­rity Bureau of Ukraine (SBU) is in charge of the ATO de jure.

In con­fir­ma­tion of the Verkhov­naRada res­o­lu­tions men­tioned in its pre­am­ble, the newly passed law pro­vides the le­gal state­ment of the fact that Ukraine coun­ters Rus­sia’s armed ag­gres­sion in the for­mat of de­fend­ing it­self from ag­gres­sion un­der the Con­sti­tu­tion of Ukraine, the laws of Ukraine and Art. 51 of the UN Char­ter, not in the ATO regime. This is also con­firmed in the text of the law, in­clud­ing Art. 11.

This ap­proach over­turns spec­u­la­tive doubts about the le­git­i­macy of en­gag­ing vol­un­teer bat­tal­ions and Armed Forces of Ukraine in all stages of coun­ter­ing Rus­sia’s armed ag­gres­sion. Art. 51 of the UN Char­ter is an in­ter­na­tional treaty pro­vi­sion whose bind­ing force the Verkhov­naRada of Ukraine has com­mit­ted to. Un­der the Con­sti­tu­tion, this makes it part of the na­tional leg­is­la­tion.

At the same time, the law ends the un­cer­tainty about le­gal grounds for de­mands of the com­pen­sa­tion of the dam­age in­curred by in­di­vid­u­als and/or le­gal en­ti­ties as a re­sult of Rus­sia’s ag­gres­sion. Based on the norms of the law and gen­er­ally ac­cepted prin­ci­ples of in­ter­na­tional law, Ukrainian courts should pass ver­dicts on the com­pen­sa­tion of such dam­age by Rus­sia as ag­gres­sor state.

RUS­SIA’S RE­SPON­SI­BIL­ITY FOR ITS ARMED AG­GRES­SION AGAINST UKRAINE

Art. 2 of the law says that Rus­sia is re­spon­si­ble for ma­te­rial and non-ma­te­rial dam­age in­curred by Ukraine as a re­sult of Rus­sia’s armed ag­gres­sion un­der in­ter­na­tional prin­ci­ples and law. Art. 6 says that the Cabi-

RUS­SIA’S ARMED AG­GRES­SION BE­GAN WITH UN­DE­CLARED AND CONCEALED IN­VA­SIONS INTO THE TER­RI­TORY OF UKRAINE WITH UNITS OF RUS­SIA’S ARMED FORCES AND OTHER SE­CU­RITY EN­TI­TIES. THIS WAS DONE PAR­AL­LEL TO THE OR­GA­NI­ZA­TION AND SUP­PORT OF TER­ROR­IST AC­TIV­I­TIES

net of Min­is­ters will take “nec­es­sary mea­sures to es­tab­lish an in­ter­gov­ern­men­tal co­or­di­na­tion body tasked with con­sol­i­dat­ing Ukraine’s le­gal po­si­tion in coun­ter­ing and re­strain­ing Rus­sia’s armed ag­gres­sion and pre­par­ing Ukraine’s con­sol­i­dated claim against Rus­sia for the im­ple­men­ta­tion of its re­spon­si­bil­ity un­der in­ter­na­tional law for the armed ag­gres­sion against Ukraine”.

In prac­tice, the im­ple­men­ta­tion of this pro­vi­sion re­quires a num­ber of laws and by­laws to be passed. These should de­fine the fi­nan­cial, ma­te­rial, staff, or­ga­ni­za­tional, pro­ce­dural and other as­pects to make the work of the in­ter­gov­ern­men­tal body ef­fi­cient.

Con­sol­i­dated and de­tailed le­gal po­si­tion of the state in coun­ter­ing Rus­sia’s armed ag­gres­sion and over­com­ing its con­se­quences will serve as the le­gal foun­da­tion as Ukraine pre­pares a con­sol­i­dated claim against Rus­sia.

Its key el­e­ments should in­clude proof of the fact of ag­gres­sion, the as­sess­ment of dam­age caused by it to the Ukrainian State, so­ci­ety, le­gal en­ti­ties and in­di­vid­u­als, and claims on the amount and forms of re­im­burse­ment of the losses faced by Ukraine as a re­sult of Rus­sia’s ag­gres­sion.

THE MECH­A­NISM FOR COUN­TER­ING RUS­SIA’S ARMED AG­GRES­SION

Art. 8 of the Law en­tails the cre­ation of a pow­er­ful in­ter­gov­ern­men­tal plat­form to unite forces and tools in­volved in coun­ter­ing and re­strain­ing Rus­sia’s armed ag­gres­sion in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Art. 9 de­scribes the com­pe­ten­cies and modus operandi for the bod­ies of strate­gic and op­er­a­tional man­age­ment for such forces and tools. An­other im­por­tant pro­vi­sion is Art. 10. It states that “Should Rus­sia’s armed ag­gres­sion ex­pand be­yond the Au­ton­o­mous Re­pub­lic of Crimea, Sev­astopol, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the forces and tools listed in Art. 8 hereof shall be en­gaged and used in coun­ter­ing it, in com­pli­ance with the procedure es­tab­lished in Art.9 hereof.”

THE FRAME­WORK FOR DE-OC­CU­PA­TION POLI­CIES

Art. 4 states that the pri­or­ity goal of Ukraine’s state pol­icy is the lib­er­a­tion of the tem­po­rar­ily oc­cu­pied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and the restora­tion of con­sti­tu­tional or­der in that ter­ri­tory.

Art. 5 says that gov­ern­ment bod­ies and their of­fi­cials shall:

• take rel­e­vant diplo­matic, sanc­tion and other mea­sures (their range is not lim­ited or spec­i­fied in the Law),

•en­gage in­ter­na­tional as­sis­tance, and

• use mech­a­nisms of bi­lat­eral in­ter­na­tional co­op­er­a­tion, in­ter­na­tional or­ga­ni­za­tions and in­ter­na­tional courts to keep and in­crease the sanc­tions im­posed on Rus­sia by the in­ter­na­tional com­mu­nity.

These and other pro­vi­sions of the Law, in­clud­ing Art.7.1, es­tab­lish a le­gal ground on which Ukraine’s ex­ec­u­tive au­thor­i­ties can de­velop a com­pre­hen­sive and spe­cific ac­tion plan to move for­ward with the deoc­cu­pa­tion and re-in­te­gra­tion of the oc­cu­pied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The Law con­firms that peace­ful, po­lit­i­cal and diplo­matic reg­u­la­tion is a pri­or­ity. At the same time, it does not ex­clude the ap­pli­ca­tion of co­er­cive mea­sures in line with Art. 51 of the UN Char­ter.

PRO­TECT­ING THE RIGHTS OF CIVIL­IANS AND SANC­TIONS

The Law de­fines the frame­work for the pro­tec­tion of the rights of civil­ians on the tem­po­rar­ily oc­cu­pied ter­ri­tory based on the fact that the Ukrainian au­thor­i­ties are tem­po­rar­ily un­able to func­tion on that ter­ri­tory. Un­for­tu­nately, Art. 7 speaks only gen­er­ally of Rus­sia’s obli­ga­tions as the oc­cu­py­ing state. Un­der the in­ter­na­tional hu­man­i­tar­ian law, it rather speaks of Rus­sia’s neg­a­tive obli­ga­tions for the vi­o­la­tions of hu­man rights of civil­ians, while Rus­sia is also re­spon­si­ble for most of the pos­i­tive li­a­bil­i­ties. The im­ple­men­ta­tion thereof should aim at sup­port­ing the life of civil­ians and pro­tect­ing hu­man rights.

Hu­man rights ad­vo­cates and some MPs have been largely con­cerned about cer­tain re­stric­tions of hu­man rights im­posed by the Law on civil­ians in the ar­eas that neigh­bor on the con­flict zone. This is un­der­stand­able in peace­ful time, but not in wartime.

In a sit­u­a­tion where the state has faced an armed ag­gres­sion and its pub­lic or­der, se­cu­rity in­ter­ests, ter­ri­to­rial in­tegrity and mere ex­is­tence are threat­ened, it has the right and obli­ga­tion to re­strict some rights of cit­i­zens, par­tic­u­larly in the ar­eas ad­ja­cent to the con­flict zone. These re­stric­tions are set to en­sure ef­fec­tive re­sis­tance to the ag­gres­sor, as well as to pro­tect the life of the cit­i­zens who find them­selves within the area of bat­tle.

Un­der Art.3.2, 9, 12, 14 and 17 of the In­ter­na­tional Covenant on Civil and Po­lit­i­cal Rights, and Art. 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the Euro­pean Con­ven­tion on Hu­man Rights, the states with a state of emer­gency or an armed con­flict on their ter­ri­tory are en­ti­tled to de­part­ing from some obli­ga­tions un­der the treaties men­tioned above. Ukraine made a State­ment on such de­par­ture ap­proved by the Verkhovna-Rada un­der No462 dated May 21, 2015, upon the de­mand of the Coun­cil of Europe. Un­der these doc­u­ments, Ukraine has in­tro­duced cer­tain re­stric­tions on hu­man rights for the pe­riod un­til full ter­mi­na­tion of Rus­sia’s armed ag­gres­sion. This en­tails com­plete with­drawal of all il­le­gal armed for­ma­tions that are man­aged, con­trolled and funded by Rus­sia, as well as of its oc­cu­py­ing armed forces from the ter­ri­tory of Ukraine.

The re­stric­tions of civil rights listed in Ar­ti­cle 12 of the Law for the ar­eas ad­ja­cent to the zone of con­flict are in line with the norms of in­ter­na­tional law, jus­ti­fied and rea­son­able.

At dif­fer­ent stages of draft­ing and con­sid­er­a­tion, some Ukrainian MPs pro­posed that the Law in­cludes clauses on the ter­mi­na­tion of diplo­matic re­la­tions with Rus­sia, the ter­mi­na­tion of the Treaty on Rus­sia-Ukraine Friend­ship, the in­tro­duc­tion of a visa regime with Rus­sia, the ban of trade with the oc­cu­pied ter­ri­tory, and more.

UKRAINE AND GLOBAL DEMOC­RA­CIES SHOULD CO­OP­ER­ATE FOR THE PUR­POSE OF RESTOR­ING IN­TER­NA­TIONAL PEACE IN EUROPE BASED ON LAW, EURO­PEAN VAL­UES AND FAIR­NESS, NOT FOR THE PUR­POSE OF SEEK­ING WAYS TO MEET RUS­SIA’S IL­LE­GAL DE­MANDS

This im­por­tant and spe­cial prob­lem should be reg­u­lated by other laws. Spe­cific pro­pos­als on con­sis­tent de­vel­op­ment of a con­sol­i­dated state sanc­tion pol­icy (as dis­cussed in War or imi­ta­tion of war: A le­gal view avail­able at ukraini­an­week.com) re­main im­por­tant. It would take po­lit­i­cal will of the coun­try’s lead­er­ship to im­ple­ment them.

THE GEOPO­LIT­I­CAL ASPECT OF THE LAW

This Law plays a his­toric role and is ex­tremely im­por­tant in pro­tect­ing Ukraine’s vi­tal in­ter­ests and re­in­forc­ing its geopo­lit­i­cal po­si­tion.

It demon­strates to the world that Ukraine does not ac­cept the con­se­quences of il­le­gal use of force against it, and gives a prin­ci­pled an­swer to Rus­sia’s last­ing armed ag­gres­sion against Ukraine.

It shows Ukraine’s de­ter­mi­na­tion to de­fend its in­de­pen­dent state­hood, ter­ri­to­rial in­tegrity and con­sti­tu­tional or­der based on in­ter­na­tion­ally ac­cepted norms and prin­ci­ples, in­ter­na­tional co­op­er­a­tion and in­ter­ac­tion with global democ­ra­cies.

The Law un­equiv­o­cally de­fines Rus­sia as ag­gres­sor state. It thus de­bunks the ab­sur­dity of a pro­pa­gan­dist myth about Rus­sia’s peace­ful me­di­a­tion in solv­ing an in­ter­na­tional armed con­flict in which it is in­volved as ag­gres­sor state.

In the con­text of the Law, Rus­sia is what it is in re­al­ity: an un­der­miner of in­ter­na­tional or­der, not a peace­maker; it brazenly vi­o­lates fun­da­men­tal prin­ci­ples of in­ter­na­tional law and bi­lat­eral com­mit­ments. The Law is aimed against Rus­sia’s at­tempts to re­place the in­ter­na­tional or­der based on the UN Char­ter with an ar­chaic sys­tem with no civ­i­lized, uni­ver­sally ac­cepted or un­der­stood rules, and with force as the dom­i­nant fac­tor.

The Law is an in­stru­ment al­low­ing Ukraine to re­ject the model of con­flict reg­u­la­tion that en­ables the ag­gres­sor to ac­com­plish its il­le­gal goals and en­joy im­punity. It also re­in­forces Ukraine’s po­si­tions in so­lu­tion-seek­ing ne­go­ti­a­tions based on the UN Char­ter rather than whims and as­pi­ra­tions of the ag­gres­sor.

The Law does not re­ject the pos­si­bil­ity and fea­si­bil­ity of us­ing the pos­i­tive po­ten­tial of the Minsk Agree­ments, there­fore it un­der­lines Ukraine’s com­mit­ment to the pri­or­ity of po­lit­i­cal and diplo­matic reg­u­la­tion of the con­flict in line with the rule of law. The Minsk Agree­ments, given their sta­tus as a po­lit­i­cal ac­cord im­posed by force and not rat­i­fied by the Verkhovna-Rada of Ukraine, and in view of some il­le­git­i­mate pro­vi­sions therein, do not create le­gal grounds for a re­vi­sion of this Law that has been duly rat­i­fied by Ukraine’s Par­lia­ment while its pro­vi­sions are fully in com­pli­ance with in­ter­na­tional law.

In view of mod­ern in­ter­na­tional law and Euro­pean civ­i­liza­tional val­ues, it. 10.4 of PACE Res­o­lu­tion ti­tled Hu­man­i­tar­ian con­se­quences of the war in Ukraine dated Jan­uary 23, 2018, raises se­ri­ous con­cerns and res­o­lute re­jec­tion. It rec­om­mends the Ukrainian au­thor­i­ties to “re­vise the Law … to be based on the Minsk agree­ments”. This pro­vi­sion was in­te­grated into the PACE Res­o­lu­tion as a re­sult of ef­forts by Vadym-Novyn­sky and Yu­lia-Liovochk­ina, mem­bers of the Ukrainian del­e­ga­tion and the Op­po­si­tion Bloc party. Their con­duct as agents of Rus­sia’s in­flu­ence is self-ex­plana­tory. By con­trast, it is dif­fi­cult to de­scribe the po­si­tion of EP mem­bers who have sup­ported this anti-Ukrainian ini­tia­tive as any­thing but shame­ful, im­moral and ir­re­spon­si­ble.

As noted be­fore, the Minsk Agree­ments are the re­sult of Rus­sia’s il­le­gal use of force against Ukraine. They con­tain a num­ber of pro­vi­sions that are starkly in vi­o­la­tion of mod­ern in­ter­na­tional law and Euro­pean val­ues. There­fore, it makes sense to re­view the Minsk Agree­ments, not the Law which does not vi­o­late in­ter­na­tional law in any of its clauses.

The ap­proach to es­tab­lish­ing le­gal grounds and ways to reg­u­late the in­ter­na­tional armed con­flict that has un­folded in the cen­ter of Europe as a re­sult of Rus­sia’s armed ag­gres­sion is a test both for Ukraine’s lead­er­ship, and for the lead­ers of global democ­ra­cies.

Ukrainian au­thor­i­ties should prove ca­pa­ble of de­liv­er­ing a quick and con­sis­tent im­ple­men­ta­tion of the Law. They should re­ject any at­tempts to re­vise it and not agree to con­ces­sions that un­der­mine Ukraine’s con­sti­tu­tional or­der and con­tra­dict in­ter­na­tional law.

Western lead­ers should prove their com­mit­ment to the rule of in­ter­na­tional law, and drop at­tempts to force Ukraine to blindly ful­fill il­le­gal pro­vi­sions of the Minsk Agree­ments. They should also ex­pand sanc­tions against Rus­sia as the state that re­fuses to stop its ag­gres­sion against Ukraine and re­store in­ter­na­tional le­gal or­der.

Con­ces­sions to the ag­gres­sor by Ukrainian au­thor­i­ties based on il­le­git­i­mate clauses of the Minsk Agree­ments will stand for a be­trayal of Ukraine’s na­tional in­ter­ests. Other democ­ra­cies will be­come part­ners in the crime of ag­gres­sion by forc­ing Ukraine to make con­ces­sions in fa­vor of the ag­gres­sor.

Ukraine and global democ­ra­cies should co­op­er­ate for the pur­pose of restor­ing in­ter­na­tional peace in Europe based on law, Euro­pean val­ues and fair­ness, not for the pur­pose of seek­ing ways to meet Rus­sia’s il­le­gal de­mands.

If Ukraine and its western part­ners fail to ef­fec­tively counter Rus­sia’s ag­gres­sion and agree to meet its il­le­git­i­mate de­mands and whims they will sig­nal a ca­pit­u­la­tion and en­cour­age the ag­gres­sor to launch new ven­tures.

His­tory shows that ap­peas­ing an ag­gres­sor re­in­forces the cul­ture of im­punity, leads to a tri­umph of force, chaos, ar­bi­trari­ness and dik­tat in in­ter­na­tional re­la­tions. The only way to pre­vent this sce­nario is by ex­pand­ing in­ter­na­tional sanc­tions against Rus­sia if the ag­gres­sion against Ukraine con­tin­ues. There should also be a prospect of cre­at­ing a wide anti-Putin coali­tion that would aim at de­liv­er­ing a crim­i­nal pun­ish­ment for the ag­gres­sor-state’s lead­er­ship for the dam­age it has caused to Ukraine and its al­lies that have faced losses as a re­sult of sanc­tions im­posed on the ag­gres­sor; at full restora­tion of in­ter­na­tional le­gal or­der, and at the in­tro­duc­tion of re­stric­tive mea­sures against Rus­sia to pre­vent its ag­gres­sion in the fu­ture.

THIS LAW DEMON­STRATES TO THE WORLD THAT UKRAINE DOES NOT AC­CEPT THE CON­SE­QUENCES OF IL­LE­GAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST IT, AND GIVES A PRIN­CI­PLED AN­SWER TO RUS­SIA’S LAST­ING ARMED AG­GRES­SION

A solid fac­tor. The law re­in­forces Ukraine’s po­si­tion in the search for a so­lu­tion to the on­go­ing con­flict based on the UN Char­ter, not on the whims of the ag­gres­sor

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