Russia and China pose a unique dual challenge
Time for U.S., allies to set consequences for aggression
Let’s get right to the question: What if, simultaneously, Russia invades Ukraine and China invades Taiwan? Unlikely probably, but not improbable. China and Russia today are ruled by risk takers who have demonstrated a capacity and willingness to commit military aggression against neighbors. Not since the 1930s and 1940s have two major military powers posed a major military threat to U.S. interests and global peace. A simultaneous attack by China and Russia would be a League of Nations moment — the end of the United Nations as a meaningful multilateral organization. Global economic organizations (World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization) would likewise survive, but be substantially damaged.
Human psychology makes it difficult to contemplate something that has not before happened; the failure to think Pearl Harbor or the World Trade Center were cases in point.
Let’s dig deeper.
China in recent years has acted outside its historic pattern of behavior, which has been limited to its sovereign territory. It has built islands in the South China Sea, militarized them, and then claimed the surrounding waters as territorial, despite a U.N. tribunal’s ruling in 2016 that it had no legal basis for such claims. China has grossly violated the 1984 treaty with the United Kingdom that guaranteed Hong Kong ’s rights and freedoms after the city was returned.
Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, Crimea in February 2014 with troops disguised without insignias, and eastern Ukraine the following month with Russian-backed separatists. It currently has deployed more than 100,000 regular troops along Ukraine’s border. It has waged continuous cyberattacks against Ukraine’s infrastructure. Numerous bilateral and multilateral talks with Russia have demonstrated unanimous western support for Ukraine, but have failed to produce any meaningful Russian withdrawal much less an unambiguous moderation in its unwarranted demands. So, too, an unprecedented release of U.S. intelligence about Russian disinformation plots and military plans has failed to curb Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggressiveness.
Putin’s control of Russia’s domestic discourse is a return to Stalinism. His domestic propaganda glorifies Russia’s military prowess and increasingly seeks to legitimize the idea that Ukraine is an aggressive western outpost and Russia might consequently be forced to initiate defensive military action. It is classic gangster logic.
Chinese and Russian jets have increased the frequency and the menacing nature of patrols along the respective borders of Taiwan and Ukraine. Moreover, both Russia and China observe our grossly divisive domestic politics and undoubtedly consider us politically weakened. Xi and Putin probably read correctly that the American public has no appetite for yet another military intervention. And in their last two meetings, Xi and Putin have expressed in exalting language mutual support on issues concerning the other’s core interests.
What to do?
The U.S. continues to provide military assistance to Ukraine, bringing the total to about $3 billion since 2014. On December 12, 2021, the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.K. and U.S.) stated that a Russian attack on Ukraine would have “massive consequences and severe costs in response.” While this message has been constantly reaffirmed by the U.S. and our European allies, all have explicitly said this means economic and political consequences, not a direct military intervention.
This is inadequate. If the U.S. wants to maximize the prospects of deterring Russia, then it must specify, preferably with its allies, what these consequences will be.
While Russia has impressively accumulated more than a half-trillion dollar reserve, the fact is Russia is a one industry country: oil and gas. At a minimum, Russia needs to know that the U.S. is working with its allies on plans to curb, if not eliminate, purchase of its oil and gas if Ukraine is invaded, and to otherwise provide
Europe with energy security. The new German government has said, albeit reluctantly, it will not purchase Russian gas from the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which ordinarily would soon become operational, if Ukraine is invaded. The U.S. needs to work with Germany and its other gas and oil suppliers — the Netherlands, Norway and the U.K. — and with other potential sources to find substitute supplies so that purchases from the Nord Stream 1 pipeline can be reduced, if not terminated. Reminiscent of the Berlin Airlift when the U.S. and its allies in 1948-49 supplied fuel and food to a Russian blockaded Berlin, the U.S. and its allies need to plan a German sealift to supply it with gas and oil.
In short, Russia needs to know it will be isolated from the west politically and its banks financially if it invades Ukraine.
Unlike Russia, China’s economic strength makes it largely immune to international political and economic deterrence. The U.S. has deliberately articulated an ambiguous policy toward the defense of Taiwan. To date, ambiguity has been satisfactory — but no longer. The U.S. needs to adopt a policy of maximum deterrence, making it clear it will come to the defense of Taiwan if it is attacked. The failure to do so would blot our self-esteem as well as shatter our alliance relationships with Japan, South Korea, Australia and others. It would likely make North Korea’s Kim Jong-un even more aggressive toward South Korea. To leave no doubt for China about U.S. policy, the U.S. should, preferably with its Asian allies, deploy an enhanced naval presence in the South China Sea — but not in the Taiwan Strait, which would be unnecessarily provocative. Nuance is necessary.
It is a small dangerous world. Failure to deter China and Russia would make it more so.
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