Albuquerque Journal

Timeline: ‘Clear the Capitol,’ Pence pleaded

Internal Pentagon file shows details of riot

- BY LISA MASCARO, BEN FOX AND LOLITA C. BALDOR ASSOCIATED PRESS

WASHINGTON — From a secure room in the Capitol on Jan. 6, as rioters pummeled police and vandalized the building, Vice President Mike Pence tried to assert control. In an urgent phone call to the acting defense secretary, he issued a startling demand. “Clear the Capitol,” Pence said. Elsewhere in the building, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi were making a similarly dire appeal to military leaders, asking the Army to deploy the National Guard.

“We must establish order,” said Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a call with Pentagon leaders.

But order would not be restored for hours.

These details about the riot are contained in a previously undisclose­d document prepared by the Pentagon for internal use that was obtained by The Associated Press and vetted by current and former government officials.

The timeline adds another layer of understand­ing about the state of fear and panic while the insurrecti­on played out, and lays bare the inaction by then-President Donald Trump and how that void contribute­d to a slowed response by the military and law enforcemen­t. It shows that the intelligen­ce missteps, tactical errors and bureaucrat­ic delays were eclipsed by the government’s failure to comprehend the scale and intensity of a violent uprising.

With Trump not engaged, it fell to Pentagon officials, a few senior White House aides, the leaders of Congress and the vice president to manage the chaos.

Lawmakers, protected to this day by National Guard troops, will hear from the inspector general of the Capitol Police this week.

“Any minute that we lost, I need to know why,” Sen. Amy Klobuchar, D-Minn., chair of the Senate Rules and Administra­tion Committee, which is investigat­ing the siege, said last month.

The timeline fills in some of those gaps.

At 4:08 p.m. on Jan. 6, as the rioters roamed the Capitol and after they had menacingly called out for Pelosi, D-Calif., and yelled for Pence to be hanged, the vice president was in a secure location, phoning Christophe­r Miller, the acting defense secretary, and demanding answers.

There had been a highly public rift between Trump and Pence, with Trump furious that his vice president refused to halt the Electoral College certificat­ion. Interferin­g with that process was an act that Pence considered unconstitu­tional.

Pence’s call to Miller lasted only a minute. Pence said the Capitol was not secure, and he asked military leaders for a deadline for securing the building, according to the document.

By this point, it had been two hours since the mob overwhelme­d Capitol Police unprepared for an insurrecti­on. Rioters broke into the building, seized the Senate and paraded to the House. In their path, they left destructio­n and debris. Dozens of officers were wounded, some gravely.

Just three days earlier, government leaders had talked about the use of the National Guard.

On the afternoon of Jan. 3, Miller and Milley gathered with Cabinet members to discuss the coming election certificat­ion. They also met with Trump.

In that meeting at the White House, Trump approved the activation of the D.C. National Guard and told the acting defense secretary to take whatever action needed as events unfolded, according to the informatio­n obtained by the AP.

The next day, Jan. 4, the defense officials spoke by phone with Cabinet members, including the acting attorney general, and completed details of the Guard deployment.

The Guard’s role was limited to traffic intersecti­ons and checkpoint­s around the city, based partly on strict restrictio­ns mandated by district officials. Miller also authorized Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy to deploy, if needed, the D.C. Guard’s emergency reaction force, stationed at Joint Base Andrews.

The Trump administra­tion and the Pentagon were wary of a heavy military presence, partly because of criticism officials faced for the seemingly heavyhande­d National Guard and law enforcemen­t efforts to counter civil unrest in the aftermath of the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapoli­s.

On the eve of Trump’s rally Jan. 6 near the White House, the first 255 National Guard troops arrived in the district, and Mayor Muriel Bowser said in a letter to the administra­tion that no other military support was needed.

By the morning of Jan. 6, crowds started gathering at the Ellipse before Trump’s speech. According to the Pentagon’s plans, the acting defense secretary would be notified only if the crowd swelled beyond 20,000.

Before long, it was clear that the crowd was far more in control of events than the troops and law enforcemen­t there to maintain order.

Trump, just before noon, was giving his speech, and he told supporters to march to the Capitol. The crowd at the rally was at least 10,000. By 1:15 p.m., the procession was well on its way there.

As protesters reached the Capitol grounds, some immediatel­y became violent, bursting through weak police barriers in front of the building and beating up officers who stood in their way.

At 1:49 p.m., as the violence escalated, then-Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund called Maj. Gen. William Walker, commanding general of the D.C. National Guard, to request assistance. Walker immediatel­y called Army leaders to inform them of the request.

Twenty minutes later, around 2:10 p.m., the first rioters were beginning to break through the doors and windows of the Senate.

Sund franticall­y called Walker again and asked for at least 200 Guard members. But even with the advance Cabinet-level preparatio­n, no help was immediatel­y on the way.

Over the next 20 minutes, Army Secretary McCarthy spoke with the mayor and Pentagon leaders about Sund’s request.

At 2:25 p.m., McCarthy told his staff to prepare to move the emergency reaction force to the Capitol. The force could be ready to move in 20 minutes.

Shortly after 3 p.m., McCarthy provided “verbal approval” of the activation of 1,100 National Guard troops to support the D.C. police and the developmen­t of a plan for the troops’ deployment duties, locations and unit sizes. Minutes later, the Guard’s emergency reaction force left Joint Base Andrews for the D.C. Armory. But military and law enforcemen­t leaders struggled over the next 90 minutes to execute the plan.

The Guard troops had been prepared only for traffic duties. Army leaders argued that sending them into a volatile combat situation required additional instructio­n to keep both them and the public safe.

By 3:37 p.m., the Pentagon sent its own security forces to guard the homes of defense leaders. No troops had yet reached the Capitol.

At 3:48 p.m., frustrated that the D.C. Guard hadn’t fully developed a plan to link up with police, the Army secretary dashed from the Pentagon to D.C. police headquarte­rs to help coordinate with law enforcemen­t.

At 4:17 p.m., Trump tweeted to his followers to “go home and go in peace.”

By about 4:30 p.m., the military plan was finalized, and Walker had approval to send the Guard to the Capitol.

At about 4:40 p.m. Pelosi and Schumer were again on the phone with Milley and the Pentagon leadership, asking Miller to secure the perimeter.

It would be another hour before the first contingent of 155 Guard members were at the Capitol.

They started moving out the rioters, but there were few, if any, arrests by police.

At 8 p.m. the Capitol was declared secure.

 ?? JOHN MINCHILLO/ASSOCIATED PRESS ?? Rioters storm the nation’s Capitol on Jan. 6. Details from the riot are contained in a previously undisclose­d document prepared by the Pentagon for internal use that was obtained by The Associated Press.
JOHN MINCHILLO/ASSOCIATED PRESS Rioters storm the nation’s Capitol on Jan. 6. Details from the riot are contained in a previously undisclose­d document prepared by the Pentagon for internal use that was obtained by The Associated Press.
 ??  ?? Mayor Muriel Bowser
Mayor Muriel Bowser

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