20th anniversary of the Iraq invasion: Lessons learned?
As we approach the 20th anniversary of the Iraq invasion, it’s time to reflect on what lessons, if any, the United States may have gleaned from the experience and whether such lessons will deter any future military operations to effect regime change.
By all accounts, the invasion has failed in achieving whatever goals U.S. policymakers had identified to justify the massive military operation in Iraq. Aside from removing Saddam Hussein from power, the country is still plagued by instability, corruption, sectarian conflicts, economic dislocation, dysfunctional infrastructure and terrorism. Several factors contributed to the post-invasion debacle.
Politics, religion
As a government intelligence analyst on the eve of the Iraq invasion, I was appalled by how little our senior policymakers knew about the formation of modern Iraq and the establishment of Shia Islam in the southern Iraqi city of Karbala. Nor did our leaders appreciate the depth of the grievances among Iraq’s Shia majority.
Iran’s deeply rooted geopolitical and religious interests in Iraq go back to the 16th century when Shia Islam became the official religion of Iran. Najaf and Karbala have always constituted the hub of the most influential Shia seminaries or centers of learning, also known as hawzas.
This helps explain why Iran became so involved in Iraq after the invasion and the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Iranian-supported and -armed Shia militias began to organize in Iraq in the ensuing years and foment an insurgency against the American “invaders.”
Several months after the invasion, senior policymakers were asking government analysts to explain why, as they put it, the “Shia thing” was so important in Iraq, and why Iran was so focused on it?
Day-after questions
Aside from the rudimentary knowledge of Iraqi realities, senior policymakers in Washington were not focused on what would follow the Saddam regime. Reflecting a sense of “can do” hubris, some thought the massive American presence would by itself create and maintain stability in Iraq. Regime change was viewed by some top officials as a manageable process that included replacing one leader with another, while maintaining business as usual.
Throughout Iraq’s turbulent history, the Shia majority was excluded from power and never allowed to develop a leadership cadre that could one day rule the country. Consequently, top U.S. policymakers relied on Iraqi Shia exiles, such as Ahmed Chalabi, who were encouraged to return and run the country. That decision, which was made at the highest level of the U.S. government, ignored Chalabi’s murky background and his naked political ambitions.
In their frequent briefings to senior policymakers on the eve of the invasion, government analysts raised several key questions that they felt needed to be addressed once Saddam Hussein was removed. These focused, among other things, on which tribes to engage, who will rule Iraq, which senior Shia leaders to deal with and how to distribute the oil revenues.
In the run-up to the war, senior policymakers maintained Iraqis would welcome American troops as “liberators” and would view the occupation as “liberation.” Shortly after the fall of Saddam, however, the euphoria of “liberation” turned into occupation and the insurgency against the “occupiers” erupted across Iraq.
De-Ba’athification
The senior architects of the Iraq war in Washington on the eve of the invasion knew very little about the centrality of the Ba’ath Party to all levels of Iraqi society. They were briefed that the party was the backbone of the Saddam regime in Iraq and party membership was absolutely essential to getting any job — from a janitor to a university professor. But membership was not necessarily a sign of loyalty to the party, but rather a means to earn a living.
De-Ba’athification and the dissolution of the Iraqi military were the two most disastrous decisions made by the American administration in Baghdad following Saddam’s fall.
Lessons learned?
Intelligence and policy expertise on Iraq were made available to policymakers at the highest levels, but such expertise and in-depth analysis were ignored. Groupthink and seemingly a lack of interest in what expert analysts had to offer underpinned the war decision, which, in turn, resulted in the debacle that followed.
As the country observes the 20th anniversary of the Iraq invasion and before our leaders embark on another regime change adventure, they should base their decision on deep expertise about the target country, strong and verifiable intelligence, a nationally acceptable rationale, and clear end-game objectives. Above all, they should display genuine humility regarding the limits of the United States’ ability to control the unfolding of events, and the resulting outcomes and broader repercussions.
Emile Nakhleh is a retired senior intelligence service officer, and a founding director of the CIA’s Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program and the Global and the National Security Policy Institute at the University of New Mexico. Since retiring from the government, Nakhleh has consulted on national security issues, particularly Islamic radicalization, terrorism and the Arab states of the Middle East. He is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations.