How the U.S. should prepare for the coming Gaza war

The next conflict in the tragic Gaza saga is around the corner. Hamas leaders speak openly of their commitment to armed struggle against Israel. The director of Israel’s Shin Bet describes a near-constant battle to foil Hamas terrorist attacks in the West Bank, any one of which, if successful, could be the match that reignites the Gaza fire.

While no effort should be spared to prevent another round of violence, we should not be caught flat-footed when it starts. As U.S. ambassador to Israel, I took part in the ceasefire negotiations that ended both the 2012 and 2014 conflicts. These experiences offer lessons on how to contain and stop the violence when it starts, and to prevent it from beginning anew.

To begin, though, let’s be clear about where the blame for Gaza’s suffering lies. Since Hamas seized control of the territory in 2007, following Israel’s full withdrawal in 2005, it has devoted its resources and ingenuity not to improving conditions for Gaza residents, but to smuggling weapons, firing rockets, building tunnels and kidnapping Israelis. At the urging of the United States and the international community, Israel has progressively loosened economic restrictions on Gaza and permitted significant humanitarian assistance to enter. But periodically, Hamas’ acts of aggression and terror spark conflict, setting back any gains.

The next conflict will likely start the same way. In that moment, there should be no expression of sympathy for the aggressors, a terrorist organization which openly calls for Israel’s destruction through armed conflict, and which maintains links to other regional extremists like Iran and Islamic State. There should, however, be deep concern for those caught in the crossfire between Hamas, which fights behind civilian human shields, and the Israel Defense Forces. Hundreds of Palestinian civilians, including many children, were killed in the fighting in 2014. Israel lost some 70 soldiers, and millions of Israeli civilians lived in the shadow of rockets aimed at their homes, schools and businesses.

So here are several lessons, drawn from my experience, for how the U.S. should approach renewed fighting in Gaza.

First, the United States should offer strong and vocal public support for Israel.

Obviously, the details of how a conflict unfolds matter. But a likely scenario is that a Hamas strike or escalation will be the trigger. A cardinal principle of U.S. support for Israel has been standing up for Israel’s right of self-defense. At the same time, the public support can be accompanied by private diplomacy aimed at encouraging Israel to redouble its efforts to avoid civilian casualties, and to avoid the most extreme operations, like a ground invasion.

President Barack Obama struck this balance well in 2012, with public statements of support and ongoing private communication with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In 2014, our messages were less consistent as the conflict dragged on and the casualty toll mounted. Even so, senior U.S. military officers both praised Israeli measures to minimize civilian casualties and advised their IDF counterparts of the importance of redoubling such efforts.

Second, when it comes to ceasefire negotiations, there is no substitute for Egypt playing the leading role.

Only the Egyptians, with their peace treaty with Israel and their unique intelligence channels with Hamas, have the relationships and standing with both sides to act effectively as a mediator.

This was true when the Muslim Brotherhood ruled Cairo in 2012, and when its nemesis, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, took power in 2014. The U.S. should provide support, but not seek to lead. Arguably, the United States tried to do too much in 2014, and we found ourselves awkwardly inserted between our democratic ally and a terrorist organization (via Turkish and Qatari proxies), whose word we could neither trust nor vouch for.

Egypt’s modestly improving relations with Hamas are actually a positive indicator for conflict containment. While Egypt knows how to squeeze Hamas, Hamas also has more to lose by alienating the government that controls much of its freedom of movement.

Third, the U.S. should be prepared to maintain assistance to Israel’s successful missile defense programs.

The Iron Dome system, which has received over $1.3 billion in U.S. investment, has been a key factor in containing conflicts, giving Israeli leaders time and flexibility in determining how to respond.

In 2014, Iron Dome intercepted over 700 rockets that were heading for populated areas. If even one of them had landed and caused significant casualties, Israeli leaders would have faced irresistible public pressure to conduct a full ground invasion of Gaza. In this way, Iron Dome saved both Palestinian and Israeli lives. As in 2014, if Israel needs emergency resupply assistance for Iron Dome, the administration and Congress should rush to provide it.

Fourth, the United States should lead an international effort, working with Israel and Egypt, to rush humanitarian assistance to Gaza during any conflict.

Don’t wait for the end of the fighting. In the 2014 conflict, Israel permitted the continued flow of consumer goods and humanitarian supplies to Gaza. It also supplied electricity to Gaza even as Hamas fired rockets at the power plant that was providing that electricity. At the same time, Israeli airstrikes damaged or destroyed many homes, public facilities and infrastructure. Extensive humanitarian assistance was required to keep people fed and housed, and to prevent outbreaks of disease. IDF officials with responsibility for the humanitarian situation turned to the U.S. Agency for International Development to coordinate the assistance effort; the United States should be prepared to lead again.

Finally, the United States should advocate massive rehabilitation in exchange for Hamas’ complete disarmament.

This is the only arrangement that can relieve Gaza’s suffering and prevent the next conflict.

Following the 2014 conflict, the U.N. Security Council considered, but did not pass, a resolution locking in this trade-off. It can and should be resurrected. For a decade, Hamas has prioritized its ability to conduct damaging but ultimately fruitless wars against Israel over Palestinians’ ability to improve their lives. But the means to reverse this dynamic exist. International donors, weary of an endless cycle of conflict and reconstruction, could be motivated to take part in an extensive program of rehabilitation of Gaza’s housing and infrastructure, coupled with the removal of Hamas’ arsenal, the destruction of attack tunnels, and a verification regime to prevent rearming.

Creative solutions exist—including the construction of an offshore island with a seaport and airport—to permit the importation of the goods Gaza needs to rebuild, while ensuring that the smuggling of weapons does not resume. The Palestinian Authority, supported by Israel and Egypt, must embrace a role as monitor and guarantor of Gaza’s border crossings, a first step toward supplanting Hamas for control of the entire territory.

Remember that any conflict poses a real threat to the Palestinian Authority, which would, once again, be tasked with helping prevent passions in the West Bank from boiling over, and would thus be accused of collaborating with Israel. A prolonged Gaza conflict has always been one scenario that could plausibly lead to the collapse of the Palestinian Authority—and the hope of a two-state solution.

The United States probably cannot stop another round of conflict in Gaza, with all the suffering that Palestinians and Israelis will endure. But we can and should be prepared to make every effort to contain and end it, and prevent the next round.

Daniel Shapiro, who served as U.S. ambassador to Israel under President Barack Obama, is a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University.