Gut check for the Saudi lobby

Washington needs to have a thorough debate about Saudi Arabia and whether the bilateral relationship as it now stands serves U.S. interests. That raises a difficult question: Is it possible to have an honest discussion when so many American experts are, in one way or another, on the Saudi payroll?

Many countries spend heavily to influence Congress or U.S. public opinion, but the Saudi operation dwarfs most of them. In the decade after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, in which 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi nationals, the regime spent more than $100 million to rebuild its image here, according to Ben Freeman of the Center for International Policy. Last year alone it spent $27.3 million on lobbyists and consultants, according to public records; more than 200 people have registered as Saudi agents.

So far, all the influence-buying has not protected the regime from the powerful backlash to the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Four lobbying firms and at least one think tank have cut their ties with the Saudis. Most top U.S. executives canceled their participation in a major investment conference in Riyadh last week. There has been almost no public dissent from a bipartisan congressional chorus casting doubt on the credibility of the regime’s explanation of the Khashoggi murder and calling for sanctions.

Over time, however, the Saudi lobby will seek to re-assert itself, just as it did after 9/11.

In the long run, a total break in relations would not serve anyone’s interest. But future cooperation ought to depend on whether there is full accountability for Khashoggi’s murder. By pushing for such accountability now, the Saudis’ Washington advocates would best serve the alliance—while helping to preserve their own integrity.