Capitol Police knew riot risk, senators find
Report focuses on failures to communicate, prepare
WASHINGTON — The U.S. Capitol Police had specific intelligence that supporters of then-President Donald Trump planned to mount an armed invasion of the Capitol at least two weeks before the Jan. 6 riot, according to new findings in a bipartisan Senate investigation, but a series of omissions and miscommunications kept that information from reaching front-line officers targeted by the violence.
A joint report, from the Senate Rules and Administration and the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs committees, outlines the most detailed public timeline to date of the communications and intelligence failures that led the Capitol Police and partner agencies to prepare for the “Stop the Steal” protest as though it were a routine Trump rally, instead of the organized assault that was planned in the open online.
Released Tuesday, the report shows how an intelligence arm of the Capitol Police disseminated security assessments labeling the threat of violence “remote” to “improbable,” even as authorities collected evidence showing that pro-Trump activists intended to take weapons to the demonstration and “storm the Capitol.”
“There were significant, widespread and unacceptable breakdowns in the intelligence gathering . ... The failure to adequately assess the threat of violence on that day contributed significantly to the breach of the Capitol,” Sen. Gary Peters, D-Mich., chairman of the homeland security panel, told reporters. “The attack was, quite frankly, planned in plain sight.”
The bipartisan report is the latest to examine the security failures that contributed to the mayhem as Congress tallied Electoral College results certifying Joe Biden’s victory in the 2020 presidential election. It was released just days after the Senate rejected legislation to create an independent
investigative commission that passed the House with strong bipartisan support, and as lawmakers continue to wrestle with how to pay for security improvements to the Capitol grounds.
The report’s recommendations, which call for better planning, training and intelligence gathering, largely mirror those of other investigators who have examined the topic, and its contents steer clear of offering any assessment or conclusion about Trump’s responsibility for the riot.
Still, the report provides a vivid picture of how poor communication and unheeded warnings left officers underequipped to face violent threats about which they had not been made aware, leaving the Capitol vulnerable to an attack that otherwise might have been preventable.
According to the report, Capitol Police intelligence officers knew as early as Dec. 21 that protesters planned to “bring guns” and other weapons to the Jan. 6 demonstration and turn them on any law enforcement officers who blocked their entry into the Capitol. They knew that would-be rioters were sharing maps of the Capitol campus online and discussing the building’s best entry points — and how to seal them off to trap lawmakers inside. But that information was shared only with command officers.
A separate security assessment dated Dec. 23 made no mention of those findings. Neither did a follow-up Dec. 30.
The only hints about what the Capitol Police’s Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division knew appeared at the end of a 15-page report released on Jan. 3, which stated that “there is the possibility that the protesters may be inclined to become violent,” and that their desperation “may lead to a significantly dangerous situation for law enforcement and the general public alike.” But even that warning was fleeting: In the days that followed, in the Capitol Police’s daily intelligence assessments, such notes about violence were nowhere to be found.
The Senate committees’ report found fault with the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI for failing to provide specific warnings about the threats posed to the Capitol. According to the report’s findings, the FBI alerted the Capitol Police of potential “war” only the night before Trump’s rally, attaching the warning to a casually worded email that was shared with other law enforcement agencies — and the warning was picked up by a Capitol Police intelligence unit separate from the one that had been preparing the threat assessments.
The joint Senate investigation recommended improving the Capitol Police’s intelligence-gathering capabilities by, among other steps, housing all such specialists in one centralized unit.
But the report suggests that even with better intelligence, other governance and organizational deficiencies within the Capitol Police may have doomed its ability to respond to the riot. According to the findings, “fewer than ten” uniformed officers had actually been trained in how to use the “full suite of lessthan-lethal munitions” that Capitol Police rely on for mob control, and much of the equipment in the force’s possession was either defective or inaccessible during the attack.
BOARD CRITICIZED
The report was heavily critical of the Capitol Police Board, a three-member panel made up of the heads of security for the House and Senate and the Architect of the Capitol. The board now is required to approve requests by the police chief, even in urgent situations. The report recommends that its members “regularly review the policies and procedures” after senators found that the three board members on Jan. 6 did not understand their own authority and could not detail the statutory requirements for requesting National Guard assistance.
Steven Sund, the Capitol Police chief, never filed a formal request to call in the National Guard, the report determined, despite repeatedly asking his superiors to procure such backup — and the members of the Capitol Police Board still disagree about whether approving such a request needed to be a unanimous decision.
Two of the three board members, the House and Senate sergeants-at-arms, were pushed out in the days after the attack. Sund resigned under pressure.
Giving the Capitol Police chief the power to call up the National Guard in emergencies is among the report’s 20 bipartisan recommendations for improving the Capitol’s security posture in the future — and the subject of forthcoming legislation from Rules and Administration Committee leaders, Sens. Amy Klobuchar, D-Minn., and Roy Blunt, R-Mo. The recommendations also include pointed suggestions for federal agencies, such as exhorting the Defense Department and the District of Columbia National Guard to devise a standing plan for protecting the Capitol and mounting a faster response to terrorist threats.
The report faults slow mobilization and poor interdepartmental communication — not any sort of stand-down order from the White House, as some Trump critics had speculated — for the fact that it took the National Guard more than three hours to respond to pleas for help from the Capitol during the attack. According to its findings, it was Army staff members — not Trump — expressing early reservations about a military intervention, while the Army secretary claimed he was never informed that the District of Columbia National Guard had a quick reaction force “ready to go” to the Capitol, just awaiting his approval.
OFFICERS WITHOUT ORDERS
In a response to the report, the Capitol Police acknowledged the need for improvements and said some are already being made. “Law enforcement agencies across the country rely on intelligence, and the quality of that intelligence can mean the difference between life and death,” the statement said.
During the attack, the report says, the police force’s incident command system “broke down during the attack,” leaving officers on the front lines without orders. There were no functional incident commanders, and some senior officers were fighting instead of giving orders. Capitol Police “leadership never took control of the radio system to communicate orders to front-line officers,” the investigation found.
“I was horrified that no deputy chief or above was on the radio or helping us,” one officer told the committee in an anonymous statement. “For hours the screams on the radio were horrific, the sights were unimaginable and there was a complete loss of control. … For hours no Chief or above took command and control. Officers were begging and pleading for help for medical triage.”
The acting chief, Yogananda Pittman, who replaced Sund after his resignation, told the committees that the lack of communication resulted from “incident commanders being overwhelmed and engaging with rioters, rather than issuing orders over the radio.”
The committee’s interviews with police officers detail “absolutely brutal” abuse from Trump’s supporters as they ran over them and broke into the building. The officers described hearing racial slurs and seeing Nazi salutes. One officer trying to evacuate the Senate said he had stopped several men in full tactical gear, one of whom said, “You better get out of our way, boy, or we’ll go through you to get [the senators].’”
The insurrectionists told police officers they would kill them, then members of Congress.
At the same time, the senators acknowledge the officers’ bravery, noting that one officer told them, “The officers inside all behaved admirably and heroically and, even outnumbered, went on the offensive and took the Capitol back.”
CALL FOR COMMISSION
Senate Majority Leader
Charles Schumer, D-N.Y., said Tuesday that the findings show an even greater need for a bipartisan commission to investigate the root causes of the attack, referring to Trump’s fraud claims about the 2020 election.
“As the ‘big lie’ continues to spread, as faith in our elections continues to decline, it is crucial — crucial — that we establish a trusted, independent record of what transpired,” said Schumer.
But Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., who led the blockade against such a commission, said he’s confident the ongoing reviews by lawmakers and law enforcement will be sufficient.
The House in May passed legislation to create a commission that would be modeled after a panel that investigated the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks.
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., told colleagues in a letter Tuesday that if the Senate fails to approve the commission, her chamber will launch its own investigations.
The most tangible impact of the report, may come in the next several weeks, as lawmakers tackle what changes they can effect at the Capitol.
Last month, the House narrowly passed a $1.9 billion supplemental appropriations package to pay for security improvements to the Capitol and settle accounts with the various agencies that responded to the riot. The intensely partisan reception for the measure all but guarantees that it will be narrowed as it moves through the Senate, where such legislation must procure 60 votes to avoid a procedural filibuster.
The senators who cowrote the report told reporters that they hope it provides a guide for what must be done — and that it can get the necessary bipartisan support to pass.
“It should be informing the supplemental appropriation,” said Sen. Rob Portman, R-Ohio, the top Republican on the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.