What courts? Part II
Today, I continue last week’s discussion regarding the disparity between what Supreme Court opinions command and how they’re enforced. High Court proclamations represent the end of litigation, but because they’re not self-executing, implementation can be challenging.
Recently, you likely read here that Chris Corbitt, Ben Motal, and I brought a case that ended with the Arkansas Supreme Court ruling attorneys may carry guns into state courthouses. I provide en toto, as background for today’s exposition, the merits portion of Supreme Court’s opinion. (I made de minimis formatting changes and omitted citations, case history, and procedural issues.)
Justice Shawn Womack, delivering the opinion for all justices except Karen Baker, who dissented, wrote:
“The remaining claims must proceed on the merits of the case. The relevant language from the controlling statute is as follows: ‘[A] law enforcement officer, either on-duty or off-duty, officer of the court, bailiff, or other person authorized by the court is permitted to possess a handgun in the courtroom of any court or a courthouse of this state.’
“In interpreting the language of the statute in parts relevant to the remaining issues in this appeal, it unequivocally permits certain individuals, including 1) law enforcement officers, 2) bailiffs, and 3) officers of the court, to possess handguns in courthouses within the state.
“First, each word in a statute must be given significance and meaning. Here, the inclusion of the term ‘officer of the court’ alongside law enforcement officers and bailiffs suggests a deliberate intent by the legislature to afford individuals falling within this category the privilege of possessing handguns in court settings.
“Next, it is important to emphasize that the term ‘other’ serves as a determiner in this case. If the drafters had meant for the phrase ‘authorized by the court’ to apply to each item, they would have left out the word ‘other.’ (The argument that ‘other person authorized by the court’ modifies the first three groups is absurd and would render most of the statute superfluous. If this were, in fact, true, the statute would only need to authorize one group to carry a handgun inside a courthouse: those whom the judge has authorized.)
“As a result, attorneys, as officers of the court ([and] [a]s this court has repeatedly recognized, an ‘officer of the court’ is commonly understood to include an attorney or a lawyer), are recognized under the statute as individuals authorized to possess handguns in courthouses within the state.
“Although Amendment 80, section 3 of the Arkansas Constitution was raised initially in this case, we need not address it given that appellants have abandoned the argument regarding courtrooms on appeal and have narrowly argued their position as it relates to courthouses. The dissent claims this court distinguished courtrooms from courthouses, and that is ‘a distinction without a difference.’ Yet this court distinguishes the two because the General Assembly distinguished them in the section we are called to interpret.
“Section 5-73-122(e) demonstrates that the General Assembly did not consider courthouses and courtrooms the same. While subsection 122(c) used both terms, subsection 122(e) created an exception where it provided off-duty law enforcement officer could not ‘carry a firearm into a courtroom if the off-duty law enforcement officer is a party to or a witness in a civil or criminal matter …’ It did not provide the same exclusion for courthouses. Thus, when the appellant limited his case to courtrooms, so does the court limit its constitutional application. A decision on a challenge to the courtroom provision will be considered when it is before the court, and we will not sua sponte address it now.
“Accordingly, the circuit court erred when it denied the remaining plaintiffs’ petition for a declaratory judgment. We reverse [Judge Chip Welch’s opinion] on this point and remand … .”
Kudos to Womack for penning a succinct, logical, and unpretentious opinion.
My first contact in seeking to implement the high court’s order was with Adam Fogleman, counsel to Pulaski County, where the case began. He could not have been more professional and courteous. Fogelman seems intent on executing the court’s instructions, irrespective of whether he personally agrees. Kudos!
If that was all I had to report, this wouldn’t be a column. During our discussions, however, Fogleman inquired as what feedback I received on entering the Supreme Court’s courthouse. That prompted me to go there.
I was greeted by two Supreme Court police officers. (They have their own four-person department.) The duo told me that: (1) they were aware of the court’s ruling, and (2) attorneys would not be permitted to carry guns into their courthouse. Wait, what?
When I asked with whom I could speak about this disconnect, the officers directed me to their chief, Pete Hollingsworth, who works in the building. But the officers quickly told me that he wasn’t available. They had me leave my number and told me that they’d have the chief call me. That was May 1. I’m still waiting.
My next step will to be to write the chief justice in his capacity as the court’s chief administrative officer, along with the so-far silent chief, asking for an explanation as to why the Supreme Court Police Department refuses to allow guns in their courthouse. The irony seems a bit on the nose.
I’ll let you know what I hear in response—if anything—because:
This is your right to know.