Bullpen could prove to be Nationals’ undoing
His bullpen lurks over every decision Dave Martinez makes in these playoffs, a poison pill he is forced to swallow now or later. It makes standard bullpen strategy difficult and difficult choices impossible. Most every manager does not have to decide how hard he should push to win a World Series game. The manager of the Washington Nationals does. The effects Saturday night, in the seventh inning of Game 4, were calamitous.
The Nationals entered the seventh inning trailing by three runs, in almost the same spot Martinez found himself Friday night. In Game 3, Martinez had holstered Sean Doolittle and Daniel Hudson, his only two trustworthy relievers, while keeping the game competitive. Within a loss that counted as a minor-yet-significant victory. Martinez attempted the same tack Saturday night, and his decisions imploded.
In a tenuous moment Saturday night, every path presented Martinez with disaster. In the seventh inning, the Nationals trailed the Houston Astros by three. He could insert his best relievers and risk losing despite their usage, which for these Nationals, a team with only six reliable pitchers, is a nightmare. He could summon his secondary relievers and risk the game spiraling. He could stick with a reliever in the middle, Tanner Rainey, who had walked two batters and risk watching him unravel.
The composition of his bullpen left Martinez no good options. The one he chose backfired in spectacular fashion. He picked Fernando Rodney to replace Rainey, and pitching for the second consecutive night, Rodney turned a competitive game into an 8-1 rout, turned a chance to seize control of the World Series into a 2-2 split.
“For me, you don’t chase wins,” Martinez said. “Come tomorrow, we’re up 2-0, and all of a sudden we’re in the seventh inning. You gotta use Hudson for two innings, you gotta use Doolittle for two innings. You want those guys ready to pitch. I know we got a day off the next day. All this was talked about before the game. But when you’re down still three runs ...”
When you’re down three runs and you’re Dave Martinez, you have no easy decision - and no good decision. Washington’s quiet bats may have ensured a 2-2 series tie regardless of how Martinez deployed his pitches, but Rodney’s appearance erased any hope.
Protecting a three-run lead, Rodney faced five batters. Those hitters produced hideous results: single, grand slam, walk, walk, walk. As the carnage piled up, Martinez found himself under scrutiny for his bullpen management, a position he grew familiar with during the season and distanced himself from in October.
Throughout the postseason, Martinez has possessed a divine touch. When he has called on his suspect bullpen, it has recorded outs. When he has inserted a hitter into the lineup, he has produced. Even his funkiest moves - like intentionally walking the go-ahead run in Game 4 of the NLDS - have worked to perfection.
The past two nights, Martinez has watched big decisions implode. He allowed Game 3 starter Aníbal Sánchez to bat with one out and a runner on third in the fourth inning, and for surrendering a likely run, Martinez received only four more outs and a run allowed from Sánchez.
The seventh inning Saturday night proved more calamitous, and perhaps more questionable. Martinez faces a daunting task in managing his bullpen, which contains two trusted relievers - Doolittle and Hudson - and a gaggle of uncertainties and arsonists.
When do you chase a win? A potentially huge rally had fizzled in the bottom of the sixth with just one run, making the score 4-1. If another run or two had crossed, Hudson or Doolittle likely would
Washington Post photo have entered.
“It definitely would have different,” Martinez said.
But it was a three-run game, not two or one. Martinez could have started the seventh with Hudson. He did not want to chase a win. He opted instead for Rainey.
“It makes sense,” Astros outfielder Josh Reddick said. “You don’t want to use your horses unless you have it one run or a tied game or a lead. You got to save your horses for what they’re there for.”
Rainey was a sound choice, a flamethrower who mixes spasms of dominance with crippling wildness. Rainey immediately walked pinch hitter Kyle Tucker and George Springer. Rodney started warming. Rainey stabilized with José Altuve’s lazy flyout, and sticking with him would have been the easiest path for Martinez. From experience, he viewed that as a nonstarter.
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When Patrick Corbin recorded six innings, Martinez’s aim had become keeping Game 4 within reach without wasting Hudson and Doolittle in what could become a three-run loss. In Corbin’s starts, Martinez is especially handcuffed - one of his few trusted relievers had started the game. He had a list of bad options. From them, though, he may have picked the worst at a crucial moment.
Martinez emerged and signaled for Rodney. No matter the upcoming hitters, it carried substantial risk. Rodney, who at 42 is the oldest player in the majors by three years, has struggled when pitching consecutive days. In the 14 appearances Rodney pitched this season on zero days rest, opponents hit .283 with a .365 on-base percentage and slugged .500. Rodney had not pitched all playoffs on back-toback days.
While acknowledging the unique difficulty of Martinez’s task, it’s hard to escape two facts. Rodney pitching consecutive days should be considered an option only in an emergency. Martinez orchestrated it at one of the highest-leverage points of Washington’s season.
The only left-hander Martinez had to face Brantley was Doolittle. Rodney’s best pitch is his changeup, both an effective weapon for a right-hander against a lefty and a strong pitch for inducing a double play. Instead, Brantley hit a soft liner up the middle for a single.
Unless Brantley rolled into the double play, choosing Rodney invited disaster. After Brantley loomed Alex Bregman, the presumptive American League MVP, one of the most dangerous hitters in baseball.
The night before, Rodney had retired Bregman on a weak groundball following his intentional walk to Brantley. An optimist would see proof Rodney can retire Bregman in a big spot. A realist would concede Bregman seeing Rodney’s arsenal again would swing an already sizable advantage further in Bregman’s direction.
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