Tired of bad cops? First, look at their labor unions.
6pecial To The :ashington 3ost
$fter every police brutality case like the one involving *eorge )loyd, there are loud calls – this time backed by nationwide protests – for police departments to reform. )rustratingly, nothing seems to change. $mong the many reasons for this bureaucratic sclerosis, one often gets overlooked the power of police labor unions.
The purpose of policing is to promote public safety and uphold the rule of law so that individuals and communities can thrive. The purpose of police unions, however, is to win members better salaries and benefits and to protect their job security – specifically by pushing for safeguards against investigation, discipline and dismissal. These protections can make it difficult for police chiefs to manage their forces effectively and can allow a few bad officers to act with impunity, poisoning an entire organizational culture in the process.
The most notorious example of this problem emerged from &hicago after the 2 killing of -year-old /aquan McDonald by officer Jason Van Dyke. %efore that fatal incident, Van Dyke had been the subject of 2 civilian complaints, of which alleged excessive use of force. %ut under the union rules then in place, the complaints proved toothless. $s a task force appointed by Mayor 5ahm (manuel in the wake of the shooting reported, “The collective bargaining agreements between the police unions and the &ity >had@ essentially turned the code of silence into official policy.”
To be sure, many of the protections demanded by police unions reflect the unique challenges of policing. %ecause of the nature of their work, law enforcement officers tend to have adversarial relationships with the citizens and communities they serve. )alse or exaggerated complaints are inevitable, and it is understandable that labor representatives would want to protect their members against these threats.
3roblems arise when these provisions are exploited to help cover for bad policing. In many $merican cities, police union contracts limit the amount of time an officer accused of misconduct can be interviewed, who can interview him and when an interview can occur. +ouston and /ouisville, .entucky, for example, allow for delays of up to hours before an interview with an officer accused of wrongdoing. 2n one hand, these rules protect officers who, because they must make statements on the record, surrender as a condition of their jobs their constitutional right to remain silent. 2n the other hand, this grace period can be used as time for officers to “get their story straight.”
In %altimore and other cities, labor contracts allow – or even require – expunging officers’ records of past disciplinary actions or accusations of misconduct. In &leveland, a Justice Department investigation into the police department was stymied because the union contract required the deletion of disciplinary records every two years. $t their most benign, these policies deprive supervisors of accurate personnel files, making effective management – and organizational change – impossible. In more troubling circumstances, they allow cops who have violated the public trust to take police jobs in new cities without any record of their past infractions.
*rievance and arbitration proceedings are another obstacle to accountability. These provisions are often the largest part of any contract and are discussed in mind-numbing detail. In 1ew %eyond erecting structural obstacles to reform, unions also informally perpetuate some of the most problematic aspects of police culture. /abor leaders have considerable influence over rankand-file officers, and they don’t always use that influence constructively. $s tragic as )loyd’s death is, it might finally prompt union leaders to reconsider some of these practices – and to put the mission of the police above job security for officers. In the past several days, many police unions have broken with their usual wagon-circling and openly denounced the actions of the Minneapolis officers involved in )loyd’s death.