THE SHORTCOMINGS OF CURRENT OPTIONS

If each side simply stays on its current course, the future of U.S.-Saudi relations is bleak. Left to its own devices, Saudi Arabia will continue its hedging policies, maintaining its OPEC+ agreement with Russia over oil quotas and deepening its trading ties to China, perhaps discounting its oil sales, and even pursuing an oil-for-yuan trade, though this objective would remain elusive as long as the Saudi riyal is pegged to the dollar. Over time, the Saudis would likely buy more arms and technology from China and Russia and less from the United States. At a time of intense geopolitical competition, Saudi Arabia’s gravitation to a Russo-Chinese alliance would represent a win for them and a strategic setback for the United States.

Unable to rely on the United States for its security but knowing that China and Russia would not sacrifice their relations with Iran for the sake of Saudi security, Saudi Arabia would likely try to find a modus vivendi with Iran. However, it could never afford to rely on Iranian goodwill for its security. Thus, lacking any reliable great power ally to underwrite its security, Saudi Arabia would probably pursue its own nuclear weapons program and shift even more toward Israel, as the two Middle Eastern powers would maintain a common interest in deterring and containing Iran.

For its part, the United States would take a more adversarial approach to Saudi Arabia’s decision to hedge with China and side with Russia in keeping oil prices high, as that took a higher toll on Western and developing economies. The Biden administration and Congress would likely adopt an ever more critical view of bin Salman’s human rights record and the prosecution of his war in Yemen.

Although this separation between the two countries would be painful, it would also have benefits. If decoupling improves Saudi-Israeli