INCLUDE PALESTINIANS IN POST-WAR GAZA PEACE FORCE
As New Year’s Day approaches in a blood-soaked Gaza, the Biden administration must prod Israel to face a reality: There is no endgame for this war that doesn’t require a Palestinian security force to help maintain order in Gaza after Hamas is deposed.
Where will this postHamas Palestinian force come from? The obvious answer is that it should be drawn from the thousands of Palestinians who serve in the roughly half-dozen security organizations now under the nominal control of the Palestinian Authority.
The authority is incompetent and corrupt — so this is hardly an ideal option. Israel rightly faults the authority for doing a poor job in maintaining law and order in the West Bank. But the authority, for all its faults, provides the best bridge to a postwar international peacekeeping force for Gaza, with Arab support. The authority has supporters in Gaza who despise Hamas. But they need help — not more bombs.
This challenge — of empowering and training security forces drawn from the Palestinian Authority — is one that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu keeps resisting. But Biden administration officials see no other good pathway forward; they’re urging Israel to address the challenge before the carnage in Gaza gets worse and the future power vacuum there becomes impossible for anyone to fill.
The reality is that the future of Palestinian security in Gaza begins with improved Palestinian security forces in the West Bank. That’s where such forces, independent of Hamas, can learn how to protect Palestinians, even as they cooperate with Israel, the United States and moderate Arab governments.
The multiple security services illustrate the jumble of responsibility within the authority. Some units, such as the Presidential Guard and parts of the General Intelligence Service, have been well-trained by the CIA and Jordanian military and intelligence. The problem is that their writ has been too narrow, with authority limited mostly to what’s called “Area A” of the West Bank, which includes the big cities of Hebron, Ramallah, Nablus and Jenin, but accounts for only 18% of the overall territory.
To develop the leadership and skills they will need in Gaza — and the West Bank — the security forces need a wider footprint. The State Department explicitly calls for them to move into “areas vacated by [the Israel Defense Forces], including Area B,” which connects the West Bank’s big cities and accounts for another 22% of the West Bank.
Biden administration officials understand the need for such an expansion. But they’ve been wary of pressing a beleaguered Israel. They should push harder.
Time is running out. Unless the authority can operate across a wider swath of the West Bank and begin training for a future role in Gaza, it won’t have the confidence of Palestinians or the competence to be a strong partner for Israel.
Israel’s path out of Gaza also requires a crackdown on violence by extremist settlers in the West Bank. The Biden administration should recognize that senior IDF commanders oppose violence committed by extremist settlers and the harassment of the authority’s fragile security forces because they make it harder to maintain order in the West Bank — and, eventually, to create a stable post-Hamas order in Gaza in which Palestinian rights and security will be respected. The IDF doesn’t want an endless war.
Netanyahu’s relentless campaign against Hamas has shattered Gaza. He seems to have no idea how to put the pieces back together — or even to care what happens to the Palestinians there. The United States has a plan for the day after, even if Netanyahu doesn’t. He should start listening — or face the likelihood that he will soon be replaced.