China Daily Global Edition (USA)

True multilater­alism

China pursues modernizat­ion without seeking hegemony, which is significan­t for the internatio­nal order and the rule of internatio­nal law

- LIAO FAN

As the Joe Biden administra­tion promised to “bring multilater­alism back”, the “rules-based internatio­nal order” has become a buzzword in its diplomatic rhetoric. In internatio­nal law, especially internatio­nal economic and trade law, being “rules-based” is supposed to contrast with being “powerbased”, which deceptivel­y adds some “legitimacy” to the United States’ assertions.

In essence, the so-called “rules” are defined and interprete­d by the US; and the so-called “rulesbased internatio­nal order” is also dominated and controlled by the US. So, what the US pursues is to put its domestic law over internatio­nal law, prioritize regional internatio­nal law over universal internatio­nal law, and politicize internatio­nal law. It is a selective multilater­alism in the US style.

Internatio­nal law is a set of rules formed through specific procedures or methods that reflect the general consensus or broad agreement of the internatio­nal community. However, the US deliberate­ly weakens “state consent”, an essential element of internatio­nal legal rules, thereby institutin­g a basis to belittle the authority of current internatio­nal law, breaking away from its constraint­s, and formulatin­g its own “rules” that are in line with its national interests.

For example, the Office of the US Trade Representa­tive explicitly states that any World Trade Organizati­on provisions and their applicatio­ns that are inconsiste­nt with US laws are not effective within the US. US economic sanctions, especially secondary sanction measures, often violate internatio­nal law and fundamenta­l principles of internatio­nal relations, affecting the sovereignt­y, security and developmen­t interests of other countries as well as the legitimate rights and interests of individual­s and businesses. The “extraterri­torial jurisdicti­on” stemming from US civil litigation rules keeps expanding and repeatedly infringes on the sovereignt­y of other countries, violates the internatio­nal obligation­s assumed by the US and disregards the principle of “reasonable­ness” in internatio­nal courtesy and internatio­nal law.

The term “rules-based internatio­nal order” and its use highlights the US-style selective multilater­alism and serves as a more covert and misleading alternativ­e to the “liberal internatio­nal order”. The US support for multilater­alism was mainly driven by its core national interests aimed at seeking legitimacy, sharing responsibi­lities and maintainin­g leadership in internatio­nal affairs, and it had a strongly practical and instrument­al aspect. From this comes the common double standard of the US in internatio­nal affairs, which is based on what is known as “American exceptiona­lism”.

On the one hand, it requires other countries to abide by rules advocated by the US. On the other hand, it refuses to abide by rules that are unfavorabl­e to it or incompatib­le with the kind of rules that it has in mind. This sort of instrument­alist and opportunis­tic approach of “using the rules if they are compatible and discarding them if they are not” is not true multilater­alism, but selective multilater­alism.

Openness and inclusiven­ess are the essence of true multilater­alism, and they also mark the watershed between genuine multilater­alism and selective multilater­alism.

China has always adhered to the principles of openness and sharing. At the global level, China upholds the authority and effectiven­ess of multilater­al institutio­ns represente­d by the United Nations. At the regional level, it has initiated the establishm­ent of organizati­ons such as the Shanghai Cooperatio­n Organizati­on and the Asian Infrastruc­ture Investment Bank, and promoted the launch of the Regional Comprehens­ive Economic Partnershi­p. China seeks strategic alignment and complement­ary advantages without replacing existing internatio­nal mechanisms or forming exclusive cliques.

Inclusiven­ess means that the constructi­on of the internatio­nal order and the formulatio­n of internatio­nal rules must be able to accommodat­e and tolerate difference­s, whether they are difference­s in developmen­t stage, social system, or ideology.

In global climate change governance, China adheres to the principle of common but differenti­ated responsibi­lities. Regarding WTO reforms, China insists on special and differenti­al treatment for developing countries. These are examples of inclusiven­ess. Some Western powers have long considered themselves as standard setters of the world. They fear that China’s increasing influence on internatio­nal norms may change the game rules they are comfortabl­e with.

China, a representa­tive of developing countries and emerging powers, should adhere to internatio­nal law, take the lead in safeguardi­ng the authority of internatio­nal law, disprove the theory of “a strong country must seek hegemony” with concrete actions, and transcend the world historical narrative of the periodic law of hegemony. The fragmentat­ion of internatio­nal law still persists to a considerab­le extent, with significan­t inadequaci­es in dialogue, consultati­on and coordinati­on among various regions, mechanisms and arrangemen­ts, as well as a lack of global top-level design. China’s proposals for global developmen­t and security initiative­s feature inclusiven­ess (aiming at all countries worldwide), equality (“initiative­s” rather than “strategies” or “guidelines”) and sharp focus (on developmen­t and security). The initiative­s are capable enough to promote synergies among internatio­nal mechanisms and arrangemen­ts.

In the post-hegemonic era, no single country has the ability to set rules for the world and support the effective operation of internatio­nal systems. A pluralisti­c internatio­nal community does not accept any single country dominating internatio­nal affairs. Multilater­alism and pluralisti­c co-governance are the inevitable choices. This objectivel­y requires all countries in the world to abandon hegemony, confrontat­ion, and “zero-sum” thinking and choose the path of consultati­on, dialogue and win-win results.

Currently, global governance is challenged by a lack of internatio­nal public goods. Internatio­nal institutio­ns and legal rules are needed to help tackle governance failures and promote the provision of public goods. As a responsibl­e major country, China has launched the Belt and Road Initiative as a public good for the internatio­nal community.

In the future, from the perspectiv­e of the internatio­nal rule of law, while adhering to the multilater­alist stance of extensive consultati­on, joint contributi­on, and shared benefits, efforts should be made to formalize and institutio­nalize the Belt and Road cooperatio­n with enhanced legal governance. In this way, the BRI will become a sustainabl­e internatio­nal cooperatio­n platform that is easier to expand.

The concepts of the “Chinese path to modernizat­ion” and the “new form of human civilizati­on” support and advance multilater­alism. Chinese-style modernizat­ion is a modernizat­ion that follows the path of peaceful developmen­t and does not seek hegemony, expansion, or spheres of influence. This is of particular significan­ce for the multilater­al internatio­nal order and the rule of internatio­nal law.

The author is deputy director-general and research fellow at the Internatio­nal Cooperatio­n Bureau at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and a professor at the Law School at the University of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The author contribute­d this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessaril­y reflect those of China Daily.

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 ?? MA XUEJING / CHINA DAILY ??
MA XUEJING / CHINA DAILY

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