Remember lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis
Editor’s note: This column contains observations previously shared by the author on the anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the event’s ongoing relevance.
The Cuban Missile Crisis occurred more than a half century ago, but the lessons of that terrifying ColdWar episode remain important. Fading of memories over time argue more strongly for reviewing the story.
Dangers of fatal military mis calculation maybe greater today than during the ColdWar. In theUnited States, our military presence in the Middle East fuels partisan political debate, but little discussion of potential confrontation with Russia.
During Oct. 22-28 in 1962, the Cuba crisis dominatedworld attention, as Washington and Moscow sparred on the edge of thermo nuclear war. Lessons include difficulty of securing accurate intelligence, and the unpredictability of events.
On Oct. 14, 1962, U.S. reconnaissance photos revealed the SovietUnionwas placing offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba, despite contrary assurances. On Oct. 16, after thorough review and analysis, National Security AdviserMcGeorge Bundy informed President John F. Kennedy.
Kennedy and his advisers spent a week debating options. On Oct. 22, 1962, he addressed the nation and stated the missiles must be removed. Until Soviet PremierNikita Khrushchev agreed to withdrawthem on Oct. 28, Armageddon loomed.
SeniorKennedy administration officials, with the exception ofCIA director JohnMcCone, had assumedMoscow would never put long-range missiles into Cuba. They erroneously calculated the Soviets also felt themovewould be just too risky.
Earlier, reconnaissance flights over Cuba were curtailed to avoid antagonizing Moscow and resumed only because McCone aggressively pressed the matter. Analysis developed photographic evidence of the Soviet deception just before the missileswould become operational.
However, therewas already circumstantial evidence, including reports fromreliable Cuba agents, that something of this naturewas underway. As with the GeorgeW. Bush administration regarding Iraqweapons, senior officials chose evidence they preferred.
At the start of the crisis, therewas strong sentiment, especially among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for a conventional air attack followed by an invasion of Cuba. JFK imaginatively decided instead on a naval quarantine as theU.S. first step.
Years after the crisis, surviving policy makers fromCuba, the SovietUnion and theU.S. initiated a series of meetings, which have revealed important new dimensions and insights. Soviet commanders already had shorter-range nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba, and at least for a time the authority to use them in the event of an American invasion of the island.
Soviet submarine commanders had nuclear-armed torpedoes. The important book by Michael Dobbs, “One Minute to Midnight,” documents an occasion in which the commanding officer of a Soviet sub nearly launched one against the harassingU.S. Navy ships.
Bundy’s history of the nuclear age, “Danger and Survival,” published a quarter century after the crisis, revealed JFK privately accepted while publicly rejecting a Soviet proposal for a CubaTurkey missile trade.
Throughout the crisis, Kennedy demonstrated calm, open-minded engagement. He assembled a group that freely debated a wide range of options. When tensions mounted, the president would shrewdly suggest taking a break. The initial strong support for immediate military attack dissipated.
Lessons of the crisis include importance of thorough, objective intelligence analysis, and communicating effectively with opponents. Then and now, strong U.S. presidential leadership is essential.
Today, U.S. troops are in the Mideast along with forces fromRussia, Iran, Israel, Syria, Turkey and various national and terrorist groups. Yet partisan politics drives the debate, not clear consideration of our national interests. There is almost no discussion of possible accidentalwar.
Cuban Missile Crisis lessons remain important, ignored at our peril.