Two views: Negotiate again, or add sanctions?
The North Koreans (have) made clear that their nuclear program is a response to the general “U.S. hostile policy.” As such, nothing Seoul could offer would alter Pyongyang’s commitment to its nuclear arsenal. The North Koreans won’t even deign to negotiate with the South Koreans, whom they described repeatedly as “puppets” of the United States. Thus, the new South Korean president, Moon Jae-in, is in for a major disappointment if he tries to resurrect the “sunshine policy” of unconditional engagement pursued by previous progressive presidents from 1998 to 2008.
President Donald Trump has placed his hopes on Chinese promises to more fully implement U.N. sanctions. But as even he now seems to acknowledge, this hasn’t happened. He tweeted on Tuesday: “While I greatly appreciate the efforts of President Xi ( Jinping) & China to help with North Korea, it has not worked out. At least I know China tried!”
Although Trump has criticized President Barack Obama’s “strategic patience” policy as weak and ineffectual, he has yet to distinguish his North Korea policy from his predecessor’s. Trump’s policy of “maximum pressure” is anything but, and he continues to pull his punches against North Korean and Chinese violators of U.S. law. The Trump administration has also sent conflicting signals about whether it would negotiate with North Korea or potentially conduct a military attack to prevent the regime from mastering an intercontinental ballistic missile.
Initiating a pre-emptive strike would be a bad idea against a state that already has nuclear weapons, as well as 10,000 artillery tubes aimed at Seoul. In our talks, the North Korean officials emphasized that they did not struggle to acquire nuclear weapons only to perish without using them. The implied threat was clear: If the United States were to use military force against North Korea, Pyongyang would retaliate, potentially leading to hundreds of thousands or millions of casualties.
Instead of trying to preempt the North Korean nuclear weapons program, the Trump administration would be better advised to ramp up sanctions, despite predictable Chinese protests. This would impose a penalty on North Korea, without risking a war — and could conceivably hasten the day the Kim regime finally collapses. Bolstering sanctions might not be exciting, but it would be a more pragmatic step than yet another attempt at negotiations.
As Kim Jong Un moves toward longer-range missiles capable of carrying miniaturized nuclear weapons, North Korea could soon pose a new sort of threat. Does it mean that, once he obtains such an arsenal, he will launch a nuclear strike against South Korea, Japan, or California? Almost certainly not. The United States still has a few thousand nukes, which could obliterate Kim’s kingdom. Kim may be erratic, but he’s not suicidal; in fact, his weirdest behavior, like that of his father and grandfather, is geared toward ensuring the survival of his regime and himself. But the further he goes down the nuclear road, the more immune he will become to outside pressure. And, in a crisis, war can erupt from misunderstandings, mixed signals, and desperate needs to demonstrate “credibility.”
In the long run, the only way to “solve North Korea” is probably regime change. But the United States can’t be the agent of this change. First, we’re not very good at it. Second, we have no standing or even much presence in North Korea. Third, it’s a big place; no one could possibly want to station a million U.S. troops in North Korea for decades to come. China will have to be the main actor, and, for reasons already discussed, Beijing is reluctant to step into that role. North Koreans themselves will have to take the lead, and, given Kim’s efficiency at quashing the slightest hint of dissent or disloyalty, this seems unlikely for now.
In the short run, the only course open is to negotiate, not right away, certainly not in the wake of Otto Warmbier’s death, but at some point. We do have an interest in halting North Korea’s march to a larger, longer-range nuclear arsenal. We do have an interest in simply calming the tensions of the region. So do China, South Korea and Japan. North Korea has been lured to the tables before through shrewd combinations of threats and rewards. Clinton’s accord stands as a possible model; it even halted Pyongyang’s drive to a nuclear weapon for eight years.
But this is a delicate matter. How to instill Kim’s confidence to come to the tables in the short run, while setting the stage for his toppling in the long run? This requires shrewd and subtle statesmanship, conducted (or at least advised) by specialists with a deep knowledge of the territory and the history. It also requires patience; this will take longer than two months, and it might not work after two years. And one thing that will get in the way, as much as any obstruction, is a president who erupts before he (or anyone else in his Cabinet) thinks.