Battle of the Superfighters
F-14D Tomcat vs. F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
F-14D Tomcat vs. F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
BY BOB KRESS AND REAR ADM. PAUL GILLCRIST U.S. NAVY, RETIRED
The requirements for a practical, deep interdiction fighter/bomber
have long been the subject of controversy within the naval aviation community, especially when it comes to the F-14D Tomcat versus F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. Often, however, the definition of “deep interdiction” is changed to fit the aircraft being discussed, rather than taking into account the real-world theater of operations for which it is destined.
As shown over Afghanistan, there were four basic requirements for any carrier strike force: • Reach the target. • Don’t get shot down by surfaceto-air missiles (SAMs), anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), or enemy fighters. • Strike the target. • Return to the carrier before running out of gas. Within these four seemingly simple rules are the needs for an airplane to have a long range while carrying sufficient munitions to hammer a target, and still be able to fight its way through enemy aircraft and AAA threats.
Afghanistan Scenario
Because our government doesn’t tell us all of its secrets, we had to make some assumptions while using Afghanistan as an example. It is, however, obvious that reaching the target presents a great challenge. To avoid Silkworm missiles, the carrier battle group probably would not want to venture north of a line joining Masqat in Oman and Ahmadabad in Pakistan. Along this line, the group would be somewhat west of Karachi. Reaching Kabul in Afghanistan would require a oneway flight of roughly 825 statute miles. Assuming the use of S-3 tankers, an F-14D strike refueling somewhere between the towns of Quetta and Sukkur in Pakistan wouldn’t have any trouble attacking targets in the northernmost parts of Afghanistan. If, however, an F-18 refuels in the same spot, it will barely make it to Kabul. The unrefueled radius of an F-14D carrying the normal strike load (four 2,000-pound LGBs, two HARMs, two Sidewinders, plus 675 rounds of 20 mm ammo, and two 280-gallon external tanks) is at least 500 miles. Accompanying F-18s have only a 350-mile radius carrying about half the bomb load. To complete the picture of mission distances, the S-3s would have to dash back to the carriers,
hot refuel, and meet the raid coming out of Afghanistan, which would be much in need of JP-4 cocktails. Why are we nitpicking over mission details? Easy! At the beginning of the studies that led to this article, we were convinced that the Afghan campaign would be an all-USAF show, and that would lead to questions of carrier fleet effectiveness. But map studies combined with knowledge of geopolitical restrictions showed that carrier assets, primarily the F-14D, were just about the United States’ only option. This has clearly been substantiated by events. Of course, the F-14Ds were not the first to hit targets in Afghanistan; B-2 stealth bombers each carried sixteen 2,000-pound GPS-guided bombs. They flew from Whiteman AFB in Missouri; a 33-hour round trip. Further, big-time USAF strategic air assets—B-52s and B-1s, arrived shortly afterward. It was soon apparent that USAF tactical aircraft were not being used in Afghanistan. We went back to the maps and found that, even given unlimited inflight tanker refueling, the USAF F-15 and F-16 could not be used without a Middle Eastern ground base. Turkish bases were simply too far away and would require refueling over hostile areas. Only the use of tactical air bases in Turkmenistan and/or Uzbekistan would work, and this would allow only partial coverage of Afghanistan. The big question then becomes: does the Navy have the assets to be able to carry this kind of war into the future, and what kind of planning is in place? To cut to the chase, the discussion once again reverts to whether or not the new Super Hornet will really cut the mustard or if the Navy has taken yet another wrong turn that will cost us dearly on the battlefield.
History of Naval Aviation Difficulties
The subject of the erosion of Naval aviation has nagged both of us ever since the cancellation of the A-12 program by the Secretary of Defense in the late 1980s. It was a watershed for a number of reasons, not the least of which was the level of bad management that had not been seen in the Pentagon for decades! We can look back on that day and clearly see that the unraveling of the fabric of Naval aviation would become a longterm trend. Neither of us contends that the A-12, as envisioned by Navy leaders, was the right airplane to develop at that point in history. In fact, it wasn’t! That, however, is another story. We have put off writing this article simply because we know it is likely to ruffle many feathers in the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill, but events in Afghanistan again brought our main arguments into focus. Is writing this kind of article worthwhile? We wondered if we might be seen as “piling it on” when the Navy was in difficulty and clearly on a steep, downhill slide. Well, we have listened, with no small restraint, to the pontifications that justify how well the Navy is doing with its favorite program, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet—despite unimpeachable reports to the contrary from the guys in the fleet. Comments made to us by young fleet pilots who have flown the airplane and describe it as “a dog” carry much more weight than statements from senior officers and civilians higher up in the food chain. But certain pontifications in a statement by a senior Naval officer who should have known better served as the last straw. The pronouncement appeared along with a spate of triumphal announcements that celebrated the successful completion of the Super Hornet’s first operational evaluation (OPEVAL). In a publication titled “Inside Washington,” the Navy’s director of operational testing is quoted as saying that the Super Hornet was superior to its earlier models “in every category but three: acceleration, maximum speed and sustained turning performance.” This pronouncement boggled our minds because these are the very performance capabilities that determine a tactical airplane’s survival. Then, as if to justify this hand grenade, the officer is quoted as stating that the Navy has sacrificed speed in the Super Hornet for other beneficial
EVEN GIVEN UNLIMITED IN-FLIGHT TANKER REFUELING, THE USAF F-15 AND F-16 COULD NOT BE USED WITHOUT A MIDDLE EASTERN GROUND BASE
THE NAVY’S DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TESTING IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE SUPER HORNET WAS SUPERIOR TO ITS EARLIER MODELS “IN EVERY CATEGORY BUT THREE: ACCELERATION, MAXIMUM SPEED AND SUSTAINED TURNING PERFORMANCE.”