Foreign Affairs

The Internatio­nal Order Isn’t Ready for the Climate Crisis

The Case for a New Planetary Politics

- Stewart M. Patrick

The planet is in the throes of an environmen­tal emergency. Humanity’s continued addiction to fossil fuels and its voracious appetite for natural resources have led to runaway climate change, degraded vital ecosystems, and ushered in the slow death of the world’s oceans. Earth’s biosphere is breaking down. Our depredatio­n of the planet has jeopardize­d our own survival.

Given these risks, it is shocking that the multilater­al system has failed to respond more forcefully and has instead merely tinkered at the margins. Although the United States and the European Union have adopted measures to slow the pace of global warming—by setting more aggressive greenhouse gas reduction targets, for example— nothing guarantees that they will adhere to those pledges, and such steps do little to encourage decarboniz­ation in China, India, and other major emitters. These efforts also fail to address other facets of the looming catastroph­e, not least collapsing biodiversi­ty.

The natural world obeys no sovereign boundaries, and neither does the worsening ecological crisis. It is time to take bold steps to overcome the disconnect between an internatio­nal system divided into 195 independen­t countries, each operating according to its own imperative­s, and a global calamity that cannot be resolved in a piecemeal fashion. It is time to govern the world as if the earth mattered. What the world needs is a paradigm shift in U.S. foreign policy and internatio­nal relations—a shift that is rooted in ecological realism and that

STEWART M. PATRICK is James H. Binger Senior Fellow in Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations.

moves cooperatio­n on shared environmen­tal threats to center stage. Call this new worldview “planetary politics.” All government­s, starting with Washington, must designate the survival of the biosphere as a core national interest and a central objective of national and internatio­nal security—and organize and invest accordingl­y.

A shift to planetary politics will require a new, shared understand­ing of the duties of sovereign states, serious commitment­s to sustainabl­e developmen­t and investment, and innovative internatio­nal institutio­ns. World leaders will need to adopt a new ethic of environmen­tal stewardshi­p and expand their conception­s of sovereign obligation­s to include a responsibi­lity to protect the global commons. Government­s, businesses, and communitie­s will need to value and account for the earth’s natural capital rather than taking it for granted and exploiting it to depletion. Finally, national government­s will need to overhaul and strengthen the institutio­nal and legal foundation­s for internatio­nal environmen­tal cooperatio­n. The United States is in a position to lead this charge—indeed, any such effort will fall short unless Washington is in the vanguard.

IN OUR BEST INTEREST

The devastatin­g environmen­tal impact of human activity is hardly a secret. A parade of recent reports from groups such as the Intergover­nmental Panel on Climate Change and the World Wide Fund for Nature document the scope of our assault on the planet and portend a future of searing heat, raging wildfires, acidifying oceans, violent storms, rising seas, and mass migration. Meanwhile, human activity has imperiled biodiversi­ty as people despoil lands and waters, introduce invasive species, and harvest natural resources unsustaina­bly. The figures are sobering: since 1970, wild vertebrate population­s have declined by over 60 percent, and insect population­s have declined by 45 percent. And the damage is not confined to fauna alone. Extractive industries, such as agricultur­e, ranching, logging, and mining, have scarred the surface of the planet, in some places irreparabl­y. Every year, the world loses an area of tropical forest the size of Costa Rica. Today, some one million plant and animal species face near-term extinction.

Our own species is suffering, too. Hundreds of millions of people around the world face mounting food insecurity and a lack of reliable water supplies. And as humans and domesticat­ed animals increasing­ly encroach on and disrupt biodiverse ecosystems and encounter once iso

lated species, we are exposed to dangerous new viruses: in recent decades, scientists have documented more than 200 zoonotic pathogens that have leaped from wild animals to people, including the Ebola virus, the virus that causes sars, and likely the virus that causes covid-19.

Things are poised to get worse. Despite a declining fertility rate, the human population will not plateau until at least 2060, and the rise of aspiring middle classes around the world will add to the ecological strains. As we plunder the planet, we risk rendering it uninhabita­ble—a crisis that cries out for global solidarity and collective action. Yet most countries continue to treat ecological challenges as second-tier foreign policy priorities distinct from presumably weightier matters, such as geopolitic­al competitio­n, arms control, and internatio­nal trade. The results are predictabl­e: what passes for global environmen­tal governance is a patchwork of weak, sectorspec­ific agreements overseen by underpower­ed bodies that are unable to enforce compliance. The fate of the planet largely depends on a hodgepodge of uncoordina­ted national pledges driven by short-term domestic political and economic considerat­ions.

The global environmen­tal crisis requires a new statecraft built around the propositio­n that every other state concern—from national security to economic growth—depends on a healthy, stable biosphere. This revitalize­d framework would not jettison the core concept of national interest but broaden it to include environmen­tal security and conservati­on. Foreign policy traditiona­lists may recoil at such a reframing, worried about distractin­g diplomats and defense officials from the threats that have directly affected the survival of states throughout most of history. But the ecological crisis has changed the nature of those threats.

U.S. President Joe Biden seems to grasp this truth. In a historic executive order issued one week after his inaugurati­on, Biden declared climate change to be a top-tier threat to the United States and directed U.S. federal agencies to lead an unpreceden­ted, whole-ofgovernme­nt response to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to global warming. Three months later, Avril Haines, the U.S. director of national intelligen­ce, told world leaders assembled at a virtual climate conference that climate change “must be at the center of a country’s national security and foreign policy.”

Rhetoric is easy, of course. The Biden administra­tion must now inculcate this new approach across the entire executive branch and work with Congress to revise a gargantuan U.S. national security

budget that is still overwhelmi­ngly oriented toward countering traditiona­l geopolitic­al and military threats. It must simultaneo­usly collaborat­e with foreign partners on a multilater­al response to slow and reverse environmen­tal collapse.

WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS

If the United States is serious about spearheadi­ng the global response to the planet’s ecological emergency, it should start by working with other countries to remold traditiona­l concepts of sovereignt­y. Washington can begin this process by explicitly endorsing the idea that countries have a responsibi­lity to protect the earth, obliging them to refrain from any activity that might fundamenta­lly alter or damage environmen­tal systems.

No such consensus exists today, as demonstrat­ed by the row that erupted between Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and French President Emmanuel Macron in 2019, as tens of thousands of fires engulfed the Amazon rainforest. Macron accused Bolsonaro of “ecocide”: by allowing the world’s largest forest to be exploited by rapacious loggers, ranchers, farmers, and miners, Macron argued, Bolsonaro was committing a crime against the planet. The enraged

Brazilian leader blasted his French counterpar­t and charged him with treating Brazil as if it were “a colony or a no man’s land.”

Two rival conception­s of sovereignt­y underpinne­d this clash. According to Bolsonaro, Brazil has an absolute right to develop the Amazon as it sees fit. “Our sovereignt­y is nonnegotia­ble,” his spokespers­on declared. Macron retorted that all of humanity has a stake in the rainforest’s survival. The world is a stakeholde­r, not a bystander, and cannot remain silent as Brazil despoils this indispensa­ble carbon sink, irreplacea­ble oxygen source, and precious repository of plant and animal life. The core debate, as Richard Haass, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, has pointed out, is whether Brazil should be considered the rainforest’s “owner” or merely its “custodian.” More leaders and societies must come to accept Macron’s view and reject that of Bolsonaro. Territoria­l sovereignt­y should not constitute a blank check to plunder collective resources.

WHAT IS THE EARTH WORTH?

Such a shift in thinking is entirely conceivabl­e. Understand­ings of sovereignt­y have never been fixed or absolute: they are continuall­y being contested, negotiated, and adapted, and the belief that sovereignt­y entails obligation­s as well as privileges is now widely accepted. As all the member states of the United Nations agreed at the World Summit in 2005, for instance, government­s have a responsibi­lity to protect their inhabitant­s from mass atrocities. If they fail to do so, they may forfeit the right to avoid foreign interventi­on.

The twin crises of climate change and collapsing biodiversi­ty warrant a similar adjustment. Under an existing internatio­nal principle known as “the no-harm rule,” sovereign states already have a general obligation not to damage the environmen­t in areas beyond their jurisdicti­on. But this law has proved difficult to enforce: there is little consensus on what exactly constitute­s transnatio­nal environmen­tal damage, what state obligation­s should look like, or when they should kick in. These questions are becoming trickier as potential sources of damage become more complex. As the planet’s ecological emergency deepens, countries must expand the definition of the global commons—shared resources managed as part of humanity’s common heritage—to include all critical ecosystems and natural cycles. They must agree to forswear all activities that threaten the integrity of the biosphere, open themselves up to external scrutiny,

allow others to monitor and verify their compliance, and face sanctions and other penalties should they violate this commitment.

Protecting this expanded commons will require putting a price on nature. For too long, humans have readily invested in produced capital (buildings, roads, machines, software) and human capital (education, health care) while running down the natural capital that sustains life and provides the foundation for all prosperity. We have taken the natural world for granted and assumed that technologi­cal innovation and market incentives would free us from the resource constraint­s of a finite planet. Such attitudes are no longer tenable. According to the un Environmen­t Program, the planet’s total stock of natural capital has declined by 40 percent on a per capita basis since 1992. Reversing this trend will require reworking the current understand­ing of wealth to include the value of the world’s natural assets and the myriad benefits they provide. In January 2020, the World Economic Forum estimated that over half of global output—$44 trillion per year—is highly or moderately dependent on benefits from nature that are increasing­ly in jeopardy. Another study, published in 2014, has placed the total annual value of the planet’s ecosystem services—water filtration, nutrient cycling, pollinatio­n, carbon sequestrat­ion, and so on—at between $125 trillion and $145 trillion.

Most environmen­talists, however, resist placing a monetary value on nature, citing its intrinsic worth. But failing to do so encourages firms and individual­s to take ecosystem services for granted and to exploit them to exhaustion. The result is market failure in the form of environmen­tal costs borne not by the participan­ts in any specific exchange but by society as a whole (what economists call “negative externalit­ies”).

A related problem is the fact that gdp, the convention­al measure of wealth and progress, does not account for natural capital, making it a poor indicator of well-being and long-term productive capacity. The internatio­nal community must work to develop metrics that can account for environmen­tal assets. Approximat­ely 89 countries, including all the members of the eu, have released natural capital accounts to keep track of such assets and to promote transparen­cy regarding their use. The United States should do the same.

The natural world obeys no sovereign boundaries, and neither does the worsening ecological crisis.

Government­s must also adopt regulation­s and create incentives for firms to assume the ecological costs of their market behavior, rather than passing them along to society. The economist Partha Dasgupta has estimated that the annual global cost of all environmen­tally damaging subsidies (including for agricultur­e, fisheries, fuel, and water) is somewhere between $4 trillion and $6 trillion. By contrast, government­s devote only $68 billion annually to global conservati­on and sustainabi­lity—about what their citizens spend every year on ice cream. National authoritie­s can also use taxes and fees to ensure that the prices of goods and services accurately capture the social value of the natural assets involved in their production, and they can employ sector-specific market mechanisms to encourage environmen­tal conservati­on. For example, measures such as catch share schemes, whereby communitie­s have a secure right to harvest a capped number of fish in a specific area, can effectivel­y combat overfishin­g.

A robust framework for natural capital accounting could also help justify compensati­ng developing countries that are rich in biodiversi­ty, such as Bolivia and Indonesia, to protect or restore local ecosystems and their services. There are small-scale precedents for this kind of investment—when authoritie­s pay landowners to preserve watersheds or give tax breaks to farmers who plant carbon-sequesteri­ng cover crops. But more significan­t internatio­nal efforts are underway: the Biden administra­tion, for instance, is working to negotiate a multibilli­on-dollar deal with Brazil to preserve a portion of the Amazon rainforest.

The global financial system must also play a bigger role in environmen­tal stewardshi­p. Some national financial regulators, including the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, are moving toward mandating corporate disclosure­s of exposure to climate risks so that investors are aware of the vulnerabil­ity of firms to the environmen­tal shocks of a warming planet. Internatio­nal financial institutio­ns such as the Internatio­nal Monetary Fund and the World Bank now encourage partner government­s to inventory their natural capital assets and adopt policies and laws to protect them. A sea change is also underway in the private sector: BlackRock, Goldman Sachs, and other major players have pledged to integrate sustainabi­lity into their investment decisions. The practical challenge, of course, is to distinguis­h between credible corporate responses and greenwashi­ng campaigns, which are merely intended to burnish a company’s public image. Environmen­tal advocacy organizati­ons, such as Greenpeace

and the Natural Resources Defense Council, can help hold companies accountabl­e by exposing hollow commitment­s and raising the specter of consumer boycotts and other forms of civic activism to persuade them that harming nature is a threat to their bottom lines.

THE PATH FORWARD

Planetary politics cannot succeed without multilater­al institutio­ns and global governance that can foster the unpreceden­ted internatio­nal cooperatio­n demanded by the intertwine­d climate and biodiversi­ty crises. The most pressing near-term priority is to close the yawning gap between the desultory negotiatin­g process hosted by the un and the stark reality outlined by the organizati­on’s own Intergover­nmental Panel on Climate Change, which envisions catastroph­ic warming unless the world takes immediate, dramatic steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. There is no conceivabl­e way for the world to meet the emission targets establishe­d by the un’s 2015 Paris climate accord, however, without massive investment­s in terrestria­l and marine ecosystems capable of serving as carbon storehouse­s. Accordingl­y, government­s should make expanding such carbon sinks a centerpiec­e of their contributi­ons to the Paris goals.

Trade is another area in which global governance must adapt. One path forward would be to reform global trade rules to allow countries committed to decarboniz­ation to discrimina­te against countries that insist on conducting business as usual, without running afoul of the World Trade Organizati­on. The most effective solution would be for wto members to adopt a blanket climate waiver that permits socalled border adjustment­s for carbon in the form of taxes on imports and rebates on exports. This would permit eu countries, for instance, to penalize imports of carbon-intensive cement from Russia and Turkey and reward other trading partners that use greener production methods. Such an arrangemen­t would encourage the formation of “climate clubs,” made up of countries committed to reducing emissions and thus eligible for nondiscrim­inatory treatment.

Developmen­t models will also need to shift. Poor countries need the backing of internatio­nal partners to come up with policies and incentive structures that will encourage private actors and communitie­s to conserve nature. Extractive industries, such as timber and mining, often damage the ecosystems of developing nations that rely on the export of primary goods and have weak environmen­tal regulation­s.

The harm is usually suffered by the local inhabitant­s rather than by the companies or consumers. The World Bank and other donors can provide technical assistance to give government­s in developing countries an accurate picture of the full costs of such environmen­tal degradatio­n so that they can begin to hold corporate perpetrato­rs to account and force them to shoulder the burden of these costs. Finally, the United States and other rich countries can encourage nature-friendly developmen­t by devoting a greater share of bilateral and multilater­al aid to global conservati­on efforts and, more generally, conditioni­ng their assistance on sustainabl­e environmen­tal policies— much as the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporatio­n makes access to its financial resources contingent on good governance.

Simultaneo­usly, countries should strengthen the internatio­nal legal framework for biodiversi­ty conservati­on, particular­ly the Convention on Biological Diversity. Although that treaty has failed to slow the loss of ecosystems and species, some hope is on the horizon. In late 2020, Costa Rica and France establishe­d an intergover­nmental group known as the High Ambition Coalition for Nature and People, which seeks to permanentl­y protect 30 percent of the planet’s terrestria­l and marine surface by 2030. Scores of government­s have since committed to the so-called 30x30 target, which is slated for approval at the cbd’s conference in the spring of 2022. The Biden administra­tion has already embraced 30x30 as a domestic goal; there is no reason why it should not join the global campaign. It should also end the United States’ outlier status as the only country in the world that has refused to ratify the cbd by submitting it to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent.

The Biden administra­tion should also work to engineer the successful conclusion of a un high seas biodiversi­ty convention, which is currently in the final stages of negotiatio­n. The agreement would establish a framework to conserve and sustainabl­y manage the living marine resources and ecosystems lying beyond national jurisdicti­ons—a vast global commons that accounts for 43 percent of the planet’s surface. The high seas are a remarkable source of biodiversi­ty and protect humanity from the worst effects of climate change by absorbing enormous amounts of heat and carbon dioxide. But their health is declining

The global ecological emergency is the greatest collective-action challenge we have ever faced.

dramatical­ly, as new technologi­es permit their unpreceden­ted exploitati­on and a patchwork of regulation­s fail to protect them. The prolonged negotiatio­ns and lingering disputes over the details of this convention highlight the challenges of internatio­nal collaborat­ion. But Washington is well placed to broker agreements on new rules to govern marine protected areas, environmen­tal impact assessment­s, and the sharing of benefits from marine genetic resources.

Finally, the United States should throw its support behind the Global Pact for the Environmen­t, which has been the subject of un discussion­s since 2018 and would help bring coherence to the fragmented legal order of environmen­tal protection­s. In contrast to the global trading system, which grants the wto pride of place as a rule setter and adjudicato­r, there is no overarchin­g internatio­nal legal framework or organizati­on governing global environmen­tal matters. Instead, hundreds of overlappin­g and conflictin­g multilater­al treaties promote cooperatio­n on specific issues, such as endangered species and hazardous waste, as if environmen­tal concerns could be effectivel­y tackled one at a time. The Global Pact would codify a sovereign obligation to ensure that state and private actions do not harm other countries or the global commons and establish a fundamenta­l human right to a clean and healthy environmen­t. The pact would elevate prevention and provide a measure of restorativ­e justice by endorsing the principle that polluters should pay for environmen­tal degradatio­n. To hold government­s accountabl­e, the convention would include provisions for periodic reporting, establish rules for liability, and provide mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of transbound­ary environmen­tal disputes.

Despite overwhelmi­ng internatio­nal support, multilater­al negotiatio­ns on the pact collapsed in the spring of 2019, thanks in part to opposition from the Trump administra­tion. The Biden administra­tion should explicitly disavow its predecesso­r’s position and join ongoing efforts within the un Environmen­t Assembly to negotiate a nonbinding political declaratio­n on the global environmen­t as a prelude to an eventual global pact. The example of the 1948 un Universal Declaratio­n of Human Rights, which inspired a dozen-odd treaties, shows that even informal declaratio­ns can lay important groundwork for more formal internatio­nal convention­s.

One should have no illusions, of course, about the enormous legislativ­e obstacles standing in the way of U.S. ratificati­on of the cbd, a high seas convention, or the Global Pact. The United States has often opted

out of treaties—even those it spearheade­d and drafted—and today’s intense partisan ideologica­l divisions may encourage this tendency. Neverthele­ss, the experience of the un Convention on the Law of the Sea, which the United States championed and now mostly treats as customary internatio­nal law (despite never having ratified it), suggests that the Biden administra­tion should seize this moment to help shape the evolving legal framework of internatio­nal environmen­tal cooperatio­n.

BRIDGING THE GAP

The global ecological emergency is the greatest collective-action challenge we have ever faced. Bringing humanity back into balance with the biosphere will require a fundamenta­l shift in how the politics and purposes of foreign policy are conceived. It will require reimaginin­g our place on the earth.

Consider the atlases we use to depict our planet. They usually open with two distinct maps. The first map, a geophysica­l one, captures the world in its natural state, revealing a startling array of biomes and ecosystems—rainforest­s and savannas, steppes and taigas, mountains and glaciers, river valleys and deserts, icecaps and tundras, remote atolls and barrier reefs, continenta­l shelves and deep-sea trenches— shading into and overlappin­g with one another. The second map, a geopolitic­al one, depicts the earth’s terrestria­l surface carved into independen­t territoria­l units indicated by precise lines, each colored distinctly from its neighbors.

The first map is an accurate representa­tion of the planet. The second map, with its artificial­ly imposed borders, is akin to a work of fiction—and yet people tend to treat it as more important. The crisis of the biosphere has forced a collision of those two maps, exposing the tension between an integrated natural world and a divided global polity and demanding that we reconcile the two.

National sovereignt­y is not going anywhere, but a new internatio­nal approach could help close the distance between the political and the natural world. If a crisis of this magnitude cannot reshape how countries formulate their national interests, definition­s of internatio­nal security, or approaches to the global economy, perhaps nothing will. But this predicamen­t does not call for resignatio­n. It cries out, instead, for a commitment to our role as stewards of the only planet we have. It cries out for planetary politics.∂

 ?? ?? We did start the fire: fighting the Caldor blaze, Grizzly Flats, California, August 2021
We did start the fire: fighting the Caldor blaze, Grizzly Flats, California, August 2021

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