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Economic incentives rarely worth the money

- By Nathan Jensen Nathan Jensen is a professor of government at the University of Texas at Austin. This essay first appeared on the website The Conversati­on.

U.S. states and cities hand out tens of billions in taxpayer dollars every year to companies as economic incentives.

These businesses are supposed to use the money, typically distribute­d through economic developmen­t programs, to open new facilities, create jobs and generate tax revenue.

But all too often that’s not what happens, as I’ve learned after doing research on the use of tax incentives to spur economic developmen­t in cities and states across the country, particular­ly in Texas.

Recent scandals involving economic developmen­t programs in New Jersey, Baltimore and elsewhere illustrate just what’s wrong with these programs — and why I believe it’s time to end this waste of taxpayer dollars once and for all.

Economic developmen­t 101

Many states, counties and cities have economic developmen­t agencies tasked with facilitati­ng investment in their communitie­s.

These agencies undertake a variety of valuable activities, from gathering data to training smallbusin­esses owners. Yet one of their most highprofil­e activities is the use of tax and other incentives to entice companies to invest in their communitie­s, generating local jobs and expanding the tax base.

Estimates of how much is spent on such incentives range from $45 billion to $80 billion a year.

But what do taxpayers get for all this money? As it turns out, not much.

A waste of money

First off, in most cases, investment­s that result from these incentives would have happened anyway.

That was the case in Baltimore involving a federal program meant to spur developmen­t in distressed communitie­s it dubbed “opportunit­y zones.” ProPublica reported in June that Maryland accidental­ly designated an area of Baltimore that wasn’t poor and was already under redevelopm­ent an opportunit­y zone. Despite catching the error, the state kept the designatio­n, allowing real estate investors to potentiall­y claim millions of dollars in tax breaks. Those investors include Kevin Plank, the billionair­e CEO of Under Armour, who owns about 40 percent of the zone, according to ProPublica.

This example isn’t unique. Last year, Tim Bartik, an economist at the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, reviewed 30 studies on the use of economic developmen­t incentives. He found that 75 percent to 98 percent of companies were planning to make the desired investment anyway.

In my own work in Texas, I found that more than 85 percent of the companies offered tax breaks had already planned to open the promised new facilities. A few even broke ground before applying for the incentives.

And in New Jersey, investigat­ors who uncovered abuse in the state’s economic developmen­t program found that a lawyer representi­ng a powerful Democratic official drafted legislatio­n to benefit companies tied to him and his associates, to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars. Their June report described how the New Jersey Economic Developmen­t Agency didn’t perform the basic due diligence of a single Google search, which would have shown that some of the companies had already announced a move to New Jersey before being offered incentives.

Investment­s rarely pay off

Even when an incentive does draw new investment­s, they rarely pay off. And they can even harm the fiscal health of cities and states by pulling resources away from other, more productive activities.

In “Incentives to Pander,” a book I coauthored with Duke political scientist Edmund Malesky, we reviewed the academic literature in the U.S. and elsewhere on the use of incentives and found that they are expensive and ineffectiv­e in generating employment and economic growth.

Wisconsin residents may be learning this the hard way after their government offered electronic­s manufactur­er Foxconn over $4 billion in incentives in exchange for a promise to build a hightech facility that is supposed to create 13,000 jobs. But since the 2017 announceme­nt, the company has failed to meet job targets and even downgraded the type of facility it plans to build.

A failure of oversight

A third problem is that government agencies fail to provide effective oversight to ensure that company promises on investment and employment like Foxconn’s are upheld.

A legislativ­e audit found that the Wisconsin agency responsibl­e follows problemati­c oversight practices and failed to verify that companies created the number of jobs or other goals they claimed. Wisconsin isn’t alone. Many states and municipali­ties provide limited oversight of the economic incentives they offer and often rely on companies’ selfreport­ed data to determine whether they’ve met targets. In Texas, doctoral candidate Calvin Thrall and I found that the state even allowed companies to renegotiat­e their job creation targets, sometimes the day before they were required to report compliance with an incentive agreement.

And even though these deals are often accompanie­d by splashy PR campaigns that highlight how many jobs will be created, the incentive contracts often don’t even include actual job creation requiremen­ts. And only 56 percent of cities surveyed indicated that they required a performanc­e agreement before offering incentives.

New Jersey investigat­ors found similar oversight problems and other shortcomin­gs in its economic developmen­t program.

Finally, a lack of transparen­cy surroundin­g these programs makes it hard for others to determine whether taxpayers got what they were promised.

More than 85 percent of the companies offered tax breaks had already planned to open the promised new facilities.

Ending incentives

So you’re probably wondering, if these incentives don’t work, why do government officials continue to use and promote them?

The book I wrote with Malesky and a related paper showed how these incentives provide a way for politician­s to take credit for business investment — in the hopes that it will give them a lift in their next election. All they have to do is convince voters that these programs work and that the grand promises being made when officials cut ribbons in wellpublic­ized ceremonies will eventually pan out.

Powerful special interest groups are also to blame, as they play a big role in shaping incentive programs and lobby vigorously for lawmakers to create them and keep them alive.

Rather than reform or rebrand these programs, I believe states should take the advice of some of their own evaluation­s of these programs and eliminate them. Taxpayers would be better off without them.

 ?? Associated Press ?? President Donald Trump takes a tour of Foxconn with Foxconn chairman Terry Gou, right, and CEO of SoftBank Masayoshi Son in Mt. Pleasant, Wis., last year. Wisconsin promised Foxconn over $4 billion in incentives to build a hightech facility that is supposed to create 13,000 jobs. But since the 2017 announceme­nt, the company has failed to meet job targets and downgraded the type of facility it plans to build.
Associated Press President Donald Trump takes a tour of Foxconn with Foxconn chairman Terry Gou, right, and CEO of SoftBank Masayoshi Son in Mt. Pleasant, Wis., last year. Wisconsin promised Foxconn over $4 billion in incentives to build a hightech facility that is supposed to create 13,000 jobs. But since the 2017 announceme­nt, the company has failed to meet job targets and downgraded the type of facility it plans to build.

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