In bid to please constituents EU is sending them to fight

Ukraine’s ambitious attempt to join the European Union is a decision marred with short sight and poor policy considerations that sends the wrong signals to our adversaries and allies. This decision demonstrates that, irrespective of turbulent pasts or wrongdoings, adversaries may become allies when it suits the interests of feckless policymakers.

This decision sets a dangerous precedent and demonstrates to the world that our leaders care more about party politics than the people they govern. It is not a mystery that the people of the developed nations overwhelmingly support Ukraine, but this burgeoning desire to align with Ukraine may culminate in losses that far surpass what was intended.

Despite our desire to do what is right, we often act inappropriately. It is simple to see why Ukraine’s entry into the EU would be so problematic.

First, it may prolong the conflict. Russia, regardless of its power to follow through, has made it clear that anyone aligning themselves too closely with Ukraine will be held accountable.

Second, they could expand the conflict areas by allying themselves with Ukraine. The EU has tacitly forced each of its member nations to side with Russia’s sworn adversary, Ukraine. It would be unwise to bring innocent parties into the conflict.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, it will remove a crucial negotiating point prior to the start of negotiations. Ukraine need not be a member of the EU to be recognized as a legitimate force on the international scene. Why, then, would you unilaterally give up a crucial negotiating point so early in the game?

The best approach at this time would be to negotiate a ceasefire to halt the bloodshed and halt Russian military gains, thereby allowing Finland and Sweden to join NATO and bolster its economic power. After all, without question, the EU is a financial husk. It is no more than the German economy, which is an Achilles’ heel. Knowing this, it is obvious why the EU must bolster its eco- nomic might before engaging in an unnecessary conflict with a tenacious foe.

The West must facilitate Russia’s gradual withdrawal over time. Externally, this is vastly preferable because Russia would no longer pose a threat to Ukraine. Internally, however, this course of action would lead to a rift in the Russian government and possibly a change in leadership. The aging communists of the Cold War era will cycle out as they die off, resulting in a longterm improvement for the nation, since this generational transition and ideological shift will bring about a beneficial development in both international and internal policy. There are now credible Russian leadership figures only waiting for the opportunity.

The EU and the U.S. seem to believe, erroneously, that Ukraine will outlive the Russians or somehow force them back into Russia. Our Ukraine strategy must be founded on fact, such as this: If Russia chooses to destroy Ukraine with artillery, the nation’s cities will be reduced to gravel. The U.S., the EU and NATO are repeating the same strategic and tactical errors from the previous two decades. The “measured response,” the “gradual escalation,” the “piecemeal” and the slow delivery of supplies and weaponry. The Russians understand this predictable policy escalation and methodical, single-issue approach. The present lack of initiative and emphasis, as well as the unclear signal of EU membership, suggest inadequate preparation by all parties involved.