Immigration deja vu

The prospects for major immigration reform are now the brightest in years, but a shadow still looms: the ghost of 2006.

That was the last time the stars were aligned for a breakthrough. Immigration reform that included a path to citizenship for those in the United States illegally had the support of President George W. Bush, a broad labor-business-faith coalition and a bipartisan Senate majority. Yet that armada splintered against the stony refusal of House GOP leaders to consider a bill opposed by a majority of their majority. Any of that sound familiar? Already many of the same dynamics are developing, with President Obama stamping immigration reform as a top priority, a bipartisan Senate coalition reassembling, a broad alliance of support groups coalescing — and most House Republicans rejecting anything that hints at “amnesty” for illegal immigrants. Yet the contrasts between now and 2006 are also significant. Understanding both the similarities and the differences will be critical for reform advocates if they are to avoid replicating the disappointment they suffered under Bush.

Presidential interest was then, as it is now, crucial in elevating immigration reform. Since his days as Texas governor, Bush had courted Latinos, and — even during the 2000 GOP presidential primary campaign — he defended illegal immigrants as “moms and dads” trying to make a better life for their children. Bush saw comprehensive reform that coupled a path to citizenship with tougher enforcement as an opportunity to consolidate the beachhead that allowed him to capture more than 40% of Latino voters in 2004.

But Bush largely looked away when Republicans who controlled the House channeled that impulse in a very different direction. In December 2005, they passed an enforcement-only bill drafted by Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. (R-Wis.), that, for the first time, designated all undocumented immigrants as felons.

Initially, debate in the GOPcontrolled Senate drifted. Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-Tenn), considering a presidential bid, pushed his own enforcement-only bill. But with huge public rallies against Sensenbrenner’s proposal, Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) unexpectedly joined with three other Republicans and all eight

As in 2006, House Republicans hold the key to reform.

Judiciary Committee Democrats in March to approve a comprehensive plan, including a path to citizenship, that followed a blueprint negotiated by Sens. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.).

When broader Senate agreement teetered over the terms of legalization, Sens. Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.) and Mel Martinez (RFla.) devised a compromise that divided illegal immigrants into three categories, requiring those here less than two years to leave but allowing those with deeper roots to eventually earn citizenship by paying fines and learning English. After Bush finally delivered a national address on immigration, the Senate passed a bill embodying that plan; 23 Republicans backed it.

House Republicans immediately signaled their disinterest by refusing to appoint a conference committee and instead scheduled hearings in border communities to highlight security lapses.

Even in 2006, something like the Senate plan probably could have attracted a majority in the House — 218 votes — but not a majority of Republicans. Faced with a collision between his two political imperatives — courting Latinos and mobilizing conservatives — Bush blinked. House leaders replaced the Senate bill with enforcement-only legislation, which he signed. These choices began the GOP’s slide among Latinos that continues unabated: Latino support for Republican House candidates plummeted from 44% in 2004 to just 29% in 2006, presaging Mitt Romney’s disastrous 27% showing in 2012.

That slippage is one of the two most important differences in the political environment around immigration between 2006 and today. Back then, hardly any House Republicans argued that the GOP needed to pass a plan attractive to minorities. But many GOP leaders now see that as self-preservation.

The “Gang of Eight” proposal released this week makes it likely that, as in 2006, the Senate will eventually pass a bipartisan bill. Again, there are probably 218 House votes for one, but not a majority of the majority Republicans. That raises another key difference from 2006: House Speaker Dennis Hastert faced little pressure to consider the Senate bill because Bush bit his tongue when the speaker buried it. If House Republicans shelve another bipartisan Senate plan in 2013, they should expect much more public heat because Obama won’t be as deferential.