Los Angeles Times

Arms and the TSA

Giving guns to screeners could add to airport security problems.

- By Brian Michael Jenkins Brian Michael Jenkins is senior advisor to the Rand Corp. president and the author of “Al Qaeda in Its Third Decade: Irreversib­le Decline or Imminent Victory?”

The recent shooting at Los Angeles Internatio­nal Airport has raised questions about how airport security can be improved, specifical­ly, whether Transporta­tion Security Administra­tion airport screeners should be armed. In part, this reflects the natural tendency to examine every terrible event with a view of how to prevent its recurrence. But it also ref lects the desire of Americans to create a riskfree society. From this perspectiv­e, a shooting with casualties like the one at LAX can only be the result of a failure of security, which therefore must be increased.

Securing crowded public places is difficult, disruptive and costly. Securing an airport checkin area would require the creation of a physical security perimeter at the entrances to the terminals where passengers arriving with luggage would undergo preliminar­y screening. But shootings and bombings can also take place in the baggage pickup areas, so these also would have to be secured.

Security measures at the entrances would create lines of people waiting to be screened who would be vulnerable to attack out- side the terminal. A Rand Corp. study recommende­d mitigating the potential casualties that might be caused by a bomb by speeding up the check-in and security check procedures, thereby thinning the crowd. But this would not have significan­t effect in a shooting incident.

Rapid response is the main means of mitigating casualties in such incidents. A shooter determined to kill as many people as possible continues killing until he shoots himself or is neutralize­d by police. So why not arm screeners?

Undoubtedl­y, armed screeners at LAX could have confronted the shooter before police intervened. Whether a gunfight at the checkpoint would have resulted in fewer casualties than occurred, we cannot say. If, however, the shooter’s objective had been to cause as many casualties as possible — rather than focus on TSA personnel — armed screeners might have helped. But arming screeners raises issues beyond this incident.

Arming screeners would change the demographi­c of recruiting for the TSA. Some screeners are older, retired people who might not feel comfortabl­e carrying weapons. Arming screeners would add to training requiremen­ts at the beginning and on a continuing basis to remain qualified. It would undoubtedl­y alter pay scales. A decision to arm would also raise questions about the TSA’s authority. Would armed screeners also be given arrest powers? What liabilitie­s would be incurred?

Would armed screeners be effective in responding to an armed assault? Shootouts in crowded areas are extremely dangerous. The risks of casualties resulting from friendly fire are high. Police at airports undergo specialize­d training to engage shooters. Officers at the airport, both from the airport police and the Los Angeles Police Department, are trained in “active shooter” response. Passengers wounded or killed by friendly fire would create a public relations catastroph­e for the TSA. The public accepts that this may happen when police are obliged to use deadly force, but there is already a measure of public hostility toward the TSA. Perception­s matter.

Some of these questions arose when the TSA was first created. The objective then was to ensure more effective screening than that provided by private contract personnel, whose performanc­e was often abysmal. But there were strong objections to creating another federal force, let alone arming it. And with its current 47,000 screeners, an armed TSA would become the federal government’s largest armed entity outside of the military.

In the eyes of many, arming TSA screeners would change the image of the organizati­on from a service aimed at guaranteei­ng safe air travel to an unwanted imposition of federal authority.

The decision made at the creation of the TSA was to focus on screening. Arrests, and armed response if necessary, would remain the responsibi­lity of local police. The federal government requires that airports have sworn, armed police officers available at the checkpoint­s. They do not have to stand behind the checkpoint­s as sentries, but they should be able to respond rapidly. If the threat indicates more security (visible or undercover) is required, then it is the responsibi­lity of the local authoritie­s.

Since its creation, the TSA has formed Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response, or VIPR, teams, deploying them according to threat assessment­s or on a random basis at train stations and other transporta­tion venues. They are made up of local law enforcemen­t officers, federal air marshals, TSA behavioral detection officers, bomb-sniffing dogs and other special capabiliti­es. These teams are armed. (And their existence is seen by some as evidence of creeping government tyranny, giving a hint at the reaction to arming airport screeners.) VIPR teams are meant to be a deterrent and a preventive force, not an armed response.

What happened at LAX was a tragedy of a type that has become all too common. The answer in every case cannot be to further ramp up security, create more perimeters or deploy more armed guards.

Newspapers in English

Newspapers from United States