Los Angeles Times

How the scourge of originalis­m is taking over the Supreme Court

- By Erwin Chemerinsk­y Erwin Chemerinsk­y is a contributi­ng writer to Opinion and dean of the UC Berkeley School of Law. His latest book is “Worse than Nothing: The Dangerous Fallacy of Originalis­m.”

In 1987, the Senate resounding­ly rejected the nomination of Judge Robert Bork for the Supreme Court because it found his originalis­t views unacceptab­le. As a law professor, Bork argued that the meaning of a constituti­onal provision is fixed when it is adopted and can be changed only by amendment.

Under this view, there would be no constituti­onal protection for abortion or other privacy rights, no protection for women or gays and lesbians from discrimina­tion, and no right to freedom of speech except for political expression. Bork, who was impeccably qualified, was defeated by the largest margin of any Supreme Court nominee in history.

Senators from both parties voted against Bork because his originalis­t philosophy was seen as nonsensica­l and dangerous. It makes no sense to limit the Constituti­on’s broad language to what was intended in the agrarian, slave society of 1787. Originalis­m was rightly regarded as a radical approach to constituti­onal law that would upend decades of precedents in a myriad of areas.

Now, though, originalis­m is in its ascendancy on the Supreme Court. In case after case in the last term, the conservati­ve justices based their decisions on their cramped reading of American history. Under that erroneous analysis, they found no constituti­onal right to abortion, a broad constituti­onal right to have concealed weapons in public, a constituti­onal requiremen­t for government to subsidize religious schools, and a constituti­onal right for high school coaches to lead prayers at school football games.

In expanding the scope of the 2nd Amendment and striking down New York’s law limiting having concealed weapons in public, the court said, “Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s ‘unqualifie­d command.’ ” In other words, look to the law that existed in 1791 when the 2nd Amendment was adopted and perhaps to 1868 when the 14th Amendment was ratified.

In the ruling on prayers on a school football field, the court said that in determinin­g the meaning of the Constituti­on’s religion clauses, “the line that courts and government­s must draw between the permissibl­e and the impermissi­ble” has to faithfully reflect “the understand­ing of the Founding Fathers.” In overruling Roe vs. Wade, the court looked at abortion regulation beginning in England and the American colonies and stressed the absence of historical protection of abortion rights in the United States.

The world we live in is vastly different from 1787, when the Constituti­on was written, or 1791, when the Bill of Rights was adopted, or 1868, when the 14th Amendment was ratified.

Under originalis­m, Brown vs. Board of Education, which ruled that public school segregatio­n violated equal protection under the 14th Amendment, was wrongly decided because the Congress that ratified the 14th Amendment also voted to segregate the District of Columbia public schools and there was no indication that Congress meant to outlaw segregatio­n. Under originalis­m, Loving vs. Virginia, which declared state laws prohibitin­g interracia­l marriage unconstitu­tional, was wrongly decided because most states had such laws when the 14th Amendment was ratified. Under originalis­m, Griswold vs. Connecticu­t, which protected a right to purchase and use contracept­ives, was also wrongly decided.

Any theory that makes Brown and Loving and Griswold illegitima­te is one that should be rejected. Moreover, the assumption of originalis­m is that there is an “original” meaning for constituti­onal provisions that can be discovered. The reality is that so many people were involved in drafting and ratifying constituti­onal provisions, and practices were sufficient­ly divergent, that it is a fiction to say that there is a clear answer from history that can resolve modern constituti­onal questions.

The result is that originalis­ts pick and choose from the historical record to support the conclusion they want.

The conservati­ves on the court ignore originalis­m when it does not serve their purpose. In 2013, the court declared unconstitu­tional a crucial provision of the 1965 Voting Rights Act that required states with a history of race discrimina­tion in voting to get preapprova­l before making significan­t changes in their election systems. The court said that provision violated the principle of equal sovereignt­y among the states. But this cannot be historical­ly justified since the Congress that ratified the 14th Amendment also created military rule over Southern states. Likewise, that 1868 Congress adopted many race-conscious programs, such as the Freedmen’s Bureau, which today would be considered affirmativ­e action. Yet there is very little doubt that the Supreme Court in the coming term will overrule decades of precedents allowing colleges and universiti­es to engage in affirmativ­e action.

The implicatio­ns of a court committed to originalis­m are frightenin­g. In overruling Roe, the conservati­ve justices said that a right should be protected only if it is in the text of the Constituti­on or safeguarde­d by a long unbroken tradition. Adhering to this doctrine would put in jeopardy the right to marry, the right to procreate, the right to custody of one’s children, the right to keep the family together, the right of parents to control the upbringing of their children, the right to purchase and use contracept­ives, the right of consenting adults to engage in private consensual sexual activity, and the right of competent adults to refuse medical care. None of these rights can be justified under the court’s rigid historical focus.

Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in 1819 that ours is “a Constituti­on intended to endure for ages to come, and consequent­ly, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.” The current court ignores this historical truth, and instead misuses history to support exactly the conservati­ve results that it prefers.

Originalis­m was a destructiv­e approach to constituti­onal interpreta­tion in 1987, when Robert Bork was rejected for a seat on the Supreme Court. It is no more legitimate or desirable today.

 ?? A CONSERVATI­VE J. Scott Applewhite Associated Press ?? Supreme Court embraces originalis­m to justify bad decisions.
A CONSERVATI­VE J. Scott Applewhite Associated Press Supreme Court embraces originalis­m to justify bad decisions.

Newspapers in English

Newspapers from United States