2-HEADED CLOSER
Minus Robertson, Yanks should consider non-traditional approach in late innings, using Miller & Betances as . . .
In moving on from David Robertson, the Yankees have created the most fascinating bullpen scenario in baseball, as the dynamic pairing of Andrew Miller and Dellin Betances practically begs for some creativity in how they are
used. And barring another bullpen signing, it will also test the need for an experienced closer, a subject that prompts much debate among baseball people these days.
It’s a multi-faceted debate at that: for while bullpens are regarded as more crucial than ever to winning a championship, after what the Royals did last season, the explosion of young, power relief arms in the game seems to be sparking more and more belief among executives that overpaying for closers is a mistake.
For that matter, it’s worth noting that the two most recent championship teams won it all with closers who started the season as set-up men:
Koji Uehara moved into that role for the 2013 Red Sox only after Joel Hanrahan and Andrew Bailey were lost to injuries. And Santiago Casilla took over for Giants last season when Sergio Romo slumped at midseason.
On the other hand, getting those final three outs in the ninth demands a certain mental toughness, especially in learning to deal with failure, that makes closing unique — and not for everyone.
So it remains to be seen: did the Yankees undervalue Robertson’s proven ability to produce consistently for six-plus seasons in New York, the last as closer when he followed the legendary Mariano Rivera rather seamlessly?
“If I were the Yankees I would have done the same thing,” says an exec from another major league club. “I think Miller is that good. The consensus around the game now is that guys who are as talented as Betances and Miller will figure it out. “I guess you can make a case that both of those guys have had their share of bumps in the road along the way, so there’s always the chance that the added stress of closing could mess with their confidence. But it’s not like they weren’t in a ton of high-leverage situations last year.”
It’s true that both Miller and Betances failed as highly touted starters before emerging as dominant relievers.
You know about Betances: as recently as 2012 he issued a rather incredible 99 walks in 131 innings while being demoted from Triple-A to Double-A, finally forcing the Yankees to try him in the bullpen.
Two seasons later, as a 26-year-old rookie reliever in the Bronx, his transformation was remarkable: he walked just 24 batters while striking out 135 in 90 innings and allowing 46 hits. Miller loomed as a bigger bust for years. Once the No. 6 pick in the 2006 draft, he was considered a can’t-miss starter with a high-90s (mph) fastball, but command issues derailed him for years.
The 6-foot-7 lefthander was traded from
the Tigers to the Marlins to the Red Sox; in his final season as starter, in 2011 with the Red Sox, he pitched to a 5.54 ERA with a rather astonishing 1.815 WHIP.
Like Betances, however, Miller adapted quickly to the bullpen, enjoying success immediately. Last year, however, he went to another level, pitching to a 2.02 ERA for the Red Sox and Orioles holding hitters to a .106 batting average over the second half of the season while racking up 45 strikeouts — vs. five walks — in 26 innings.
Miller’s slider was so effective, in addition to his fastball, that he was tougher on righthanded hitters than lefties — holding them to a .145 average for the season, compared to .163 vs. lefties.
By season’s end he was the Orioles’ most dominant reliever, but w ith Zach Britton closing effectively, Buck Showalter used Miller in the post sea son a s a mu lt i-i nn i ng weapon to maximize his influence on close games.
Showalter used him as early as the sixth inning and as late as the eighth in the sweep of the Tigers, and Miller was a huge factor, working 1.2 hitless innings each in Games 1 and 3.
Miller pitched four more scoreless innings in the ALCS against the Royals, so his postseason line looked like this: 7.1 IP, one hit, no runs, one walk, eight strikeouts.
For the season, however, Betances was much more of a multi-inning workhorse. In 35 of his 70 outings he got more than three outs, pitching a total of 90 innings for the Yankees.
Miller got more than three outs only seven times during the season, then three times during the postseason.
That multi-inning flexibility and dominance of hitters on both sides of the plate are what makes the combination of Miller and Betances so intriguing: that is, will Joe Girardi take the opportunity to manage unconventionally?
Rather than simply going with one as a ninth-inning closer, a more fluid system might better maximize their ability, allowing for them to pitch in more high-leverage situations and perhaps more innings than a traditional closer.
Managers these days lean on roles too heavily, perhaps in part to justify late-inning decision-making. But GM Brian Cashman already broke from the traditional formula by choosing Miller over Robertson; Girardi should at least consider doing likewise.