Trump’s fateful choice on Syria
Bashar Assad has struck again. The Syrian regime has carried out an air attack using sarin gas in the town of Khan Sheikhoun. Early reporting from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reports that as many as 100 are dead, many of them children. As if attacking the town with chemical weapons was not sufficient, the regime then targeted, with an air strike, the clinic where victims of the chemical assault were being treated.
These attacks are part of a wave of aerial bombardments that Assad’s air forces have been conducting across Idlib Province in northwestern Syria — an area where opposition forces continue to maintain a presence and control.
Clearly, the ceasefire that Russia claims to have brokered with Turkey and Iran does not apply to Assad’s forces. And when it comes to the Assad regime, there can be no doubt that it did not destroy or ship out all of its chemical weapons — notwithstanding its commitment to do so as part of the 2013 deal the U.S. and Russia negotiated. Worse, it feels free to use them.
While the Trump administration is still in the process of formulating its policy on Syria, this is a moment that should make clear that its strategy cannot be focused only on ISIS. There is no answer to ISIS in Syria that does not also address Assad. The statement that Secretary of State Tillerson made in Turkey that the future of Assad was up to the Syrian people seemed to reflect the changing realities in Syria and the Assad clique’s increasingly secure hold on power.
But any policy that leaves the regime intact or fails to impose a high price for using chemical weapons will only ensure the appeal of those in Syria who are prepared to continue to fight Assad. Unfortunately, that means increasingly radical Sunni Islamist groups, including Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, an offshoot of Al Qaeda.
Moreover, the President and his national security team have emphasized their commitment to stopping proliferation. Surely that must involve creating a real prohibition against the use of any weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons.
President Trump on Wednesday called the attack “an affront to humanity” and said his “attitude towards Syria and Assad has changed very much.”
The administration’s response must not be limited to strong rhetoric. If it is, the message will be clear: The use of chemical weapons is acceptable. Assad and any other leaders will know they can use them to gain an advantage in a conflict.
There is an additional point: Assad is violating the very agreement that the Obama administration worked out with the Russians. So this also becomes a good time to see whether agreements with the Russians, when they are violated by a third party, mean anything. Indeed, here is an opportunity for the administration to see what the Russians will do.
I have previously written that any cooperation with Russia in Syria must be predicated on the Russians no longer abetting Iranian power in that country. That remains a good test because there is a larger struggle going on in the region, and our traditional partners — Arabs and Israelis — feel threatened by Iran and its use of Shia militias to gain leverage and dominant influence throughout the area.
But here is a more immediate test. If Russia chooses to deny that the Assad regime — the only Syrian party in the war that has an air force — was responsible for this attack, the message will be loud and clear: no cooperation with the Russians in Syria is possible. It will indicate that the Russians will continue to go to great lengths to protect the Assad regime, no matter how many war crimes it commits.
It will show agreements with the Russians, at least on Syria, are purely situational; so long as they serve Russian interests, they will be observed, and they will be abandoned when they do not.
Alternatively, if the Russians join us in condemning the action, imposing sanctions on the regime, and insisting that Assad now permit complete access to ensure the destruction of the remaining chemical weapons on hand, we will at least have something to discuss.
Ultimately, the Trump administration must have a policy on the Assad regime. It cannot be a partner in the fight against ISIS or the other radical Sunni Islamists in the opposition as Assad serves as the greatest single source of recruitment for them. Testing the Russians on their response to Assad’s use of chemical weapons is one thing for the administration; being willing to punish the Assad regime not just with sanctions but also with possible military strikes against the forces responsible for the attack could be another.
Should the Russians understand this is a possibility, their readiness to cooperate just might increase.
A major test for his Russia policy