Behind the drama, complexities lurk
Korean leaders’ worries
The drama of Friday’s scenes at the “truce village” of Panmunjom, between the two Koreas, can hardly be overstated. Surrounded by his advisers, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un descended the front steps of Panmungak — the monumental structure on the northern side — to shake hands with South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who stood waiting to receive him at the “military demarcation line” between the two sides.
Kim stepped into South Korea, the first time a North Korean leader has done so since the Korean War. Both men then stepped together into North Korea, where Moon’s parents were born, before returning to the South. Men in traditional Korean dress ceremoniously escorted the pair down a red carpet toward “Peace House,” where they reviewed an honor guard before entering.
The summit meeting lasted a day and yielded a long joint declaration, the third issued after a North-South summit since 2000.
And that document, whose text has been released, seems promising at first. Titled “Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula,” it opens with a bold assertion: “there will be no more war on the Korean Peninsula and thus a new era of peace has begun.”
But a comparison with the last such document — the “Declaration on the Advance of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity,” issued on October 4, 2007, after a two-day summit meeting in Pyongyang — underscores how little progress has achieved in the intervening decade.
The two texts are mostly the same, touching on the importance of “inter-Korean relations,” people-to-people exchanges, reducing the danger of war, pursuing a permanent “peace regime” to replace the Korean War Armistice, and (of course) reaffirming old commitments to “denuclearization.”
All of this is to say that there has been no progress on any of these fronts in the meantime. The 2007 declaration also included a detailed agenda for joint economic projects, all of which are now ruled out by international sanctions.
Little wonder that Kim, in remarks before the television cameras upon the signing of the new declaration, recalled the disappointing agreements of the past, “which marked only beginnings.”
On the other side of the ledger, South Korean officials are quick to point out that Moon is barely a year into his term as president. He also enjoys high public approval ratings. For that matter, Kim is still a young man who faces no credible threats to his power at home.
The real question, then, is how the two leaders now navigate what Kim called a “headwind” or a “wind from outside” Korea, which will otherwise frustrate progress — apparently his diplomatic allusion to American policy.
As President Trump said once again at a press conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, he will not repeat hte mistakes of the past by relaxing sanctions until North Korea has completely surrendered its nuclear program.
This stance may be at odds with the new joint declaration, which envisions carrying disarmament “in a phased manner” as military tensions are reduced. It is starkly at odds with Kim’s highly publicized declaration of a new party line last week, which called for rebuilding the North Korean economy while retaining nuclear weapons as “a powerful treasured sword for defending peace . . . and the firm guarantee by which our descendants can enjoy the most dignified and happiest life in the world.”
If the White House holds to its all-or-nothing position on sanctions, then North Korea will struggle in its efforts to earn foreign currency and attract foreign investments. Kim may or may not be feeling the pressure today, but the sanctions regime will undoubtedly complicate his plans for growth.
Under these conditions, it is unclear whether an anticipated summit meeting will take place between Kim and Trump, or what it will yield if it does occur.
Judging by the new joint declaration, Moon is determined to continue on his own with Kim if necessary. Military-to-military talks will open in May; inter-Korean family reunions are scheduled for August; and Moon has accepted an invitation to visit Pyongyang this fall.
These interactions, along with Kim’s unilateral decision to end long-range missile tests and nuclear tests, should help to prevent a return to the crisis atmosphere of 2017. If it precludes Trumpian threats of “fire and fury,” then further engagement between the two Koreas for the best. But none of it will be terribly dramatic.