Biden must own the Ukraine war’s endgame

Nearly four months into Russia’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine, the most important thing for President Biden to do is own the endgame. The U.S., not the Europeans, need to control the final settlement. It can do that by first supplying Ukraine with the maximum amount of weapons for which it asks, including main battle tanks and long-range missile launchers capable of helping Ukraine go on the offensive. Second, it must conduct negotiations with Russia directly, but only when Russia wants. And third, it must broaden its demands to include more than Ukraine.

This does not mean the United States should insist on maximal political goals in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces are likely now at their peak threat to Russia. A full liberation of all territory seized since Feb. 24, let alone since 2014, would require the Ukrainian army to conduct large-scale offensive operations for which at the moment it is neither equipped nor prepared. The defense it has mounted so far has relied on groups of motivated infantry blunting Russian armored advances with anti-tank munitions while small units of operators destroy logistics columns. It has been admirably effective.

But the strengths of that force do not necessarily translate easily to mounting offensives of their own. That requires armor and effective integration of air and artillery forces to break through Russian lines, which are in places very well dug in. This does not mean it is impossible — only that it would be very difficult, like Iran invading southern Iraq in 1982. Popular armies are better on the defense than on the offense. Ukraine is now asking for the equipment to allow it to go on offense, and whether or not that offensive is successful, the U.S. should provide it to increase its political leverage in ceasefire negotiations.

There is absolutely no time pressure on those negotiations. Unfortunately, the prevailing wisdom among states involved with the failed 2014 settlement in Ukraine focuses on the need to proactively give Russia something. For example, on June 4, French President Emmanuel Macron suggested that Putin needs a victory to avoid being humiliated and give him a way to end the war.

That is, objectively speaking, completely insane. The West has no need to help extract Putin from a mess of his own making. At least — at very least — it has no need to do so without Putin explicitly requesting its help, and he has not yet done so.

The good news is that it doesn’t even really matter what France and Germany propose to Putin, since their effect on the war is minimal. Ukraine’s resistance and fighting capability is enabled most of all by the U.S., as well as the U.K., Poland, and other Eastern European nations. The U.S. is the key fulcrum of the war. Ukraine can keep fighting regardless of what Macron wants, but probably not regardless of what Biden wants, and Biden should use this to insert the U.S. as the key player in negotiating a settlement.

And if Putin wants the war to stop — more importantly, if he wants America’s help in stopping the war — the U.S. should make him pay for it. The most critical items are not the tactical laydown of forces and political mechanisms of sovereignty in the East. Probably some Russian forces will remain in Ukraine under any ceasefire. Probably Ukraine will not consent to ceding territory to Russia. Probably Russia will announce an annexation or liberation of some part of the East, regardless. Those are all tactical issues.

But the U.S. must have some items not related to Ukraine in the settlement — some concession on another issue, involving Russia’s behavior elsewhere. Russia’s entire strategy for nearly two decades in Eastern Europe has been to localize its behavior, to make Ukraine and Georgia and even NATO members like Estonia feel isolated when it commits aggression against them. Moscow will say to each new U.S. administration — and here I speak from some experience — that it wants to work with the United States productively on issues like Iran and arms control and climate and Syria and usually that administration will accept. This may achieve some low-hanging diplomatic fruit, but at the cost of indicating to the Russians that they can limit the fallout from aggression elsewhere.

If Ukraine’s safety is to be guaranteed, then the message must be sent that Russia cannot transgress against Ukraine without affecting its interests elsewhere. If it wants a settlement, it must pay for it — with Iran, ideally. But somewhere. That would indicate that Ukraine is inextricably linked to our other bilateral issues with the Russians, and they cannot conduct business as usual if they throw their weight around in the east. That linkage is the best way — maybe the only way — to ensure Ukraine’s safety in the future.