A Treaty Gone Wrong
IS the INF Treaty so important that the Russians should be allowed to cheat on it without consequence? That’s the implication of the criticisms of President Trump for saying that he’s pulling out of the Cold War-era arms-control agreement. Mikhail Gorbachev deemed Trump’s stated intention “unacceptable” and “very irresponsible,” although it isn’t the United States that has been flagrantly violating it for years.
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, signed in 1987, was a central achievement of the Reagan-Gorbachev diplomacy of the late 1980s. The Soviets had deployed intermediate-range SS-20 missiles that could hit NATO countries from bases in the Soviet Union. The United States countered by deploying its own intermediate-range missiles in Europe.
At the same time, Reagan proposed the “zero option” to eliminate such missiles from the arsenals of both countries. As he sought to save his doomed system, Gorbachev agreed.
The Russians have recently made obvious their contempt for Gorbachev’s handiwork. The State Department has determined since 2014 that Russia is in violation of the treaty, via the 9M729 groundlaunched cruise missile. Tests of the non-compliant missile go back to 2008, and the Obama administration first told Congress of its concerns in 2011.
Supporters of the treaty say we should just pressure the Russians to comply rather than pull out. But when confronted with their cheat- ing, the Russians simply deny it. Meetings of the Special Verification Commission, the treaty’s mechanism for addressing compliance issues, have achieved nothing.
The Kremlin has remained unmoved, even though we have made it clear that we have them nailed. We have provided Russians the names of the companies involved in developing the missile and the coordinates of the locations of tests.
If Moscow cared to come into compliance with the treaty, it had ample opportunity, and warning. Legislation has expressed the sense of Congress that Russia’s actions have “defeated the object and purpose of the INF Treaty.” Defense Secretary James Mattis has called the Russian cheating “untenable.”
The Russians have persisted in it for the simple reason that it is in their interest. The former head of the Russian General Staff has commented that intermediate-range missiles would provide Moscow “national-security assurance”— by threatening Poland, Romania and the Baltics, the missiles would “cool the heads of these states’ leaders.”
One thing that the United States and Russians can agree on is that it’s senseless that they are the only two countries in the world that are notionally forbidden from possessing this category of weapon. “Now- adays,” a Russian defense official complained in 2014, “almost 30 countries have such missiles in their arsenals.”
China in particular is outdoing itself. The head of US Pacific Command, Adm. Harry Harris, told Congress last year that the Chinese military “controls the largest and most diverse missile force in the world, with an inventory of more than 2,000 ballistic and cruise missiles. This fact is significant because the US has no comparable capability due to our adherence to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia.” According to Harris, 95 percent of the Chinese missiles “would violate the INF if China was a signatory.”
Given Russian cheating, the INF treaty as a practical matter prohibits
only the United States from having such missiles. What sense is there in that? Arms-controllers often fall back on the argument that US selfrestraint has a symbolic effect, discouraging other countries from developing weapons by the force of our example, but this is manifestly untrue.
Despite our efforts to minimize the role of nuclear weapons in international affairs, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review notes, “since 2010, no potential adversary has reduced either the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy or the number of nuclear weapons it fields.”
There’s no reason to limit our capabilities and flexibility for the sake of an INF treaty that doesn’t even constrain its other signatory.