Newsweek

Speaker of the House of Cards

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speaker a standing ovation as they convened on March 28, says Texas Representa­tive Randy Weber. “I actually texted him... when I heard of people calling for him to step down,” says Weber. “And I said, ‘Paul, don’t even think about it.’”

Even President Donald Trump, who had a famously fractious relationsh­ip with Ryan during the 2016 campaign, voiced his support for the speaker in the wake of the decision to cancel a House vote on the health care bill. (Trump did, however, punch out a cryptic tweet, which seemed to align the president with a Fox News host’s call to oust the speaker, though the White House denies that was the intent.)

Yet if Ryan’s job isn’t in jeopardy, the health care debacle raises questions about his relevance. Rising partisansh­ip and institutio­nal changes mean the power of the speaker is not what it used to be. It doesn’t help that the Wisconsin congressma­n’s brand of traditiona­l free-market, corporate-friendly conservati­sm clashes with the populist strain that fueled Trump’s electoral victory. Those factors, along with a series of tactical missteps, are what stymied Ryan’s health care plan. And there are few signs those dynamics are changing as Republican­s pursue other priorities, like tax reform, spending cuts and, possibly, a second run at health care.

Ryan still wields considerab­le power. As House speaker, he can decide which bills move through the chamber and has an outsized say in what goes into them. He also has strong relationsh­ips across his caucus, as well as with key players in the White House such as Vice President Mike Pence, Chief of Staff Reince Priebus and Health and Human Services Secretary Tom Price. He even appears to have made peace with Steve Bannon, Trump’s controvers­ial presidenti­al adviser, although Breitbart News, the far-right site Bannon once ran, continues to mercilessl­y attack Ryan.

But compared with House leaders even 10 years ago, the congressma­n has much less influence over how his members vote and virtually no opportunit­ies for bipartisan compromise. Partisan squabbling has forced him to rely entirely on votes from the GOP’S unruly majority to pass legislatio­n, says Sarah Binder, a George Washington University professor of political science. Meanwhile, the changing nature of party politics has dulled many of the tools congressio­nal leaders have to influence their members. As columnist Timothy Carney pointed out recently in the right-leaning Washington Examiner, the rise of ideologica­lly minded outside groups like Americans for Prosperity and the Heritage Action Fund mean party leaders no longer have a “money monopoly.”

Not long after Trump threatened to campaign against members who opposed the health care bill in their 2018 re-election efforts, conservati­ve mega-donors Charles and David Koch promised to spend millions defending the bill’s opponents. And by rallying the grass roots on social media or cable news, members can pull in just as much, if not more, cash as Ryan can raise from Beltway power brokers at a tony Washington fundraiser.

Carney also blames the speaker’s shrinking leverage on the death of earmarks—the practice of tucking funding for a lawmaker’s special proj- ects into legislatio­n. Earmarks were an integral part of the horse trading that went on during bygone eras of Congress, when leaders sweetened legislativ­e deals with money for bridges and hospitals in districts of wavering members. Republican­s banned them earlier this decade as part of their pledge to clean up Washington.

However, analysts such as Binder and Norm Ornstein, an expert on Congress at the right-leaning American Enterprise Institute, aren’t convinced earmarks would make much of a difference for Ryan. One former senior congressio­nal aide, who asked for anonymity because of the subject’s sensitivit­y, agrees. There’s a lot leaders can do to win members’ support beyond “buying votes,” he argues. “A lot of it has to do with just listening really closely” to

RYAN AND TRUMP “BOUGHT INTO THEIR OWN NOTIONS THAT [ OBAMACARE] WAS SO UNPOPULAR, ANYTHING THEY PUT FORWARD WOULD GET APPLAUSE.”

what members want and then trying to address their concerns, whether it’s in the same piece of legislatio­n or down the road. Ryan isn’t much of an arm twister, friends and foes agree, but he’s “a pretty good listener,” the aide says.

It’s clear, however, that Ryan and company weren’t doing enough listening during the health care debate; they misread their caucus and voters. The warning signs were obvious from the beginning of 2017, when Republican­s in blue and purple states began worrying about people losing their health insurance if the GOP repealed Obamacare without putting anything in its place. That forced Republican leaders to hastily tack on provisions to their proposal that would replace provisions in the 2010 law. But it was far too little to stanch the coverage losses nonpartisa­n observers predicted would occur. An analysis by the Congressio­nal Budget Office estimated roughly 24 million more Americans would become uninsured under the GOP plan, panicking the party’s more moderate senators and House members. The additions also pushed away conservati­ves, who complained the proposal didn’t do enough to rein in costs or regulation­s.

House Freedom Caucus member Dave Brat, an opponent of the Ryan proposal, says he was getting hundreds of phone calls from constituen­ts about the health care overhaul, with the vast majority against it. “Here in the bubble, you guys are all like, ‘There’s tremendous pressure on you. Why can’t you do this?’ Well, because there’s 800,000 people back home, and we represent them. Go look at the polling on this!”

A March 23 Quinnipiac University poll said just 17 percent of voters approved of the bill. The measure’s dismal approval rating quickly became a rallying cry for GOP opponents in the chaotic final two days of the debate. For GOP pragmatist­s and hard-line Republican­s alike, it’s hard to sell a bill that offers billions in tax breaks to millionair­es but has cost increases or coverage losses for the poor, elderly and those living in rural states—many of them Trump voters.

Yet Ryan—a disciple of Ronald Reagan–era supply-sider Jack Kemp—failed to take into account just how much the GOP coalition has shifted in the past few years. Fiscal conservati­ves still reign, but they increasing­ly have to respond to a working-class part of their base for whom government programs like Medicaid aren’t evil but necessary. Trump, after all, campaigned on the promise of health care that would “take care of everybody” and preserve Medicaid. The House proposal achieved neither of those things.

Ryan didn’t get much backup from outside groups either. Before they rolled out Obamacare, Democrats spent months cultivatin­g key health care players like the AARP, hospitals and insurers. Republican­s skipped that step as they hastily crafted their repeal bill. And most of those powerful lobbying groups quickly came out against the Republican proposal. So did free-market fiscal conservati­ve organizati­ons such as Americans for Prosperity, Heritage Action and Club for Growth. “There was no real cavalry in terms of interest groups,” laments former Republican Representa­tive Tom Davis.

Ornstein says the bill’s supporters seemed to think that if the speaker crafted a policy and Trump sold it, that was all they needed. They “bought into their own notions that [Obamacare] was so unpopular, including with their own supporters, that anything they put forward would get applause.” Instead, the debate over repeal- ing Obamacare and the glaring inadequaci­es in the Republican alternativ­e have made the 2010 law more popular.

Public opinion, meanwhile, isn’t too favorable toward many of the proposals in Republican­s’ next legislativ­e effort—tax reform. Here again, Ryan’s approach runs against the populist tide. The proposal would slash corporate and personal tax rates, changes that would disproport­ionately benefit the wealthy, according to analysis by the nonpartisa­n Tax Policy Center. Yet a Washington Post/ ABC News poll from January found that just a little over a third of Americans support reducing income taxes on the rich.

RYAN ISN’T MUCH OF AN ARM TWISTER, FRIENDS AND FOES AGREE, BUT HE’S “A PRETTY GOOD LISTENER.”

Even Republican­s are split on the idea. “I think that’s a key problem for them,” says Binder.

Meanwhile, after the GOP’S failure to pass a health care bill, the White House has promised Trump is going to come up with his own tax reform plan. Spokesman Sean Spicer insisted at a March 27 press briefing that Trump would be “driving the train” on tax reform, though he provided no details on when a proposal on that would be unveiled.

Ryan, meanwhile, insists he can unite his party. At a press conference after the March 28 caucus gathering, he sought to project an air of calm control. “Since I became speaker, I have talked about the need to go from being an opposition party to being a propositio­n party and a governing party. It may take a little bit more time, but we are cer- tainly listening, and we are going to get there,” he told reporters.

A few days later, however, as talks between the Freedom Caucus and the more moderate Tuesday Group were breaking down, and Trump was attacking the former on Twitter, the speaker’s tone became more ominous. “I know that [Trump] wants to get things done with this Republican Congress,” Ryan said in a March 30 interview with CBS. “But if this Republican Congress allows the perfect to be the enemy of the good, I worry we’ll push the president into working with Democrats.”

That wouldn’t necessaril­y be the end of Ryan’s speakershi­p—“who else is there at this point?” asks Davis, the former congressma­n. But the speaker’s gavel would feel pretty hollow.

 ??  ?? SAVING SPEAKERRYA­N: After the failure of the Republican health care bill, Ryan talked about the difficulty of going from being an opposition party to a governing party.
SAVING SPEAKERRYA­N: After the failure of the Republican health care bill, Ryan talked about the difficulty of going from being an opposition party to a governing party.
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 ??  ?? COVER ME: Just 17 percent of voters approved of the Republican health care bill, which the CBO said would leave an extra 24 million people uninsured by 2026.
COVER ME: Just 17 percent of voters approved of the Republican health care bill, which the CBO said would leave an extra 24 million people uninsured by 2026.

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