Poland Takes Center Stage
In his first in-depth talk with a U.S. media outlet, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki weighs in on Russia, Biden, Big Tech and prospects for a ‘United States of Europe’
Prime Minister Morawiecki’s First In-depth American Interview
Under the leadership of prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki, Poland has taken a decidedly nationalist turn, winning high praise among many Western conservatives but scorn among some progressives. Like many of its peer countries in the Visegrad Group (an alliance of four countries in Central Europe) and the Three Seas Initiative (a coalition of 12 EU countries bordered by the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas), Poland sits at the crossroads of the Western European/german-centric hub of pro-european Union sentiment to the west and the broader umbrella of Vladimir Putin-led Russian influence to the east.
Newsweek Opinion Editor Josh Hammer and Polish-american journalist Matthew Tyrmand sat down in Warsaw with Prime Minister Morawiecki on May 27. A member of the national conservative Law and Justice party, Morawiecki has served as prime minister of the Republic of Poland since December 11, 2017. The following conversation, which has been edited for space, is the first in-depth English-language interview with an American news outlet that Morawiecki has done since taking over as prime minister.
Let’s start with the economy. The Polish economy has grown steadily, with barely any contractions since 1989. But new challenges threaten the Eurozone economies and those challenges have a high correlation to Poland’s economic growth. How do you see Poland economically positioned, more generally, as we start to emerge from the COVID-19 pandemic?
To be precise, there was a huge contraction between 1989 and 1991—a huge recession. And then, since 1991, there was steady growth until the COVID-19 pandemic and the recession connected with this. However, our drop, our recession, was one of the shallowest in the European Union. That is because of very brave usage of “anti-crisis shields,” as we call them, a financial shield. This was in the range of 10 to 12 percentage points of GDP, of this size.
We have preserved jobs. We have the lowest unemployment level in the European Union right now. And we have helped companies go through the most difficult times in 2020. And now they have preserved their market share, they have preserved their capacity to expand, capacity to export
and we see a very strong recovery right now.
So I’m happy with regard to the prospects of the Polish economy over the next couple of years. It’s very well prepared now in this phase, POSTCOVID, to build on investment—and, in particular, exports and domestic consumption as well.
Speaking of the EU, we are five years now after the U.K. voted to leave—and fewer years than that since they actually left. But the fissures in EU cohesion remain and the heavy-handed harmonization efforts out of Brussels continue to catalyze dissent from national electorates in places like Italy and Spain. Can the EU get on a track that is more harmonious and encourages more integration among the nations? Or is the post-brexit political volatility in continental Europe a permanent feature of European continental politics?
If we want Europe to be a superpower, we should not expect that there will be one “United States of Europe” because it will never be exactly that in my imagination. There are 27 countries, and several more closely aligned that are not belonging to the European Union, but all of which have strong identities, cultural heritages, languages and traditions. But not only this, they are also having their own natures, so to speak.
So for Europe to be strong, it has to be a “Europe of homelands.” It cannot be one superpower, because if that is the case, there will be frictions and tensions that are going to grow even bigger if those from Brussels, Berlin or Paris would try to push all the others toward such a state. But contrary to just simple thinking, I believe that this is the only way for the European Union to be a superpower, rather than just a supermarket for different goods and services.
We must be able to work out a common strategy toward the external world and the global powers—in particular, those in the east, which do jeopardize our development. And in our common relations with the transatlantic community in particular, as well. We can be a superpower, but without this meaning a one-sizefits-all type of philosophy that some Eurocrats from Brussels seem to believe in.
On the other hand, I am a true believer in the European strategy toward external jeopardies from the Muslim world, from China and from Russia. And for this, we need a very strong alliance with the United States, of course.
Focusing specifically on Central and Eastern Europe, how do you see the Three Seas Initiative taking shape to become a more potent political and economic counterweight to Western Europe’s more historically developed states? And then, as well, the relationship between the Three Seas Initiative members vis-à-vis the foreboding Putin-russia threat coming out of your eastern flank?
Contrary to some statements about Three Seas from Western Europe, in particular, I do not see the initiative as being in opposition to the unity and to the strength of the European Union policy. The opposite is the case, in my view, because it’s the “missing lung,” as John Paul II said, of Europe. The western lung is on one side, while the eastern lung is not so well developed.
For it to be better developed, we need north-south connectivity— north-south infrastructure, which is missing. In Europe, we have quite well developed east-west interconnectors, in terms of infrastructure, energy, roads, railways and so on. We do not have the same from Scandinavia down to Greece. And for Poland, which happens to be in the middle of this geography and is the biggest country of all these Three Seas countries and potential Three Seas countries, this is a missing link in the strategic and defense architecture—because this [Poland] is at the same time the eastern flank of the European Union and the eastern flank of NATO, and is thus more geographically exposed and at risk.
By developing this [Three Seas Initiative] and supplementing this with that lacking infrastructure, we are going to strengthen the presence of the European Union in the transatlantic community. So it’s in the interest of the United States, and in the interest of Western Europe, to strengthen this dimension, rather than fight against it.
Focusing a little bit more on Russia, what can the EU collectively do about Russian encroachment and the Russian threat, both directly through physical sovereign border breaches and also indirectly—cyberwarfare, disinformation campaigns, spy games and so forth?
We have to be consistent and patient with regard to our Russia policy because the stability of Russian strategic policy is a challenge to us and to the
“We should not expect that there will be one ‘United States of Europe’ because it will never be exactly that.”
European Union, where governments change much more often than in Russia and where there are different views on Russia. The further from the east, the lesser Russia is perceived as a threat.
Notwithstanding this, we were able to work out a common view on sanctions toward Russia for occupying the Crimean Peninsula and the Donbas area, on the one hand. On the other hand, we still try to persuade Russia— or more accurately, dissuade Russia— from being aggressive in their own strategic activity. And from our more strategic view, Russia could be one obstacle for China to further grow and expand its influence and power all over the globe. But for this to happen, we would have to have a truly peaceful non-aggressive Russia, which is not so easy to imagine.
What about Belarus? Belarus obviously is in the news right now, as the post-election situation there has led to an escalation of implicitly Putin-supported muscle-flexing. What are your thoughts on Belarus and President Alexander Lukashenko, and Polish policy on Belarus?
It was quite an unfortunate development in the post-election period of Belarus. Indeed, I truly admire the Belarusian society for their stubborn and patient resistance toward what is happening in Minsk and in Belarus. Of course, they are all living very much in the shadow of Russia, and this is why this is so complicated because Lukashenko is not only representing Lukashenko himself, he has strong support from Russia.
Having said that, we have quite strongly and collectively condemned the act of hijacking this airplane [on May 23, Belarus forced a Ryanair flight from Greece to Lithuania to land in Minsk and arrested a passenger, dissident journalist Roman Protasevich]—which, by the way, was and is registered in Poland. And there was no country, no member state of the European Union, which hesitated on the sanctions upon which we have all agreed to levy during the last European Council meeting.
Let’s talk about energy and Nord Stream 2 [an export gas pipeline running from Russia to Europe across the Baltic Sea]. A lot of U.S. conservatives are somewhere between surprised and just enraged that President Biden has signed off on this while simultaneously blocking the Keystone XL pipeline running from Canada to the U.S. at home. From Poland’s perspective, what can and should be done about this end run around Central Europe’s energy security? It seems like Germany has made kind of a Faustian bargain with Russia at the same time that it’s leading a charge for more Europe through devolution of sovereign power toward Brussels. What can be done about Nord Stream 2, in particular?
We are very disappointed, in Poland, about the recent change of the position of the United States in particular because, over the last couple of years, we have worked hand-in-hand with the U.S. administration to stop or to slow down the development of Nord Stream 2. And it was only recently where the American administration changed their view on this, with false hopes that this will help to repair the relations between the U.S. and the European Union. Well, Germany is not the European Union. Germany is Germany, and they have their own interests and it happened that their interests are quite aligned and on the same page with the Russian interests.
But these are not aligned with the transatlantic interests. So Germany is on a collision course with the transatlantic strategy, regarding its own energy interests. And by this, I don’t only mean importing American gas. That’s not really the primary significance here. The primary significance is that by stopping Nord Stream 2, we were trying to not help the Russians accumulate funds for their military developments and aggressive policy. And it was quite successful until very recently. So such a change was very disappointing—and not only for Poland, but for many European countries.
“Poland is probably the only nation in the whole of Europe which is, at the same time, pretty fully pro-european and pro-american.”
What do you think the Biden administration’s motivation for this was? It’s such a 180-degree flip—it’s a turning of the Trump administration’s policy on this issue on its head. And it particularly stands out because this 180-degree turn happened after talking so tough on Russia and signaling a commitment to strong transatlantic U.s./paneuropean relations.
I think a very simplistic analysis of the European Union and hopes for repairing relationships with the European Union through Germany. But Poland is much more active, in terms of defending the eastern flank of the European Union— which is, at the same time, the eastern flank of NATO. And also, Poland is probably the only such society and nation in the whole of Europe which is at the same time pretty fully pro-european and pro-american. So we are a natural keystone integrating these two dimensions, which is very important from the point of view of psychology in politics, as well as with the economy.
So it was to the detriment of deeper transatlantic unity what has just happened—now, Russia is going to get a strong instrument in its hands to further divide transatlantic interests and to use its weaponry toward Ukraine and Belarus. Nothing is going to stop them [Russia] now marching deeper into Ukraine, because their gas pipeline system—i mean the Ukrainian one—is going to be redundant pretty soon after the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is completely established and fully operational.
How did you accomplish one of the European Union’s leading progressive social policies with the 500-Plus program [stipends for growing families], the housing policy to build more affordable housing units to get more people into apartments and so forth, without creating a budget deficit?
This was really through applying very
modern IT tools in our Ministry for Finance. This was using artificial intelligence and machine learning type of algorithms, which we have then implemented across the board in terms of our tax offices. So it required some training and development of IT, and we have then applied this to the whole system.
So not only were we able to dramatically increase tax receipts, but at the same time we have lowered tax rates for businesses. Like for the small- and mid-sized businesses, it’s 9 percent, the tax rate. For personal income tax, we have lowered the rate from 18 percent to 17 percent, and now we are going to have a higher tax-free allowance—one of the highest tax-free allowances in all of Europe. This goes hand-in-hand with repairing the fiscal system, which was very much in trouble before.
Shifting gears to Big Tech: Poland has led the way here in the last several months. The Polish government has come out drafting legislation that would impose punitive financial penalties on these globally active American Big Tech and social media firms for censorship that would breach domestic law or the Polish Constitution, which is a constitution committed to free speech ideals.
What is the current status of this legislation? When do you expect we might see enforcement occur?
Well today, who sets these rules is really the master of destiny for society and for nation-states. So today, platforms and communication networks and intellectual property are even more important than the land and the buildings and the technology assembly lines and all the materials that go into creating these digital realms. And these dynamics do not make it easier to grasp the elements of the moving parts of the complicated interdependent economic jigsaw puzzle that is our modern age.
This is why it is so much more difficult to understand who sets the rules today, because it is no longer the governments that can have this competence over the setting of the rules.
Huge international corporations in the area of the digital world, in particular, are setting the rules very often that are suitable for themselves, which may not always be a social good. And this is why states should now be very active in eliminating censorship and eliminating monopolistic powers of those companies, as well.
This is still being cooked in the Polish parliament, by the Polish government working through the domestic legislature, but we are quite determined for this to work— either together with Brussels, or on our own to go ahead with this if need be.
We are in discussion with the European Commission in two aspects of this area. One is vis-à-vis the freedom of speech and eliminating censorship issue. The other one is in taxing companies where they do business—so not letting them go to tax havens like Luxembourg or Cyprus or Switzerland, and not paying taxes at all or very little taxes paid in these other tax haven countries, because I think that Big Tech companies minimizing their tax burden this way is not sustainable for our economies.