Pittsburgh Post-Gazette

Even Europe disagrees about how to arm Ukraine

- Daniel DePetris Daniel DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune.

It wasn’t long ago when French President Emmanuel Macron fancied himself as Europe’s Vladimir Putin whisperer — somebody who couldtalk some sense into the Russian authoritar­ian. But four days before Putin gave the order, Macron, desperatio­n in his voice, tried to test the Russian president’s interest in a diplomatic arrangemen­t that could avert all-out war.

Macron’s gambit obviously didn’t work. Two years of destructio­n and hundreds of thousands of casualties later, he has undergone a complete 180-degree pivot, carving out a lane for himself as Europe’s most vociferous Russia hawk.

The same man who once counseled Europe to avoid humiliatin­g Russia is now giving numerous interviews on why Russia’s unconditio­nal defeat is paramount. He even said that sending European ground troops into Ukraine shouldn’t be ruled out.

Macron vs. his peers

That proposal in particular has gotten him into trouble with his European colleagues. When Macron first unveiled it in late February, multiple European leaders immediatel­y made it known that they had no interest in participat­ing. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz told the press that “there will be no ground troops, no soldiers on Ukrainian soil who are sent there by European states or NATO states.” Poland, one of Ukraine’s biggest supporters in Europe, expressed the same.

Macron, though, is stubborn. On Thursday, he argued that the West shouldn’t set limits for itself since Putin would simply take advantage of them. Embedded deep in his psyche is the concept of being as ambiguous as possible so the Russians are kept guessing.

Europe’s other big power, Germany, doesn’t see it that way and has always drawn a line about what Berlin is — and isn’t — willing to do to see Putin’s invasion flame out. If Macron was trying to deliver a message to Putin that Europe was united on Ukraine policy, his remarks did the exact opposite.

On Friday, Macron, Scholz and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk came together for a three-way summit in Berlin to hash things out. There was no joint statement after the meeting, and while the three leaders gave remarks during a joint news appearance, they didn’t allow questions.

Nonetheles­s, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will no doubt smile

at the outcome. France, Germany and Poland agreed to tap into the interest accumulate­d from Russia’s seized foreign reserves to help reconstruc­t Ukraine and provide the Ukrainian army with more weapons.

They each threw their support behind a Czech initiative to purchase ammunition for Ukraine outside the European Union bloc. The three countries also came to a consensus on establishi­ng a new coalition that will send more long- range rocket artillery into the Ukrainians’ hands so they can continue pressuring Russia’s supply lines — in occupied Ukraine and inside Russia itself.

European disputes

All in all, it was a considerab­le success for Kyiv. Yet the disputes among European powers can’t be wished away. While Europe as a whole — with the exception of Hungary and perhaps Slovakia, which are led by prime ministers sympatheti­c to Russia — would like nothing more than to see the Russian army withdraw from

Ukrainian territory, individual European states have different strategies for getting to that point.

Some are more risk-averse. Others, such as France, are led by highly ambitious leaders who view themselves as de facto spokespeop­le for the European continent and see the war in Ukraine as a gigantic step toward making Europe a stoic geopolitic­al power in its own right.

Some, such as the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, have firsthand experience with what it means to live under Moscow’s thumb and argue that it’s better to fight the Russians in Ukraine than in Eastern Europe.

Others, such as Germany, are perfectly content with backing Ukraine with military aid but have drawn rigid limitation­s around certain weapons systems, such as the long-range Taurus cruise missile, that the Ukrainians could employ against Russian cities far from the border region.

The Taurus is emblematic of the different interests at play in Europe. It is a highly sophistica­ted piece of lethal equipment, replete with the best sensors and GPS to make the work of enemy air defenses extremely difficult.

The Ukrainians would love nothing more than to have it because the missile can hit targets with precision as far as 300 miles away. But Scholz has repeatedly ruled out donating the system to Ukraine, claiming it would turn Germany into a combatant and increase the risk of Russian escalation.

Scholz’s colleagues in Europe, Macron included, scoff at that reasoning as an excuse. Yet there’s no denying that Scholz’s position is still the majority opinion, within the Bundestag and with the German public.

Ukraine matters more to Europe

The United States has been Ukraine’s primary military supporter, authorizin­g more than $44 billion in security aid since the war began. However, what happens in Ukraine is ultimately more important to European capitals than it is to Washington. If U.S. military support dries up completely, Europe will need to find a way to close at least some of the gap.

Expect the difference­s between Germany and France to be exposed to more daylight.

 ?? Alexander Zemlianich­enko/Associated Press ?? Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Alexander Zemlianich­enko/Associated Press Russian President Vladimir Putin.

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