San Diego Union-Tribune

TEST OF RESPONSIBI­LITY

- Douthat is on Twitter, @DouthatNYT. For another view on this week’s elections, see Saturday’s Opinion section.

If the Ohio Senate primary two weeks ago provided some clarity about the ideologica­l divisions in the Republican Party, Tuesday’s primaries often seemed more like a showcase for the distinctiv­e personalit­ies that populate a Trumpified GOP.

The Pennsylvan­ia Senate race gave us an especially vivid mix: As of this writing, the Celebrity Doctor and the Hedge Fund Guy Pretending to Be a MAGA True Believer may be headed for a recount, after the Would-Be Media Personalit­y With the Inspiring Backstory and the Unfortunat­e Twitter Feed faded back into the pack. In the governor’s race, Republican voters chose to nominate Doug Mastriano, aka the QAnon Dad. In North Carolina, they ended — for now — the political career of Rep. Madison Cawthorn, the Obviously Suffering Grifter.

On substance, as opposed to personalit­y, though, the night’s stakes were relatively simple: Can Republican­s prevent their party from becoming the party of constituti­onal crisis, with leaders tacitly committed to turning the next close presidenti­al election into a legal-judicialpo­litical train wreck?

This is a distinctiv­e version of a familiar political problem. Whenever a destabiliz­ing populist rebellion is unleashed inside a democratic polity, there are generally two ways to bring back stability without some kind of crisis or rupture in the system.

Sometimes the revolt can be quarantine­d within a minority coalition and defeated by a majority. This was the destiny, for instance, of William Jennings Bryan’s 1890s prairie-populist rebellion, which took over the Democratic Party but went down to multiple presidenti­al defeats at the hands of the more establishm­entarian Republican­s. You can see a similar pattern, for now, in French politics, where the populism of Marine Le Pen keeps getting isolated and defeated by the widely disliked but grudgingly tolerated centrism of Emmanuel Macron.

In the alternativ­e path to stability, the party being reshaped by populism finds leaders who can absorb its energies, channel its grievances and claim its mantle — but also defeat or suppress its most extreme manifestat­ions. This was arguably the path of New Deal liberalism in its relationsh­ip to Depression-era populism and radicalism: In the 1930s, Franklin Roosevelt was able to sustain support from voters who were also drawn to more demagogic characters, from Huey Long to Charles Coughlin. Two generation­s later, it was the path of Reaganite conservati­sm in its relationsh­ip to both George Wallace’s populism and the Goldwateri­te New Right.

The problem for America today is that neither stabilizin­g strategy is going particular­ly well. Part of the Never Trump movement has aspired to a Macronstyl­e strategy, preaching establishm­ent unity behind the Democratic Party. But the Democrats haven’t cooperated: They conspicuou­sly failed to contain and defeat Trumpism in 2016, and there is no sign that the Biden-era variation on the party is equipped to hold on to the majority it won in 2020.

Meanwhile, the Republican Party at the moment does have a provisiona­l model for channeling but also restrainin­g populism. Essentiall­y, it involves leaning into culture war controvers­y and rhetorical pugilism to a degree that provokes constant liberal outrage and using that outrage to reassure populist voters that you’re on their side and they don’t need to throw you over for a conspiracy theorist or Jan. 6 marcher.

This is the model, in different styles and contexts, of Glenn Youngkin and Ron DeSantis. In Tuesday’s primaries, it worked for Idaho’s conservati­ve incumbent governor, Brad Little, who easily defeated his own lieutenant governor’s much-further-right campaign. Next week, the same approach seems likely to help Brian Kemp defeat David Perdue for the governor’s nomination in Georgia. And it offers the party’s

Democrats cheer on unfit Republican­s on the theory that they will be easier to beat.

only chance, likely via a DeSantis candidacy, to defeat Donald Trump in 2024.

Unfortunat­ely, this model works best when you have a trusted figure, a known quantity, delivering the “I’ll be your warrior; I’ll defeat the left” message. The Cawthorn race, in which the toxic congressma­n was unseated by a member of the North Carolina state Senate, shows that this figure doesn’t have to be an incumbent to succeed, especially if other statewide leaders provide unified support.

But if you have neither unity nor a figure with statewide prominence or incumbency as your champion — no Kemp, no Little — then you can get results like Mastriano’s victory in Pennsylvan­ia: a Republican nominee for governor who cannot be trusted to carry out his constituti­onal duties should the presidenti­al election be close in 2024.

So now the obligation returns to the Democrats. Mastriano certainly deserves to lose the general election, and probably he will. But throughout the whole Trumpian experience, the Democratic Party has consistent­ly failed its own tests of responsibi­lity: It has talked constantly about the threat to democracy while moving leftward to a degree that makes it difficult to impossible to hold the center, and it has repeatedly cheered on unfit Republican candidates on the theory that they will be easier to beat.

This happened conspicuou­sly with Trump himself, and more unforgivab­ly, it happened again with Mastriano.

Pennsylvan­ia Democrats sent out mailers boosting his candidacy and ran a big ad buy, more than twice Mastriano’s own TV spending, calling him “one of Donald Trump’s strongest supporters” — an “attack” line perfectly scripted to improve his primary support.

Now they have him, as they had Trump in 2016. We’ll see if they can make the story end differentl­y this time.

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