San Francisco Chronicle - (Sunday)
How state plan for bullet train went off track
It’s the railway dream that bedazzled California for decades: bullet trains whipping up and down the state, cutting a path from Los Angeles, through the orchards of the Central Valley and into downtown San Francisco. The route promised to eventually push north to Sacramento and south to San Diego.
But high-speed rail has repeatedly hit lawsuits, engineering problems, geological obstacles, bureaucracy, swelling costs and delays. Its budget has ballooned from $33 billion to $77 billion, with no secure financing plan.
In his State of the State speech last week, Gov. Gavin Newsom said he might scale back the vision to a 165-mile track between Merced and Bakersfield that seems to have little appeal. He has since backpedaled, saying he’s still open to a
longer line, but acknowledged that there is no money for it.
Which begs the question: How did we get here?
1996
The Legislature creates the High Speed Rail Authority to design a plan to connect the state’s major job and residential centers with a high-speed train — an idea that had enthralled state officials since the early 1980s. Officials begin laying out business plans, but it will be more than a decade before significant funding emerges.
August 2008
The cities of Atherton and Menlo Park sue the Rail Authority over its decision to run trains over Pacheco Pass, and then up the Peninsula, instead of running them over Altamont Pass, which would have taken trains through the East Bay. The cities ultimately lose their fight to keep the proposed line off the Peninsula, but the challenge over where trains should run is one of many that will hamper progress on the project.
November 2008
Voters approve $9.95 billion of bonds for construction of an 800-mile track, with promises to whisk riders between Los Angeles and San Francisco in two hours and 40 minutes for a fare cheaper than an airline ticket. The act locks in expectations that will prove difficult to meet. It also leaves a large gap in funding that rail officials hope to fill with money from the federal and state governments.
2009
California secures $3.3 billion for the rail line from the federal government’s American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and other grant programs. Because it’s money intended to stimulate the economy, the federal government urges the state to begin work in the Central Valley, between Madera and Bakersfield, where the rail line becomes widely criticized as a “train to nowhere.”
2011
Kings County and several Central Valley farmers who oppose the project sue the Rail Authority. They allege that the agency will never follow through on commitments made for the train, adding to the project’s legal snags.
2012
Gov. Jerry Brown elevates the rail project as a priority, hardening the state’s push for the train while Republican legislators step up opposition. They call the project a waste of money, a view that eventually begins drawing Democrats.
2013
The Rail Authority negotiates its first purchases of private property for laying the rail line, in Madera and Fresno counties. The process of acquiring more than 1,000 parcels over the next few years results in countless delays, budget overruns and postponements of construction contracts.
2015
The first shovels hit the ground in Fresno, almost three years behind schedule. Crews start construction on a 119-mile segment from Madera to Bakersfield, clearing homes and businesses for the rail line, building bridges over rivers and relocating a 2-mile stretch of Highway 99.
2016
The Rail Authority faces one of its biggest engineering and environmental quandaries: whether to bore a 14-mile tunnel for the rail line through the Diablo mountain range. It will cost substantially more than a track that runs over the mountains, and require workers to confront rocky, undulating terrain. But the tunnel, which remains under environmental review, will allow the train to bypass the San Luis Reservoir, an area teeming with fish and wildlife. The railway faces similar geologic challenges in the Tehachapi and San Gabriel mountains.
2017
Brown helps fund the cashstrapped project by getting the Legislature to extend the state’s cap-and-trade program to 2030. The program, which forces industry to buy permits to pollute, provides revenue that keeps the rail project moving forward as other sources of money prove difficult to come by.
June 2018
The Rail Authority releases a new business plan that pushes the completion date to 2033, 13 years behind schedule, and raises the cost of the project to $77.3 billion, roughly twice the 2008 estimate. It’s the latest in a series of reports that show cost overruns and delays.
November 2018
A new 50-mile route from Palmdale (Los Angeles County) to Burbank is in the works, a trade of economic costs for social costs. Instead of snaking along State Route 14 and Interstate 5 through the San Fernando Valley, the Rail Authority opts for a more expensive tunnel beneath the San Gabriel Mountains. The original plan would have displaced 8,000 homes and businesses around the San Fernando Valley.
November 2018
The California State Auditor’s office releases a report criticizing the Rail Authority for “flawed decision making” and “poor contract management” that have led to billions of dollars of cost overruns. The agency has faced criticism before for its lack of technical expertise and questionable contractor oversight.
December 2018
A poll by the Public Policy Institute of California indicates that only 19 percent of state residents believe that highspeed rail is a priority.
February 2019
Newsom says that he will now focus on the Central Valley portion of rail, a 165-mile stretch between Merced and Bakersfield, that’s already under construction. His remarks leave the rest of the project in doubt, though he says he still wants to complete it.