San Francisco Chronicle

V- E Day celebratio­ns explain past, present

- By Robert F. Kirchubel Robert Kirchubel, a retired U. S. Army lieutenant colonel, teaches military history at Purdue University.

World War II increasing­ly slips into the background for much of the world, but not in Russia, not this weekend. On May 9, Russian President Vladimir Putin will ensure that none in his domestic audience has forgotten, nor anyone abroad who happens to be paying attention. To celebrate V- E Day, nearly 15,000 Russian service members and their newest military hardware will parade across or fly above Red Square. By the end of the day, the connection between past and present will be clear.

Fed a diet of “Saving Private Ryan” and “Band of Brothers,” Americans can be excused for not knowing that the Soviet Union contribute­d most toward defeating Nazi Germany. Of approximat­ely 60 million wartime deaths worldwide, from half to a third came from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Russian people today have every right to be mindful of these facts.

Putin, who once called the demise of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitic­al catastroph­e of the 20th century,” may possibly describe Stalin’s victory over Hitler as “the greatest geopolitic­al success of the 20th century.” With speeches and parades covered by his PR machine, Putin will twist the World War II narrative to advocate internatio­nal power politics, glorify war ( not just World War II), legitimize the use of force and honor sacrifice. His images of 1941- 45 will represent harbingers of future war, use of force and sacrifice.

Missing from the viewing stand will be top Western leaders, who flocked to Moscow for the 60th anniversar­y in 2005; numerous third- rate dictators, notably North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, will take their place.

The main reason for the different guest list is Putin’s nationalis­tic Novorossiy­a ( New Russia) project. As Saturday’s celebratio­ns will confirm, a large portion of the long- suffering Russian people support this policy. However, neighborin­g countries do not have the same rose- colored opinion. Sure, Putin can buy off some of them with Russian energy resources or membership in his new Greater Eurasian CoProsperi­ty Sphere economic union. But other neighbors would rather exist without his chest thumping or bullying, free to choose their own path to the future. Chief among these is Ukraine.

By most measures, Ukraine is far from healthy and may not want overly close relations with the West in any event. Since 1991, it has been on a rollercoas­ter ride, alternatin­g between Western- oriented Orange and Maidan revolution­s or the cleptocrat­ic but disarmingl­y telegenic regimes favored by other former Soviet republics. It suffers from deep divisions: east- west tensions, and dueling social engineerin­g schemes or Russian and Ukrainian historians debating “we were here first,” to name a few.

In 1994 and 1997, with Boris Yeltsin as president, Russia signed treaties with the sovereign nation of Ukraine, but now Putin is loathe to even recognize the country as a legitimate state.

Yet Ukraine is not such a failed state that its government could not have dealt with indigenous separatist­s in its Donetsk and Luhansk regions; these rebels are similar to Islamic State fighters, loosely associated goons with assault rifles in pickup trucks, on their own capable of little more than terrorizin­g civilians and occupying uninhabite­d countrysid­e. But Putin deployed “volunteers,” equipped with heavy weapons, which exacerbate­d the situation and skewed the battle calculus in favor of the separatist­s, exposing the weaknesses of the Ukrainian authoritie­s. So far both western Europe, which put security behind commercial­ism, and the war- weary United States have concluded that Ukraine “is not worth the bones of a single NATO grenadier” ( to paraphrase Bismarck) and have rightly eschewed war as a solution.

The United States is not squeaky clean when it comes to foreign policy moves that, to an objective observer, look uncomforta­bly like Putin’s annexation of the Crimea. However, in our interconne­cted age, Americans cannot consider the dispute between Russia and the Ukraine “a quarrel in a faraway country between people of which we know nothing ” as British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlin described the Nazi annexation of Sudetenlan­d in 1938.

Even in the Pacific Century, events in Europe — central and eastern Europe included — matter to us. The crisis between Russia and Ukraine is a big problem for American interests and values. There are many negative measures to promote change in Putin’s rule- breaking behavior short of war still open to American and European leaders. More promising and on the positive side, the West can use positive approaches to strengthen the people of Ukraine and eastern Europe, encourage competent administra­tion, provide financial support and increase cultural exchanges, i. e., be active in the region more than only during crises.

Ukraine has always existed in a dangerous corner of Europe, as Saturday’s V- E Day celebratio­ns will remind us. Solutions to challenges need to be appropriat­e for 2015, not 1945.

 ?? Alexey Druzhinin/ AFP/ Getty Images 2010 ?? Vladimir Putin ( left) then Russian prime minister, meets in Crimea in 2010 with Russian bikers called the Night Wolves.
Alexey Druzhinin/ AFP/ Getty Images 2010 Vladimir Putin ( left) then Russian prime minister, meets in Crimea in 2010 with Russian bikers called the Night Wolves.

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