Emmanuel Macron to the rescue?

The presidential race in France is almost universally regarded as offering a stark choice, not only about the future of France but of the entire European-integration enterprise. The differences between the two candidates are, indeed, astonishingly stark. Withdraw from the European Union; work for greater integration within it. Dump the euro; keep it. Erect trade barriers; compete more successfully in international free trade.

Nevertheless, my guess, not my hope, is that the real choice is between the fast or gradual demise of the European-integration enterprise.

The flaw in that enterprise is broadly misdiagnosed on both sides of the Atlantic. The problem, goes the usual analysis, is having a monetary union without a true political union and a common fiscal policy.

That’s wide of the mark. A stable currency is one of the fundamental building blocks of sustainable economic growth. It’s a virtue in and of itself, independent of anything else.

For that reason, from time to time, other countries have adopted the American dollar as their currency, or pegged their currency to it. This was thought to anchor monetary policy, even though there was no political union or coordinated fiscal policy with the United States.

That, of course, was when American central bankers were considered sober fellows, not given to grand monetary experiments, such as offering back-door financing for sovereign debt. Those were the days.

Monetary union does take away the option of temporarily masking the effects of profligate fiscal policy through devaluation. That, however, should also be considered a virtue, an enforcement of necessary and beneficial discipline.

That’s the best explanation for what’s happening in Europe. Despite monetary easing, monetary union is exposing unsustainable fiscal and economic policies in many countries.

There are bigger basket cases than France. But France stands exposed.

The governmental overhead in France is greater, as a percentage of GDP, than in any other developed country.

The unemployment rate in France is 10 percent. And that’s considered good news. Inflexible labor markets are locking out young workers.

The European savior candidate, Emmanuel Macron, is not indifferent to all this. He proposes to cut government overhead by reducing the workforce through attrition, a corporate income-tax cut and some ability to negotiate more flexible labor conditions at the company level.

But he also sees redemption in what is called “ever-closer union” in Europe. That’s an indirect way of saying that frugal German taxpayers should guarantee the shaky sovereign debt of countries such as Italy.

This flows from the faulty diagnosis, completing the monetary union with greater political integration and coordinated fiscal policies.

Germany is deeply dedicated to the European-integration enterprise. It wants to see greater political integration and coordinated fiscal policies. Nowhere was Macron emerging from the primary greeted with greater relief.

Germany, however, will never agree to guarantee the debt of other countries. Nor should it. Germany implemented somewhat painful labor-market reforms, its national government has a balanced budget, and its sovereign debt isn’t more than its private sector economy can support. Why should its taxpayers guarantee the borrowing of countries that balk at doing the same?

But without Germans agreeing to guarantee the debt of other countries, other countries aren’t going to give up sovereignty over fiscal policy and adopt the discipline Germany wants to achieve through ever closer union. The European-integration enterprise has reached an impasse.

What European countries need isn’t more Europe. It’s more-flexible domestic labor markets and smaller governments. Ever-closer union won’t deliver that. That will only be accomplished, if it is to be, through the development of a political consensus at a national level.

National identity remains strong in Europe. Even if France dodges the Le Pen bullet this election, a revival of national sovereignty that claws back powers from central control by the European Union seems ineluctable, in France and elsewhere.

If supporters of the European-integration enterprise want to retain its most valuable features — a common currency and a free-trade zone — they probably need to quit pushing for more.