A war would be suicidal for Iran

Editor: Chuck Blanchard, formerly a Phoenix attorney who now works for the international law firm Arnold & Porter, served for many years in high-level legal jobs with the Clinton and Obama administrations. He recently shared his thoughts on the implications of last week’s American attack and killing of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassim Soleimani. We share those thoughts with our readers today.

First, don't get caught up in the breathless arguments that this attack was illegal. These arguments are, by and large, being made by legal academics who are applying a view of the law quite different than the United States has long asserted in both Democratic and Republican administrations.

The Obama administration relied on pure Article II authority without Congressional authorization for military action in Libya, and I think the same principles would apply here as well.

If this becomes a sustained military action, the War Powers Act comes into play, but that is not yet the case. Similarly, the United States has long asserted a view of international law that the Trump administration could easily apply here — we have asserted a loose definition of "imminent" and have also argued that we can violate the sovereignty of a third country when that country is unable or unwilling to address the threat.

We used that justification during the Obama administration for a host of military strikes against targets around the world. While I was not a participant in any analysis of proposed attacks on Soleimani during the Obama administration, I doubt that the lawyers would have raised concern if such an attack had occurred during the Obama administration.

The specific facts, not fully known, will obviously determine the lawfulness of this action, but under the legal principles consistently adopted by the United States in the past, I doubt that an argument among lawyers will be fruitful. This is particularly the case since I have little doubt that planning attacks on U.S. interests was something that Soleimani did every day.

Second, don't get too concerned that this is the beginning of a U.S.-Iran War. The military capabilities of the two countries is such that any true conventional war between the countries would result in the Iranians being soundly defeated.

Rest assured, this would be a costly war for the United States, and the aftermath would make the Iraq War look like a cakewalk, but it would be suicidal for the current Iranian regime. That regime is not suicidal.

What we should expect instead is more indirect actions short of full military conflict. I would not be surprised to see Iran use its fairly advanced cyber capabilities.

I would also not be surprised to see a sharp rise in terrorist attacks on the interests of the United States and our allies in the region — including attacks on US embassies and military bases, attacks on Saudi oil facilities, mischief in the Persian Gulf, etc.

In each case, Iran will do what it always tries to do — use proxies so that the attacks are not directly from Iran, making a U.S. response challenging.

Third, the real danger here is that we may be in the early stages of a cycle of attack/reprisal between the United States and Iran that will at a minimum be greatly destabilizing in the region, and that at its worst could lead to a real war if the parties miscalculate.

Moreover, the attack may already have caused grave geopolitical harm to the United States. The threat of Iranian strikes may result in us having to consolidate military forces fighting ISIS (now spread out in very small, but now vulnerable units), making them less effective.

Indeed, the United States announced Sunday that it had ceased military operations against ISIS to focus on the Iranian threat. And the Iraq Parliament voted to have us remove our forces from Iraq. While nonbinding, it may be the beginning of the end of our presence in Iraq.

At the very least, this is a deeply disruptive event at the worst possible time for Iraq. The Iraq prime minister just resigned and politics in that country are very unstable. None of us can predict the future, but it doesn't look very promising.

Fourth, while this action may very well have been legal under the legal principles used even in the Obama administration, I fear the decision to strike falls squarely in the category of "legal, but stupid."

As my former Pentagon colleague Elissa Slotkin has noted, both the Bush and Obama administrations did careful reviews of the strategic wisdom of an attack on Soleimani. As she notes "What always kept both Democratic and Republican presidents from targeting Soleimani himself was the simple question: Was the strike worth the likely retaliation, and the potential to pull us into protracted conflict?"

In both previous administrations, the decision was made that the downsides were not worth what would be achieved. It appears the Trump administration made the decision to do the attack very quickly. I fear that they did not do the careful analysis of the strategic risks and benefits of the action.

Finally, I think it important to put this attack in the larger historic context. The root of where we are now is because of two past mistakes.

First, there can be no doubt that the true victor in the Iraq War was Iran. Iran's influence in the region was greatly enhanced by the resulting chaos in Iraq and the larger region.

Second, the decision to impose "maximum" pressure on Iran by the current administration has resulted in greatly increased Iranian mischief. Simply put, the sanctions have pushed Iran to the wall, and they are fighting back. If there was a strategy to maximum pressure, with clearly defined goals as as a negotiated settlement, I don't see it.

It may well be the case that my concerns are misplaced. For the sake of the U.S. interests, I hope I am wrong. But at the moment, I fear that this is yet one more strategic miscalculation that will cost us both lives and treasure.

Charles A. Blanchard is a partner with the international law firm Arnold & Porter. He previously served as general counsel of both the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army. He served as associate independent counsel with the U.S. Office of the Independent Counsel and formerly was a partner with the Phoenix law firm Brown and Bain. In 1997, he became chief of legal counsel for the Office of National Drug Control Policy.