The Arizona Republic

A reluctant no on impeachmen­t

- Robert Robb Reach Robb at robert.robb@arizona republic.com.

On Tuesday, U.S. Sen. Rand Paul tried to put an end to the impeachmen­t trial of Donald Trump by finding it unconstitu­tional, since Trump no longer holds office.

Arizona’s two senators, Kyrsten Sinema and Mark Kelly, voted to continue with the trial, as did all other Democratic members. Only five Republican­s joined them. The rest of the Republican members, 45 in number, agreed that proceeding with the trial was unconstitu­tional.

The reluctant view here is that Paul was correct. Impeachmen­t only applies to current officehold­ers subject to removal. Convicting Trump, and barring him from running again, isn’t in keeping with the constituti­onal order.

This is not to say that Trump didn’t commit an impeachabl­e offense, although the article approved by the House fails to properly delineate it.

The best insight into what the framers intended as impeachabl­e misconduct is found in what Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 65: Impeachabl­e offenses are those which proceed “from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominate­d political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediatel­y to the society itself.”

Trump lost the 2020 presidenti­al election. Rather than accept that, he plotted to overturn the democratic result by getting state legislatur­es controlled by Republican­s, such as Arizona’s, to designate Trump electors rather than the Biden ones chosen by voters.

This was a grave abuse and violation of the public trust. That – not the sketchy charge of inciting the violent storming of the Capitol – was Trump’s impeachabl­e offense. Moreover, plotting to cling to power despite losing an election fully warrants banning Trump from ever holding office again. Trump has proven himself a threat to American democracy.

Now, I know that there are legal scholars who contend that someone who has vacated public office can neverthele­ss be impeached, convicted and banned from future office. I would prefer to be so persuaded. But I don’t think that is the conclusion that best fits what the Constituti­on actually says.

Article II, which sets forth the powers and duties of the executive, says that the president “shall be removed from office on impeachmen­t for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeano­rs.” In other words, impeachmen­t is for removal from office.

Article I, which covers the legislativ­e branch, says that: “Judgment in cases of impeachmen­t shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualifi­cation to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit under the United States.” It is a strained reading of that section to contend that disqualifi­cation can be considered other than in the context of a removal action.

The primary precedent cited for conviction and disqualifi­cation independen­t of removal doesn’t really make the case. In 1876, the Senate proceeded with a trial for impeachmen­t of War Secretary William Belknap, even though he had resigned. A constituti­onal challenge was also made in that case. The vote to proceed was very narrow, 37 to 29. Belknap was acquitted.

Many senators who voted to acquit said they did so not because they thought him innocent, but because they regarded the proceeding as unconstitu­tional. So, although the vote to hold a trial without removal being the primary issue narrowly prevailed, the view that such a trial was unconstitu­tional actually determined the outcome.

The same is the inevitable conclusion of this Senate impeachmen­t trial.

The arguments that trial and conviction other than in the context of removal can set norms and discourage misconduct in an officehold­er’s waning days have merit. But they are extraconst­itutional, not rooted in the document’s actual language. The best reading of that language is that impeachmen­t was intended for removal. And that the further sanction of a ban on future office was something to be considered in addition to removal, not independen­tly from it.

That leaves an unsatisfac­tory feeling that Trump is getting away with it. And, since he would be free to run again, in a sense he is.

There is an apt metaphor for how this process neverthele­ss offends constituti­onal sensibilit­ies.

In an impeachmen­t trial of a president, the Constituti­on specifies that the chief justice of the Supreme Court shall preside. Substantiv­ely and symbolical­ly, that guards the process against runaway political passions or calculatio­n. In No. 65, Hamilton noted the value of the chief justice serving in this role.

But Chief Justice John Roberts isn’t going to preside over this trial. That’s because Trump no longer is president.

Instead, the presiding officer will be Sen. Patrick Leahy, as hard-bitten a partisan as there is in Washington.

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