How Taliban rule will affect an entire region
Following the sudden collapse of Afghan forces, the Taliban’s easy takeover of Kabul, Ashraf Ghani’s hasty departure, a terrorist attack at the Kabul airport, the race to evacuate, and the deadline for all U.S. forces to leave by the month’s end, the blame game goes on in Washington.
The Taliban are busy negotiating with several parties, including former Prime Minister Hamid Karzai, and with the reported help of Pakistan and Russia, they are trying to form what they call an inclusive government. Unlike the hard-nosed extremist regime of the 1990s, they are projecting an image of moderation, which is met with widespread skepticism.
As the U.S. ponders the lessons learned, two critical questions are: will the Taliban keep its word, having agreed to cut ties with al-qaeda as part of its accord with the U.S. in February 2020, or will the Taliban regime once again provide safe haven to terrorists and export transnational extremism? And, what are the implications of this turn of events for Afghanistan’s neighbors and for regional security?
Consider the facts: the Taliban are already revising their agreement, as spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid has reportedly said that “nowhere in the agreement has it been mentioned that we have or don’t have ties with anyone . . . . What has been agreed upon is that no threat should be posed from Afghan soil to the U.S. and its allies.”
Currently, al-qaeda and its affiliates are active, not only in the Indian subcontinent — India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh — but also in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Maldives. And another extremist actor, the Islamic State, has targeted the South Asian region for intensifying its activities, especially with Indian Muslims.
India is concerned that terrorist groups such as Lashkar-etaiba and Jaish e-mohammed may again carry out terrorist activities from Afghanistan, as they did in the 1990s, where they trained and recruited for terrorist operations in Kashmir. Last Wednesday, while chairing a meeting of the U.N. Security Council, India voiced its concern, saying that Pakistan-based terrorist groups should not be allowed to use Afghan territory to target any country.
Countries in the region consider stability in Afghanistan as a prerequisite to meet their concerns about terrorism, refugees, and regional security. Pakistan and Iran, which already have the bulk of Afghan refugees, have taken measures to prevent the further influx. Russia is concerned with the spillover of extremism in Central Asia, while China is concerned about Xinjiang with its restive Uighur Muslims. China and Russia have kept their embassies in Kabul open, but others have mostly withdrawn their personnel. None is eager immediately to recognize the new regime.
India, which never had any military presence in Afghanistan, and was friendly with both Karzai and Ghani, had used its soft power to win over the Afghan people by investing heavily in development projects — roads, dams, libraries, the parliament building that Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated in Kabul, and scholarships to students to study in India, at the cost of over $3 billion, not a paltry sum for India. The Taliban victory is a strategic setback, and India was late in opening channels of communication with the Taliban.
For Pakistan, the Taliban victory was seen as its own victory and India’s defeat, as credit for the Taliban’s survival goes to Pakistan, which welcomed the fleeing Taliban with open arms after the U.S. invasion in 2001. China, too, is eager to extend its influence in Afghanistan, given its economic capacity and willingness to provide aid.
It is too early to know whether the Taliban will continue to host terrorist groups and how harsh or moderate they will be as they impose Sharia rule.