The Guardian view on Kherson: the cost of war in Ukraine
Russia took the city of Kherson, in southern Ukraine, little more than a week after launching its invasion on 24 February. It was the first major city to fall to Vladimir Putin’s forces, and remains the only regional capital to have done so. With the failure of the Russian plan for a lightning victory increasingly evident, and humiliating, the city’s capture was important for Moscow for symbolic as well as strategic reasons. Many of its 280,000 inhabitants remained not only angry but defiant, mounting protests in its centre. But the gruelling impact of Russian occupation has taken its toll. The protests were suppressed by troops. The crackdown on dissent has been ruthless and thorough. A Russian curriculum has been imposed in schools.
So Monday’s declaration by a Ukrainian military official that a long-anticipated southern counterattack had begun was a striking moment six months into this war. Ukraine’s southern command declared that Russia had suffered heavy losses of personnel and equipment (while Russia’s defence ministry claimed that it had inflicted severe losses on the Ukrainians). Oleksiy Arestovych, an adviser to President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, claimed that troops had broken through Russian defences in several areas near Kherson – yet was also keen to manage expectations, portraying a “slow operation to grind the enemy”.
The extent of the pushback is far from clear. One Ukrainian official described “normal operations”, and some fighters have suggested that the attacks fall short of a full counteroffensive. Partisan attacks were already occurring. Despite the flow of arms from the US especially, Ukraine remains very short of weapons and personnel to attempt a major assault. Some wondered if trailing a counteroffensive so heavily in advance was designed to try to distract Russia from the east, where it has been advancing, albeit slowly. The US military said on Monday that there was an uptick in fighting around Kherson, but could not confirm whether an offensive had begun.
The former head of MI6 Sir Alex Younger spoke not in military terms but of a “key psychological moment” when interviewed by the BBC, and talked not about place but time. Russian occupation is having an incremental effect not only on the wellbeing of civilians, but also on the city’s status. The Kremlin plans a referendum to create the pretext for bringing the region into Russia, despite minimal enthusiasm; Ukraine may hope to postpone the vote. In logistical terms, bitter winter conditions are also likely to entrench
the military stalemate.
But Sir Alex was pointing to Kyiv’s need to show that it can do more than resist the Russian advance; it can seize the initiative – thus shoring up the morale of its own population, as it faces a grim winter, and maintaining the support of western leaders, whose own voters are struggling with soaring energy costs. As he discussed the development, EU defence ministers meeting in Prague were expected to approve plans for a training facility for Ukrainian troops, but finance ministers remained divided over hitting Russia further.
Meanwhile, the humanitarian crisis is growing. Unable to make swift military progress, Russia may have shifted focus towards formalising annexation and to economic punishment. Kyiv fears Russia could target its energy grid and turn off the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station. Some think that as many as 2 million Ukrainians could cross into Poland this winter. As hazy as the military situation remains, its brutal impact on civilians could not be clearer.