The perplexing aftermath of the Wagner mutiny shows Putin is more vulnerable than ever
In late June, thousands of Wagner group paramilitary forces launched a mutiny in Russia. It seemed to constitute a significant challenge to Putin – the first from within his own country since the invasion – and yet it was over within 48 hours. What can its aftermath tell us about Putin’s position? And does the group still pose a threat?
The mutiny began after the country’s defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, ordered the mercenary soldiers to sign new contracts directly with his ministry. Yevgeny Prigozhin, the mutiny’s leader and Wagner’s longtime contractor and fixer, called for the ousting of both Shoigu and the chief of the general staff, Valery Gerasimov. A vociferous critic of how the war in Ukraine was being waged, Prigozhin also said that Vladimir Putin’s justifications for invading Ukraine were falsehoods.
Wagner occupied Russia’s war headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, and sent a vehicle convoy to within 125 miles (200km) of Moscow. Wagner forces shot down six helicopters and an aeroplane, killing 13 Russian military pilots, and severely damaged buildings, roads and an oil refinery.
In the wake of these incidents, President Putin seems neither to have disbanded the Wagner group nor to have got rid of Prigozhin, although authorities did confiscate the mutineers’ heavy weapons. Several thousand Wagner forces have instead congregated in neighbouring Belarus, fulfilling the mutiny-ending deal negotiated by the Belarusian president, Alexander Lukashenko. Meanwhile, Shoigu and Gerasimov remain in office.
The situation is fluid, and many reports and images emerging from Russia cannot be verified. It is therefore impossible to make predictions with any degree of confidence. But these events may sap Russian military morale in Ukraine, while causing powerful members of Putin’s inner circle to doubt the president’s authority and competence.
Putin initially stated that the mutiny’s perpetrators were treasonous, criminal terrorists who would be “brought to account”. Yet weeks later Prigozhin was shown at the Belarusian camp exhorting Wagner forces to prepare for future African deployments. Russian state television broadcast an embarrassing security service raid on Prigozhin’s St Petersburg properties, with commentators again calling him a traitor and criminal. Yet authorities returned almost £85m to him through his driver, according to Fontanka, an online St Petersburg newspaper. The Kremlin shuttered Prigozhin’s media empire, but Russian social media accounts linked to him are still functioning. Last week those accounts showed Prigozhin hobnobbing with diplomats on the sidelines of Russia’s Africa summit in St Petersburg, and aired his offer to help support the coup in Niger.
The Wagner group is a lowcost lever for Russian influence in Africa. Prigozhin’s contracts with foreign leaders probably make Wagner’s actions there self-financing. Wagner’s willingness to fight in Africa allows Russia to avoid having its regular troops suffer casualties that might anger the Russian public. Wagner forces prop up dictators and warlords in Central African Republic (CAR), Mali and Libya who now depend on Moscow for their survival. In Sudan and CAR, Wagner also oversees gold mining and smuggling operations that help the Kremlin evade western sanctions. Wagner’s African presence may become even more important for Russia now, as Moscow’s other geopolitical tools on the continent dwindle. Many African leaders stayed away from Putin’s Africa summit last week, as fears grow that African food security will be endangered by Putin’s exit from the grain deal that allowed Ukrainian exports through the Black Sea.
It is not yet clear how official Russian military forces will ultimately react to Putin’s decisions. The situation is complicated because at least some high-level officers may have supported the mutiny. Aerospace commander Gen Sergei Surovikin, who formerly commanded Russian operations in Syria and Ukraine and is highly regarded within the Russian military, seems to have taken the fall for Prigozhin. Surovikin was detained in early July and has not been seen since. Prigozhin had earlier called him the go-between in his longstanding legal and resource battles with the defence ministry, and western intelligence officials believe Surovikin knew of the mutiny in advance.
Meanwhile, Prigozhin appears largely unscathed, despite his challenges to the regime and the death and destruction his actions caused. Instead he seems to have reached a profitable modus vivendi with Putin. This must leave Russian officers and soldiers confused at best, and perhaps doubting the worth and purpose of the sacrifices they have made in Ukraine, if a traitor who called Putin’s war justification a lie retains Putin’s favour.
Regardless, none of this is likely to spark either a popular revolution or a real coup attempt in Russia. Putin has always been surrounded by an armed presidential regiment, and now hundreds of thousands of personnel in Russia’s national guard, who report directly to Putin and are responsible for domestic security, are receiving heavy weapons. The Kremlin has also cracked down even further on dissent, arresting two prominent pro-war nationalists who have criticised Putin’s handling of the invasion.
But Putin’s dithering and backtracking, both during the mutiny and afterwards, must be giving his inner circle pause. Western intelligence officials revealed that Putin knew about the mutiny in advance, yet did nothing to stop it. Now he seems to have done little to punish it. One factor that has long kept members of the Russian elite from challenging Putin – their belief in his invincibility – is now suspect.
The fortunes of the elite remain tied to Putin and his networks. There is no obvious contender to replace him, and Russia’s domestic intelligence services are all-intrusive. Those risks mean that it would take a very big loss indeed in their confidence in Putin for any elite cabal to consider deposing him.
Yet the president is more vulnerable now than he has ever been, especially amid the bleak outlook for Russia’s costly and grinding war in Ukraine. Both the US president, Joe Biden, and CIA chief, William Burns, suggest that Prigozhin should watch his back, since Putin’s vindictiveness often leads him to take revenge long after a perceived betrayal. Now Putin may be watching his own back, too.
• Kimberly Marten is a professor of political science at Barnard College, Columbia University