The Guardian view on China and Ukraine: beware great expectations
Straddles are, by their nature, uncomfortable positions to maintain. So it isn’t surprising that China’s attempt to hold together conflicting interests on the war in Ukraine – maintaining its “no limits” partnership with Russia, without damaging its relationship with western nations and its tarnished global brand too greatly – has proved awkward.
Attention increased when its special envoy for Eurasian affairs, Li Hui, joined talks in Jeddah last weekend, having avoided similar talks in Copenhagen earlier this summer. European officials described China’s involvement as “active” and said that it “appeared constructive”. The verb may be as important as the adjective: China is manoeuvring around the conflict, not fundamentally repositioning itself.
Xi Jinping finally held a phone call with Volodymyr Zelenskiy in April – but only after a senior diplomat caused outrage by questioning the sovereignty of former Soviet republics. The Jeddah talks were immediately followed by reassurance to Moscow that nothing had changed.
Many in China view the invasion not in moral terms, but more cynically, especially given their suspicion of the US and, by extension, Nato. But the conflict has usefully diverted US energy from tackling the tense bilateral relationship. It has made Moscow more reliant on Beijing – and more clearly subordinate. China also perceives that Russia is not looking for a swift exit, but bedding itself in for a long war, not least because a second term for Donald Trump would dramatically improve its position, and Ukraine’s counteroffensive is not making the headway that
many hoped for. That allows Beijing to monitor both a modern war and western responses to it – information that would be helpful were it to move against Taiwan.
The head of MI6, Richard Moore, said last month that Beijing was “absolutely complicit” on Ukraine, supporting Moscow diplomatically and pushing Russian talking points. China has not criticised the invasion – or even acknowledged it as such – but attacks “unilateral sanctions”. It has thrown Russia an economic lifeline. Chinese firms are providing equipment that is useful to the military as well as civilians, such as body armour and drones.
But China has not supplied arms and does not want the conflict to escalate, or to spill over into the broader region. Nor does it want to see further consolidation of the west, for both security and economic reasons. It knows that its partnership with Russia has hardened European attitudes towards it. The Wagner mutiny will also have given it pause for thought. And it wants to be regarded, especially by representatives of the global south such as those present in Jeddah, as a peacemaker standing above the fray.
Its expressions of concern about the use of nuclear weapons look like hints to the west as well as warnings to Moscow: don’t push Vladimir Putin too far. Nonetheless, if they have any effect in restraining Russia, that can only be welcome. China, the biggest importer of Ukrainian grain, also has entirely pragmatic reasons for encouraging Russia to return to the Black Sea grain deal. It has highlighted the need to address the safety of nuclear power plants. And some hope it could play a useful, if marginal, role in negotiations eventually. The most important question, however, may still be what it does not do: whether it holds back from increasing support for Russia. That is why Kyiv is stepping carefully itself, as it seeks to avoid antagonising Beijing.