U.S. has long history of misjudging North Korea
North Korea has befuddled the United States and its Asian allies ever since North Korean leader Kim Il Sung launched the invasion of South Korea in June 1950.
Prior to the attack, the United States had sent inadvertent signals that it likely would not protect South Korea in the event of an unexpected invasion from the north. Not surprisingly, a war soon followed.
Gen. Douglas MacArthur chased the communists back north of the 38 parallel. In hot pursuit, MacArthur sought to conquer all of North Korea and unite the peninsula.
As MacArthur barreled northward to the Chinese border during the fall of 1950, the landscaped widened. American supply lines lengthened. MacArthur’s forces thinned. The weather worsened. The days shortened.
Conventional wisdom had been that the Chinese would not invade, given America’s near nuclear monopoly and likely air superiority. But in November 1950, nearly a million-man Chinese army poured southward into the Korean peninsula. In January 1951, the communists retook Seoul after forcing the longest American military retreat in U.S. history.
The U.S. regrouped. In early 1951, Western troops retook Seoul and drove communist forces back across the 38th parallel but chose not to reinvade the north and re- unite the country.
What followed the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War was a tense Cold War standoff between two antithetical Korean countries for the next 65 years.
In 1994, the Clinton administration gave massive aid to North Korea. In exchange, North Korea promised to cease its ongoing nuclear proliferation. Predictably, North Korean leadership lied. It eagerly took the aid only to further fast-track its nuclear weapons program.
In 2003, America and its allies once more provided aid and promised not to attack the Kim Jong Il regime. In exchange, Pyongyang agreed in writing to dismantle “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.”
Once more, North Korea interpreted American concessions as weakness to be exploited rather than magnanimity to be reciprocated, and in 2006 North Korea detonated a nuclear device.
Obama gave aid to North Korea while pleading that it change its behavior and denucle- arize, misjudging North Korea as every other president had since the end of the Korean War. North Korea only further expanded its nuclear arsenal. Pyongyang always figured it could feign one of its “crazy” moods and then play on Western empathy for more money, all while China smiled and claimed ignorance.
Soon after Donald Trump was elected, North Korea announced that it now had nuclear weaponry to take out cities on America’s West Coast. But this time around, the U.S. did not offer bribes. Instead, it issued its own threats. Trump himself assumed the unhinged role the Kims usually played, denigrating Kim Jong Un as “Little Rocket Man” and “short and fat.”
But the Trump administration also lined up an international boycott of North Korea. Now, Kim Jong Un suddenly wants to talk. A collapsing North Korea once again claims it will denuclearize.
But what have we learned in the past 65 years? North Korea’s cunning usually trumps America’s ideals of fair play. Empty threats and aid make things worse. What should Trump do?
Ratchet up the embargo of North Korea. Do not give it any aid — no matter the pleas and threats. Put more pressure on China. Do not barter with Pyongyang until it is proven that it has no more nukes.
What have we learned in thepast 65 years? North Korea’s cunning usually trumps America’s ideals of fair play. Empty threats and aid make things worse.