Former CIA analyst offers insights on secrets, secrecy

The criminal culpability of Donald Trump and the sloppiness of the staffs of both Joe Biden and Mike Pence have combined to create a crisis over the handling of classified materials. The former involved Trump's intentionally keeping large amounts of classified material at Mar-a-Lago; the latter led to small amounts of intelligence at Biden's former office and his home, as well as in Pence's home. Since I held high-level security clearances for more than four decades, I have something to offer on the issue of secrets and secrecy.

First, there is a simple fix to the problem of presidents and vice presidents being responsible for the closing of their White House offices and the boxing of sensitive materials. The closing down of these offices and the sorting of materials should be done by qualified members of the General Services Administration or, better yet, the National Archives and Records Administration.

Second, the government's classification system terms items marked “confidential” as liable to cause “damage to the national security”; “secret” as running the risk of “serious damage”; and “top secret” causing “exceptionally grave damage” to national security. I never read a “confidential” or “secret” document that could cause serious damage to national security, and even in the case of “top secret” the notion of “exceptionally grave damage” is hyped to the point of uselessness. In the case of the documents found in Biden's former office, these probably date from his term as vice president, and their shelf life from seven to 15 years ago probably renders them limited in value.

An easy solution would be to drop the terms “confidential” and “secret” or at least automatically declassify these items after five years.

Third, there is a serious amount of classified material that conveys false intelligence. For example, the Reagan administration conducted the largest peacetime weapons spending spree in the 1980s. This defense spending was based on politicized intelligence from CIA director William Casey and the deputy director for intelligence Robert Gates. In actual fact, the Soviet Union was in decline, and its economy was a sorry state that Casey and Gates concealed from the White House and the Congress. The military buildup in the 1980s was unneeded.

Finally, we need to recognize that a great deal of classification of political materials is designed to prevent embarrassing the individuals or institutions. The Pentagon Papers is an excellent example of a document that presented no threat to national security, but did provide an understanding of the lies made to the American public to defend the use of force in Vietnam that cost 56,000 American lives as well as countless Vietnamese civilians.

Our Cold War culture of secrecy must be addressed. The loss of blood and treasure in two decades of fighting unnecessary wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were fueled to a great extent by phony intelligence in the case of Iraq and a disdain for history's lessons in the case of Afghanistan. A policy of complete openness in most areas of information would lead to a more useful debate of national security issues and perhaps sounder policy choices.